United States v. Johnson , 168 F. App'x 294 ( 2006 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
February 24, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-7049
RICHARD ALLEN JOHNSON, (D.C. No. CR-03-60-WH)
(E. D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-7050
ANTHONY ALLEN PERKINS, (D.C. No. CR-03-60-WH)
(E. D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-7054
JIMMIE ALLEN PERKINS, (D.C. No. CR-03-60-WH)
(E. D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
Defendants Richard Johnson, Jimmie Perkins, and Anthony Perkins were
convicted of various criminal counts arising out of an armed bank robbery and sentenced
to lengthy terms of imprisonment. Defendant Johnson now appeals his convictions and
sentence. Jimmie and Anthony Perkins appeal only their sentences. Exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm defendant Johnson’s convictions but
remand his case to the district court for resentencing. We likewise remand defendant
Jimmie Perkins’ case to the district court for resentencing. We affirm defendant Anthony
Perkins’ sentence.
I.
On the afternoon of March 31, 2003, two men wearing camouflage clothing and
masks broke into the home of Lowell and Ima Jean Moore located outside of Keota,
Oklahoma. When Mr. Moore, who was disabled, returned home from fishing, he was
confronted by the men and ordered, at gunpoint, to comply with their demands. Mrs.
Moore, who worked at the Keota branch of the First National Bank of Stigler (hereinafter
the Keota branch bank), received similar treatment when she returned home that
afternoon from work. The masked men proceeded to question the Moores about the
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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Keota branch bank and indicated that they intended to rob it, threatened to kill the Moores
if they did not cooperate, threatened to rape Mrs. Moore, and at one point took steps
towards actually raping Mrs. Moore (i.e., ordering her to remove her pants and then
unbuttoning and unzipping her pants when she refused to cooperate). At approximately
9:30 p.m. that evening, a third man wearing camouflage clothing and a mask arrived at
the Moores’ house, stayed for approximately forty-five minutes to an hour, and then left
with firearms taken from the bedroom of Mrs. Moore’s son. After the third man left the
house, the remaining two masked men escorted the Moores to their bedroom and told
them they could lay down.
At approximately 4:00 a.m. the next morning, the masked men ordered the Moores
out of bed and escorted them outside and into a white van owned by the Moores. The
masked men drove the Moores approximately two miles from their home, blindfolded
them, and proceeded to drive around for a long period of time, making numerous turns
and stopping twice, once to meet up with another vehicle and a second time during which
Mrs. Moore was removed by the masked men, interrogated again about the Keota branch
bank, and advised of what her role would be in the robbery of the bank. Eventually, the
masked men removed the blindfolds from the Moores, ordered Mr. Moore to drive the
van, and directed him to the Keota branch bank.
At the Keota branch bank, one of the masked men remained in the van with Mr.
Moore while the other escorted Mrs. Moore, who had keys to the bank, inside. In
accordance with the masked man’s directions, Mrs. Moore turned off the bank’s alarm
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system and video camera, and then opened the bank’s vault. The masked man removed a
bag of money from the vault (totaling $29,300), left the bank with Mrs. Moore, and
returned to the van. Mr. Moore was then ordered to drive as fast as he could out into the
country. Outside of Keota on a country road, the masked men ordered the Moores out of
the van and directed them to “walk west and don’t look back.” Supp. Vol. II, at 11. The
Moores walked to a nearby house where they called law enforcement authorities. The
Moores’ van was subsequently found abandoned outside of Keota.
On April 25, 2003, a criminal complaint was filed charging Johnson and Jimmie
Perkins with robbing the Keota branch bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). ROA,
Vol. I, Doc. 1. Both men were arrested that same day. During a post-arrest interview
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Jimmie Perkins admitted his involvement
in the robbery, but asserted that he was forced to participate, under threat of physical
harm to himself and his family, by a group of Mexican men. When questioned about
Johnson’s involvement in the robbery, Jimmie Perkins refused to say whether Johnson
was involved or not.
On June 11, 2003, a federal grand jury returned an eight-count indictment charging
Johnson, Jimmie Perkins, and Anthony Perkins (Jimmie Perkins’ son) with various
crimes arising out of the robbery of the Keota branch bank. ROA, Vol. I, Doc. 8. Count I
charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371. Count II charged the defendants with armed bank robbery in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (c). Count III charged the defendants with hostage taking in
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203.1 Count IV charged Johnson and Jimmie Perkins with
possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). Counts V and VI charged Johnson with solicitation to commit a crime
of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373. Count VII charged Johnson and Jimmie
Perkins with possession of stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(l). Finally,
Count VIII charged all three defendants with conspiracy to possess a firearm during the
commission of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o).
