United States v. Eastman , 140 F. App'x 786 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 27, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-1508
(D. Ct. No. 03-CR-184-N)
DONOVAN EASTMAN, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, and HARTZ, Circuit
Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Donovan Eastman pleaded guilty to possession of a
firearm by a previously convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2), and possession of counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 472. Two months later, Mr. Eastman filed a pro se document requesting
withdrawal of the guilty plea. The District Court denied his request, and Mr.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Eastman timely appeals. We take jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Eastman was arrested on January 15, 2002, pursuant to a warrant issued
by the Larimer County District Court in Colorado. During the course of the
arrest, officers from the Denver Police Department obtained a search warrant and
seized five firearms in Mr. Eastman’s possession, along with counterfeit federal
reserve notes amounting to approximately $19,000.
In August of 2004, Mr. Eastman pleaded guilty to Counts Three and Four of
a federal indictment, as specified in the plea agreement: possession of a firearm
by a previously convicted felon, and possession of counterfeit Federal Reserve
Notes. At the plea hearing, Mr. Eastman responded positively to the court’s
inquiry about the voluntariness of his plea. Although Mr. Eastman did state that
he had not eaten for two days and that he was on a medicine called Seroquel,
which he identified as an antipsychotic that a psychiatrist had prescribed a couple
of years before, he confirmed that these did not affect his awareness of the
proceedings. The court accepted his guilty plea.
On October 27, two months after the plea hearing and three weeks before
sentencing, Mr. Eastman filed a pro se request—despite the fact that he was
represented by counsel—to withdraw his guilty plea. During the court’s hearing
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on the motion to withdraw the plea, Mr. Eastman’s concerns focused on
ineffective assistance of counsel and his physical and mental condition at the time
of the plea. Mr. Eastman also discussed the government’s loss or destruction of
the firearms that had been seized, which he advanced as a part of a number of
arguments, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court ruled
that the plea was knowing and voluntary, that Mr. Eastman had been represented
by competent counsel at all stages of the proceedings, and that the destruction of
evidence did not provide a fair and just reason to withdraw.
On appeal, Mr. Eastman argues that the District Court erred by denying his
request to withdraw. In support of his argument, Mr. Eastman contends that there
are three factors that mandate reversal of the District Court: (1) his diminished
capacity at the time of the plea, as influenced by his medication and a lack of
food, (2) his disagreements with his attorney, and (3) his desire to go to trial to
exploit the government’s destruction of relevant evidence.
II. DISCUSSION
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B), a defendant may withdraw a plea of
guilty prior to sentencing if he can demonstrate a “fair and just reason” for doing
so. This Court considers seven factors influential to its consideration of whether
a defendant has stated a fair and just reason:
(1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether
withdrawal would prejudice the government; (3) whether the defendant
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delayed in filing his motion, and if so, the reason for the delay; (4) whether
withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close
assistance of counsel was available to the defendant; (6) whether the plea
was knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would waste
judicial resources.
United States v. Sandoval, 390 F.3d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir. 2004). This Court
reviews the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Jones, 168 F.33d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999).
We first address Mr. Eastman’s claims related to the voluntariness of his
plea. To begin, we note that Mr. Eastman has offered no evidence other than his
own statements that he was “over medicated and not in good shape at the time of
plea” as proof that the plea was made involuntarily or unknowingly. This Court,
however, has held that conclusory statements made by a defendant are, “absent
any other evidence, insufficient to show that his plea was involuntary.” United
States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 758, n.2 (7th Cir. 1993). Indeed, in another case in which
the defendant disclosed his use of prescription drugs at the plea hearing but later
claimed he had been unable to understand “in depth” what was going on, this
Court rejected the defendant’s arguments on the basis that he failed to support
them with anything besides his own statements. Kramer, 168 F.3d at 1200(holding that the defendant failed to support his statements with actual evidence
“such as medical records or narcotic drug prescriptions or doctors’ affidavits”).
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As such, there is no indication that Mr. Eastman’s plea was involuntary.
Second, we point out that the evidence indicating the plea was voluntary is
well-documented and substantial. In an extended colloquy with the District Court
Judge, Mr. Eastman confirmed that the lack of food was not affecting his decision
to plead guilty, that the medicine did not interfere with his ability to understand
the proceedings, that he was alert, and that he had taken his last dose of medicine
some time ago and that its effects were beginning to wear off.
We next address Mr. Eastman’s claims with respect to his “disagreement
with counsel”; or, as advanced in District Court proceedings, his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Contrary to Mr. Eastman’s contention that
actions by his counsel provide him with a basis to withdraw his guilty plea, the
record provides ample indication that the plea was entered with close assistance
of counsel: Mr. Eastman’s attorney was present at the plea hearing, and both Mr.
Eastman and his attorney confirmed that they had discussed the elements of the
plea agreement. Mr. Eastman also confirmed that he and his attorney had
discussed all relevant elements of his case, including the plea bargain, his right to
trial, and the nature and elements of the crimes included in the agreement.
Indeed, Mr. Eastman cites no specific errors by his attorney, referring only
to a “disagreement with counsel.” This “disagreement,” from our review of the
record, stems from Mr. Eastman’s allegation during the District Court hearing that
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his counsel had failed to file a motion to examine the evidence. The District
Court, however, identified this claim as false, and Mr. Eastman—both below and
on appeal—names no additional motions his counsel should have filed. In the
same hearing, Mr. Eastman also alleged that his attorney failed to return a number
of phone calls, but he did not explain the significance of that alleged failure. As
such, Mr. Eastman’s disagreement with, or dislike of, his attorney does not
provide a basis for him to withdraw his plea of guilty.
We next address Mr. Eastman’s concern about the destruction of evidence,
which he offers on appeal as equivalent to an assertion of innocence. In essence,
he argues that he would have had a greater hope for acquittal if he had presented
evidence of the government’s destruction of the firearms at trial. This Court
follows the D.C. Circuit in concluding that “bare hope for acquittal is not a
‘legally cognizable defense’ and therefore is not an effective claim of legal
innocence.” United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The
destruction of evidence in this case is not offered as part of any “legally
cognizable defense.” Mr. Eastman made no direct assertion of innocence in
District Court and does not do so here. As such, Mr. Eastman’s statements on
appeal do not constitute an assertion of innocence.
Finally, we note the existence of significant factors that advise against the
withdrawal of the guilty plea. The District Court addressed two countervailing
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Sandoval factors—whether the court will be inconvenienced if the motion is
granted, and whether a waste of judicial resources would result if the motion is
granted—as follows:
This case had been pending now for approximately two and a half years, an
astonishing period of time for a simple, straightforward criminal case.
Most of the delay in the case has been occasioned by the defendant’s
frequent quarrels with his court-appointed attorneys and by his inability to
proceed without an attorney. . . .
For those reasons, the Court finds that it would be a waste of judicial
resources to allow the withdrawal of the plea. If I allowed withdrawal of
the plea, there would be more delay. The case would at best go to a jury
trial, and the defendant, the Court is confident, would be found guilty. We
would be months, if not years down the road with the same result, and we
would be sitting here in the same situation, with one difference.
Undoubtedly the Government would be saying, with some support in the
law, that the defendant doesn’t get a 3-point downward adjustment for
accepting responsibility.
Mr. Eastman appears to dispute the District Court’s evaluation of
inconvenience by citing his alleged arrangements for a new attorney, but his
arguments do not displace the District Court’s point about the inutility of
withdrawal and the waste of judicial resources in the present case.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court acted well within
its discretion in denying Mr. Eastman’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and
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accordingly AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Chief Circuit Judge
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