The case proceeded to trial on December 17, 2003. At the conclusion of the
evidence, the jury found the three defendants guilty as charged in the indictment. With
respect to defendants Johnson and Jimmie Perkins, the jury also found, in response to a
special interrogatory, that they brandished weapons during and in relation to Count IV of
the indictment (i.e., the § 924(c)) charge.
On May 12, 2004, the district court conducted a joint sentencing hearing for the
three defendants. At the government’s request, the district court determined it would
depart upward in two respects as regards the sentences of defendants Johnson and Jimmie
Perkins. First, the district court concluded that their § 924(c) convictions effectively
skewed their Guideline ranges lower than they would have been had they not been
convicted under § 924(c). In other words, the district court concluded that the sentences
for Johnson and Jimmie Perkins “under the Guidelines for violation of Sections 2113(a)
and 924(c) might be less severe than had they been convicted of violating only Section
1
This count was later dismissed by the government. ROA, Vol. II, Doc. 96.
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2113(a) with an enhancement for using a firearm . . . .” ROA, Supp. Vol. I, at 78. Thus,
in accordance with Application Note 4 to § 2K2.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines2, the
district court chose to calculate Guideline ranges for these two defendants by treating
them as if they had not been convicted of violating § 924(c) (and thus in turn enhancing
their offense levels for using a firearm during and in relation to the bank robbery). This
resulted in an offense level of 38 for Johnson and 36 for Jimmie Perkins, and in turn a
Guideline range of 235 to 293 months for Johnson and 188 to 235 months for Jimmie
Perkins.3
2
Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
In a few cases in which the defendant is determined not to be a career
offender, the offense level for the underlying offense determined under the
preceding paragraphs may result in a guideline range that, when combined
with the mandatory consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), §
924(c), or § 929(a), produces a total maximum penalty that is less that the
maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted had there not
been a count of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a)
(i.e., the guideline range that would have resulted if the enhancements for
possession, use, or discharge of a firearm had been applied). In such a case,
an upward departure may be warranted so that the conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a) does not result in a decrease in the
total punishment. An upward departure under this paragraph shall not
exceed the maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted had
there not been a count of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or
§ 929(a).
3
The government, in its motion for alternative sentencing calculations and upward
departure, argued in part that “the starting point for all defendants” should be the “total
offense level of 36 [and the] corresponding sentencing range of 188 to 235 months” that
was arrived at under the Guidelines for defendant Anthony Perkins. ROA, Vol. II, Doc.
105, at 4. At the sentencing hearing, the district court expressed “surprise[] that Mr.
Anthony Perkins’ range was higher than that [initially calculated for] Mr. Johnson and
Mr. Jimmie Perkins,” but emphasized it was “not using that as a basis in [its]
considerations for . . . using the alternative sentencing range . . . .” ROA, Supp. Vol. I, at
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Second, the district court found “by a preponderance of the evidence that the
combination of the sophistication of the robbery, the duration of the abduction, the use of
multiple firearms and making multiple and repeated threats of death to multiple victims,
and the sexual assault of Mrs. Moore [we]re aggravating factors present to a degree not
adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines,”
which in turn caused the case “to differ significantly from the heartland cases covered by
the guidelines.” Id. at 81. Thus, the district court departed upward by imposing a two-
level enhancement to the offense levels of defendants Johnson and Jimmie Perkins.
Ultimately, the district court sentenced the three defendants in the following
manner. With respect to defendant Johnson, who the district court found was the leader
or organizer of the robbery, the district court imposed a sentence of 324 months, in the
middle of Johnson’s guideline range of 292 to 365 months. With respect to defendant
Jimmie Perkins, the district court imposed a sentence of 293 months, a sentence at the
very top of the guideline range of 235 to 293 months. Finally, with respect to defendant
Anthony Perkins, the district court imposed a sentence of 188 months, a sentence at the
bottom of the guideline range.
II.
Denial of motion to suppress
On April 25, 2003 (the same day defendant Johnson was charged in this case and
arrested), special agent John Fitzer of the FBI applied for and received a search warrant
34.
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for defendant Johnson’s residence. Attached to the warrant was a document, Attachment
B, listing the following “ITEMS TO BE SEIZED”:
1. Any and all rifles, pistols or revolvers, including, but not limited to:
- Marlin Model 15Y rifle serial number 16732058
- Snake Charmer 410 shotgun serial number 54516
- Astra 9mm 475 handgun serial number 071D
- Smith & Wesson 22 caliber
semi-automatic pistol unknown
2. Any and all sums of U.S. Currency and containers
3. Any and all ski mask or face coverings
4. Any and all black gloves or work-type gloves with exterior writing on
them
5. Any and all camouflaged pants and/or shirts (common military battle
dress uniform pattern)
6. Any and all combat-style boots
7. Any and all diaries, daytimers, calendars or address books
8. Any and all banking documents and records to include, but not limited
to, account statements and transcripts, account credit and debit memos, and
documents reflecting the deposit, transfer, withdrawal, sale, purchase, loan
or other disposition of any asset held in an account
9. Any and all hand-held two-way radios
10. Any and all bank bags and/or money bands
11. Any and all portable recording devices and/or storage media of any
type or size
12. Cellular phone and any and all associated records
ROA, Vol. I, Doc. 2, Att. B.
The warrant was executed later that evening, and completed the following
afternoon, April 26, 2003. Although Fitzer was not present during most of the search, he
prepared the return that was filed after the warrant’s execution. The return listed the
following items that were not specifically listed in the warrant: “camouflage bag; four
Michelob beer bottles (two recovered from trash found in trailer on [Johnson’s] property,
one recovered from camouflage bag, one recovered from bed of truck); binoculars; car
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tag; owner’s manual to riding lawn mower; two newspaper clippings; camera; shotguns
that were not particularized in the warrant; miscellaneous receipts; 2003 taxes; black
gloves (recovered from camouflage bag); one brown glove; and six and one-half pair of
gloves.” ROA, Vol. I, Doc. 39, at 3.
On June 30, 2003, Johnson moved to suppress all evidence seized during the
search of his residence. In support of his motion, Johnson argued that the officers
executing the warrant flagrantly disregarded the terms of the warrant in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on Johnson’s
motion, and subsequently issued a report and recommendation recommending that
Johnson’s motion be granted in part and denied in part. In doing so, the magistrate judge
began by noting “there [wa]s no suggestion that the officers [executing the search
warrant] attempted to seize ‘anything of [evidentiary] value’ or otherwise attempted to
transform the search warrant into a general warrant.” ROA, Vol. 1, Doc. 39, at 4.
Further, the magistrate judge found “that the executing officers” did not “exhibit[] such
flagrant disregard for the terms of the search warrant as would require the extraordinary
remedy of suppression of all the items seized thereunder.” Id. at 4. Thus, the magistrate
judge proceeded to review, on an individual basis, the items that were seized but not
specifically mentioned in the search warrant. Id. In doing so, the magistrate judge
concluded “that any gloves or firearms were properly seized under the search warrant . . .
because they were within the ambit of items that were specifically mentioned in the
warrant.” Id. at 4-5. The magistrate judge also concluded that the camouflage bag and a
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Michelob beer bottle contained therein were properly seized under the plain view rule.
Id. at 6. In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate judge noted that “Agent Fitzer
testified that” these items were seized “because the Moores reported that the kidnappers
had drunk Michelob beer and used a bag to carry away the bottles and other discarded
items . . . .”4 Id. Further, the magistrate judge found that the officers discovered
camouflage clothing, which was specifically listed in the search warrant, inside the
camouflage bag. Id. Thus, the magistrate judge concluded the officers “had a legitimate
reason for searching the camouflage bag.” Id. at 7.
In contrast, the magistrate judge concluded that the newspaper clippings, the
camera, the miscellaneous receipts, paperwork relating to Johnson’s 2003 taxes, and a set
of binoculars were not within the ambit of the items specifically mentioned in the search
warrant and thus should be suppressed. Further, the magistrate judge concluded that three
additional Michelob beer bottles seized during the search (one from the bed of Johnson’s
truck and two from a trash can inside Johnson’s residence) were not listed in the search
warrant and thus should be suppressed.5
On September 9, 2003, the district court issued an order adopting the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation and granting in part and denying in part Johnson’s
4
At trial, the Moores testified that their abductors brought bottles of Michelob beer
into the house and drank them over the course of the afternoon and evening prior to the
robbery.
5
The government admitted that the car tag and the owner’s manual to the riding
lawnmower were erroneously seized and voluntarily returned those items to Johnson. Id.
at 5, n. 2.
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motion to suppress.
On appeal, defendant Johnson contends the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home. In reviewing the district
court’s decision, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
accept the district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and review de novo
the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United
States v. Katoa, 379 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004).
Johnson begins his arguments by asserting, as he did below, that the officers
executing the search warrant exhibited “flagrant disregard for its terms,” and thus all the
evidence seized during the search should be suppressed. Johnson Br. at 10. “[W]hen law
enforcement officers grossly exceed the scope of a search warrant in seizing property, the
[Fourth Amendment’s] particularity requirement is undermined and a valid warrant is
transformed into a general warrant thereby requiring suppression of all evidence seized
under that warrant.” United States v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 849-50 (10th Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks omitted; italics in original). Here, the magistrate judge found,
and the district court agreed, that the officers executing the search warrant at Johnson’s
residence did not grossly exceed the scope of the search warrant. Although Johnson
purports to challenge this finding, he points to no evidence in the record that undermines
the finding or that would support a contrary finding. Indeed, the only evidence in the
record concerning the search is the warrant itself, the return completed by agent Fitzer,
and Fitzer’s testimony from the suppression hearing. That evidence clearly indicates that,
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although the officers executing the warrant may have seized a few items that were not
specifically listed in Attachment B to the warrant, they offered specific reasons for doing
so and otherwise complied with the terms of the warrant. Thus, this case differs
dramatically from Foster, where the executing officers admitted simply taking “anything
of value” and ignoring the specific terms of the search warrant. 100 F.3d at 850.
Alternatively, Johnson argues that the district court should have suppressed those
particular items of seized evidence that were not specifically listed in Attachment B to the
search warrant. In this regard, Johnson first argues that a “Shotgun model S13” seized by
the officers should be suppressed because (a) Attachment B listed a “Snake Charmer 410
shotgun” but not a “Shotgun model S13,” (b) the shotgun at issue did not fall within the
general category of “[a]ny and all rifles, pistols or revolvers” listed in Attachment B, and
(c) the plain view exception could not support the seizure of the shotgun. Although the
first and last of these arguments appear to be correct, the magistrate judge and district
court concluded that the seized shotgun fell “within the ambit” of items listed in
Attachment B, and thus was properly seized. ROA, Vol. I, Doc. 39, at 5. In other words,
the magistrate judge and district court concluded that the executing officers could
reasonably have interpreted the phrase “[a]ny and all rifles, pistols or revolvers” as
encompassing shotguns. We agree. Even though there are technical differences between
rifles and shotguns, Attachment B specifically listed several firearms, including a “Snake
Charmer 410 shotgun,” that fell within the scope of the phrase “[a]ny and all rifles, pistols
or revolvers.” In other words, Attachment B itself effectively defined the phrase “[a]ny
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and all rifles, pistols or revolvers” to include shotguns. Thus, we agree with the district
court that the seized shotgun fell within the scope of the items listed in Attachment B to
the search warrant.
Johnson next argues that various gloves seized from his residence did not fall
within the scope of the search warrant because they did not, as required by Attachment B
to the warrant, have “exterior writing on them.” As previously noted, Attachment B to
the warrant listed “[a]ny and all black gloves or work-type gloves with exterior writing on
them.” Because there is no evidence in the record indicating that the phrase “with
exterior writing on them” was intended to modify both the phrases “black gloves” and
“work-type gloves,” we conclude that the agents executing the warrant could reasonably
have believed that the phrase “with exterior writing on them” modified only the phrase
“work-type gloves.” In turn, because the record indicates that the seized gloves were
either black or brown in color6, we agree with the district court and magistrate judge that
the seized gloves “were within the ambit of items . . . specifically mentioned in the
warrant . . . .” ROA, Vol. I, Doc. 39, at 5.
Johnson next argues that the camouflage duffel bag and the Michelob beer bottle
contained therein should have been suppressed. The magistrate judge and the district
court concluded that these items were properly seized under the “plain view” rule. That
rule allows an officer to seize evidence of a crime if it is in plain view, its incriminating
character is immediately apparent, and the officer has a lawful right of access to the item.
6
Three gloves were seized: a pair of black gloves and a single brown glove.
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Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990). Because there is no dispute that the
duffel bag and the beer bottle were in plain view, and that the officers executing the
search warrant had a lawful right of access to them, the applicability of the plain view
rule hinges on whether their incriminating character was immediately apparent. “An
item’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent if the officer had probable cause to
believe the object was contraband or evidence of a crime.” United States v.
Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d 916, 924 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “A seizing officer need not know or have an unduly high degree of
certainty as to the incriminatory character of the evidence under the plain view doctrine.
All that is required is a practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is
involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The officers executing the
search warrant at Johnson’s residence had reasonable suspicion that Johnson had been
involved in the abduction of the Moores and the robbery of the Keota bank. Further, the
officers were aware that the Moores had given statements indicating that the masked men
who abducted them drank a quantity of Michelob beer in bottles and disposed of some of
the empty bottles in a duffle bag which they carried with them. In light of this
information, we conclude the officers had probable cause to believe the Michelob beer
bottle was evidence of the crimes at issue. Cf. United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193,
1203 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that officers had probable cause to believe that
defendant’s computer, located in his residence, contained child pornography given the
information available to them regarding the defendant’s likely involvement in child
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pornography). As for the duffel bag, the Moores testified at trial that the duffel bag was
black in color, not camouflage, and it is unclear from the suppression hearing transcript
whether the officers executing the search warrant were aware of this fact. Assuming they
were, then they would not have had probable cause to believe the camouflage duffel bag
was evidence of the crimes at issue, and could not have seized it under the plain view
rule. In contrast, if the officers were unaware that the Moores had indicated the duffel
bag was black in color, they arguably could have had probable cause to believe the
camouflage duffel bag was evidence of the crimes at issue and could have seized it.
Ultimately, we conclude it is unnecessary to resolve this issue given the overwhelming
nature of the evidence of Johnson’s guilt introduced by the government at trial.7 In other
words, even assuming the camouflage duffel bag should not have been seized, we
conclude its subsequent use at trial was harmless.
Lastly, Johnson refers to the lawn mower operator’s manual, as well as the car tag,
title and registration papers seized by the executing agents. As noted, the government
conceded that these items were improperly seized and returned them to Johnson. In light
of these facts, it is unclear precisely what ruling Johnson is seeking from this court.
Clearly, the seizure of these items was harmless, considering that they were returned to
7
In addition to a wide variety of circumstantial evidence (e.g., two witnesses who
testified they were solicited by Johnson to assist him in abducting the Moores and robbing
the Keota bank), Johnson was linked to the Moores’ house by (a) cellular phone records
indicating that he made several phone calls from in or near the Moores’ residence during
the time the Moores were held captive, and (b) DNA evidence (i.e., bodily fluid taken
from a discarded Michelob beer bottle at the Moores’ residence).
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Johnson and not admitted at trial (and indeed appear not to have been inculpatory in
nature).
In sum, we conclude the district court did not err in ruling on the individual items
seized by the executing agents.
Bruton error
During the government’s case in chief, FBI agent Gary Graff testified that
defendant Jimmie Perkins, following his arrest on April 25, 2003, confessed to
participating in the robbery, including breaking into the Moores’ home and holding them
hostage. According to Graff, Jimmie Perkins stated there were “four other individuals”
involved in the robbery, including three “Mexicans” that forced him to participate, and
one other individual whose identity he knew. ROA, Supp. Vol. IV at 484. Jimmie
Perkins denied that this latter person was his son, Anthony Perkins. Id. at 486. When
asked if this latter person was defendant Johnson, Jimmie Perkins “would not eliminate
Mr. Johnson from being involved in the robbery,” id., and “preferred not to discuss Mr.
Johnson.” Id. at 487. Lastly, Graff testified that Jimmie Perkins agreed to provide a
written statement outlining his participation in the robbery, and the district court admitted
that statement into evidence. Id. at 497-500.
Defendant Johnson contends on appeal that the admission of Graff’s testimony and
Jimmie Perkins’ written statement violated the rule announced in Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant at their joint trial
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violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. 391 U.S. at 137;
see also United States v. Sarracino, 340 F.3d 1148, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2003). Generally
speaking, we review de novo any alleged Bruton errors. See United States v.
Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999). Here, however, defendant
Johnson did not object at trial to the admission of Gray’s testimony or Jimmie Perkins’
written statement. Thus, we review his Bruton claim only for plain error. To establish
plain error, defendant Johnson must prove that there was an error, that was plain, and that
affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). If he
can do so, we may exercise our discretion to correct the forfeited error if the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the admission of the challenged
evidence violated Bruton, it is clear that the error did not affect defendant Johnson’s
substantial rights. As noted, the evidence of defendant Johnson’s participation in the
robbery was overwhelming. In addition to a wide range of circumstantial evidence (e.g.,
witnesses who had been solicited by Johnson to participate in an abduction of Ms. Moore
and a robbery of the Keota bank; witnesses who observed Johnson surveilling the bank),
the government also presented cell phone records and DNA evidence tying Johnson to the
Moore’s home during the time they were held hostage. Thus, Jimmie Perkins’ refusal to
exculpate Johnson in his post-arrest statements was but a minor component of the
government’s case against Johnson.
For these reasons, we conclude Johnson cannot establish that the admission of
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Gray’s testimony and Jimmie Perkins’ written statement/confession constituted plain
error.
Sentencing errors
a) Booker error
All three defendants assert challenges to their sentences based upon the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). In Booker, the Court
held that the Sixth Amendment requires “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which
is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 125 S.Ct. at 756. To remedy the potential
for Sixth Amendment violations by a sentencing court’s application of the Guidelines, the
Court severed and excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which had required sentencing courts
to impose a sentence within the applicable guidelines range, subject to departures in
limited cases. Id. at 764. As a result, the Guidelines are now advisory. Id. at 767. We
have recognized two types of Booker-related error. “First, a court could err by relying
upon judge-found facts, other than those of prior convictions, to enhance a defendant's
sentence mandatorily.” United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731 (10th Cir.
2005) (en banc). This type of error, which violates the Sixth Amendment as described in
Booker, is generally referred to in this circuit as “constitutional Booker error.” Id.“Second, a sentencing court could err by applying the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion,
as opposed to a discretionary fashion, even though the resulting sentence was calculated
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solely upon facts that were admitted by the defendant, found by the jury, or based upon
the fact of a prior conviction.” Id. at 731-32. This type of error is referred to as
“non-constitutional Booker error.” Id. at 732.
Here, defendants allege, and we agree, that the district court committed
constitutional Booker error by enhancing their sentences on the basis of judicially-found
facts. After imposing a base offense level of 20 on each defendant pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2B3.1 (which governs robbery offenses), the district court applied the following, fact-
based enhancements: (1) a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(1) for
taking the property of a financial institution; (2) a four-level enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) because a person was abducted to facilitate commission of the
robbery; (3) a one-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(6) because
firearms were taken from the Moores’ house; (4) a one-level enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7) because the amount of loss was more than $10,000 but less than
$50,000; and (5) a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(5) because the
offense involved car-jacking (i.e., the taking of the Moores’ van).8 With respect to
defendant Johnson, the district court also imposed a two-level enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 based upon its finding that Johnson was the leader in carrying out the
bank robbery. With respect to defendant Anthony Perkins, who was not charged under §
924(c), the district court also imposed a six-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
8
The district court also, with respect to defendants Johnson and Jimmie Perkins,
departed upward from the Guideline ranges.
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2B3.1(b)(2)(B) for “otherwise using” a firearm during the robbery.
Because defendants did not assert Sixth Amendment challenges to these
enhancements at the time of sentencing, they are reviewed on appeal only for plain error.
“Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial
rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Defendants can, given the holding in Booker, easily satisfy the first two prongs of
the plain-error test. See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2005).
Specifically, in imposing these enhancements, the district court made five factual findings
“based on a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants did not admit and the jury
verdict alone did not support, pursuant to the then-mandatory Guidelines.” United States
v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 917 (10th Cir. 2005). These errors are “now [considered]
‘plain’ or ‘obvious.’” Id.The more difficult question is whether defendants can meet their burden of
satisfying the third prong of the plain error test. “In order to demonstrate that an error
affected his substantial rights, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the
defects in his sentencing altered the result of the proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). We have held that, in cases involving constitutional Booker error, “there
are at least two ways a defendant can make this showing.” Id. “First, if the defendant
shows a reasonable probability that a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard would not
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have found the same material facts that a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence,
then the defendant successfully demonstrates that the error below affected his substantial
rights.” Id. “Second, a defendant may show that the district court’s error affected his
substantial rights by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, under the specific facts
of his case as analyzed under the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district
judge would reasonably impose a sentence outside the Guideline range.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
After reviewing the record, we conclude defendants cannot prevail under the first
method. To begin with, we conclude that a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard
would have found all of the facts underlying the five enhancements that were applied to
each of the defendants, i.e., that (a) the robbery involved the taking of property from a
financial institution, (b) two people (Mr. and Mrs. Moore) were abducted in order to
facilitate the commission of the robbery, (c) guns and scopes belonging to Mrs. Moore’s
son were taken from the Moores’ house, (d) the amount of the loss suffered by the bank
was more than $10,000 but less than $50,000, and (e) the offense involved car-jacking
(i.e., the taking of the Moores’ van). Likewise, we conclude a jury applying a reasonable
doubt standard would have found that firearms were extensively used during the course of
the offense, thereby supporting the six-level enhancement imposed on defendant Anthony
Perkins for “otherwise using” a firearm. Finally, we conclude that a jury applying a
reasonable doubt standard would have found that defendant Johnson was the leader
and/or organizer of the offense. As we have noted, there was evidence that Johnson
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attempted to solicit other people to participate in a robbery of the bank. In addition, the
circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that Johnson was the person who took a lead
role during the course of the offense, doing most of the talking and questioning in the
Moore home, and threatening to rape Mrs. Moore.
We further conclude that defendants are unable to prevail under the second
method, i.e., they cannot establish a reasonable probability that the sentencing judge,
applying the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), would reasonably have imposed a
sentence lower than the Guideline range. In conducting the third-prong analysis in other
plain error cases involving constitutional Booker error, we have generally examined the
sentencing record for evidence “evinc[ing] a desire on the part of the court to give [the
defendant] a sentence lower than the Guidelines-specified range.” United States v.
Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 907 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, nothing in the record suggests that
the district court would have, had it believed it had the discretion to do so, imposed a
below-Guideline sentence. Indeed, with respect to defendants Johnson and Jimmie
Perkins, the district court departed upward in two respects and, after doing so, sentenced
Johnson to a term that was in the middle of the suggested Guideline range, and also
sentenced Jimmie Perkins to a term that was at the top of the suggested Guideline range.
As for defendant Anthony Perkins, the district court imposed a sentence at the bottom of
the suggested Guideline range. That fact standing alone, however, is not sufficient to
allow us to conclude that the district would have, had it known it had the discretion to do
so, imposed a below-Guideline sentence on defendant Anthony Perkins. Cf. United
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States v. Nguyen, 413 F.3d 1170, 1184 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding that sentence at
bottom of Guideline range, combined with district court’s general expression of
sympathy, was “insufficient to satisfy plain error under the fourth prong”).
In short, defendants cannot satisfy their burden of showing that the constitutional
Booker errors committed by the district court affected their substantial rights. Most, if
not all, of the sentencing enhancements imposed by the district court were based upon
factual findings that were amply supported by the record (and that would likely have been
reached by a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard). Further, the district court’s
actions at sentencing clearly indicate it had no desire to impose below-Guidelines
sentences on any of the defendants, particularly defendants Johnson and Jimmie Perkins.
Therefore, defendants cannot establish that the district court’s enhancement of their base
offense levels based upon judicially-found facts amounted to plain error.
b) Upward departure - defendants Johnson and Jimmie Perkins
Defendants Johnson and Jimmie Perkins also challenge the district court’s decision
to depart upward from the Guideline range based upon its findings “that the combination
of the sophistication of the robbery, the duration of the abduction, the use of multiple
firearms and making multiple and repeated threats of death to multiple victims, and the
sexual assault of Mrs. Moore [we]re aggravating factors present to a degree not
adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines.”
ROA, Supp. Vol. I, at 81. Because the upward departure was based upon facts found by
the court rather than the jury, it must be considered violative of the holding in Booker.
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See United States v. Cunningham, 405 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that, in light
of Booker, an upward departure may violate the Sixth Amendment). However, because
neither Johnson nor Jimmie Perkins objected to the upward departure on Sixth
Amendment grounds, their Booker-related challenge to the upward departure is now
reviewed only for plain error.
As with the enhancements discussed above, the first and second prongs of the plain
error test are easily satisfied. Specifically, it is clear that the district court erred in basing
its upward departure on judicially-found facts, and, in light of Booker, that error is now
considered plain.
Turning to the third prong of the plain error test, it is clear, given the district
court’s statements during the sentencing hearing, its decision generally to depart upwards,
and its final decision to impose sentences in the middle and top of the guideline ranges for
Johnson and Jimmie Perkins, that the district court would not exercise its discretion after
Booker to impose lower sentences on these two defendants. See United States v.
Rodriguez-Chavez, 153 Fed. Appx. 524, 528 (10th Cir. 2005) (reaching similar
conclusion in case involving upward departure subject to harmless error review). Thus,
the only way Johnson and Jimmie Perkins can satisfy the third prong of the plain error
test is to show a reasonable probability that a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard
would not have found the same material facts that the district court found and based its
upward departure on. With respect to four of the five factors cited by the district court, it
is clear, based upon reviewing the record, that a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard
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would have found these same factors. Specifically, the evidence presented at trial
overwhelmingly established that (a) the offenses of conviction lasted for an extended
duration (i.e., from approximately 2 p.m. on the afternoon of March 31, 2003, until 7:30
or 8:00 a.m. on the morning of April 1, 2003), (b) multiple firearms were used during the
commission of the offense, (c) multiple and repeated threats of death were made to the
Moores during the commission of the offense, and (d) Mrs. Moore was sexually assaulted
during the course of the offense.
That leaves only the district court’s finding that the robbery was “sophisticated.”
In making this finding, the district court expressly pointed to “the defendants’ knowledge
of the location of the victim’s home, choosing Mrs. Moore to abduct, disguising
themselves as Mexicans, and the use of multiple firearms . . . .” ROA, Supp. Vol. I, at 80.
A review of the record on appeal indicates that all of these underlying factors were well
supported by the government’s evidence, and therefore it can readily be concluded that a
jury applying a reasonable doubt standard would have found the existence of these
factors. The question remains, however, whether these factors reasonably supported the
ultimate finding that the robbery was “sophisticated.”
Nowhere does U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 or its accompanying commentary mention
“sophistication” as a relevant factor in determining the offense level for a defendant
convicted of robbery. In other words, the “sophistication” of a robbery is a circumstance
not typically taken into account by the Sentencing Commission in calculating the
applicable guideline range for a robbery conviction. Further, “sophistication” is not a
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factor outlined in Chapter Five, Park K, Subpart 2 of the Guidelines, which discuss
“Other Grounds for Departure.” Thus, for “sophistication” to serve as a valid basis for
upward departure in a robbery case, the case itself must be considered “exceptional.” See
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B).
After carefully examining the record, we conclude a jury applying a reasonable
doubt standard could not reasonably have found that the case was exceptional in terms of
sophistication. Generally speaking, the Guidelines define the term “sophistication”
consistent with its ordinary meaning, i.e., “especially complex or intricate.” See U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(8)(C) (referring to “sophisticated means”), and Application Note 7(B) thereto
(indicating that means are “sophisticated” when they entail “especially complex or
especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an
offense.”); see also Oxford English Dictionary Online Edition (taken from second print
ed. 1989) (defining term “sophisticated” as “highly developed or complicated”).
Although the robbery at issue was the product of some planning on the part of Johnson
and perhaps the other two defendants, it certainly cannot be characterized as exceptional
in this regard. In particular, the scheme employed by defendants was straightforward in
that it relied generally on abducting and controlling one key person, i.e., Mrs. Moore.
Further, as pointed out by Jimmie Perkins, defendants were unaware at the time they took
the Moores hostage that the bank’s vault had a time-lock on it, and thus were
unexpectedly forced to wait until the morning of April 1, 2003, to carry out the robbery.
As for the execution of the robbery scheme, the fact that defendants brought beer to the
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Moores’ residence, drank the beer throughout the siege, and ultimately left some of the
empty bottles at the Moores’ house, clearly undercuts a finding that the crime was
especially sophisticated. The same holds true for defendants’ attempt to disguise their
identities by speaking Spanish while inside the Moores’ house. The evidence at trial
indicated that this attempt was less than successful because defendants at times lapsed
into English.
Notably, we have found only one published case touching on the issue of
sophistication in the context of a bank robbery case. In United States v. Castro-
Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1990), the defendant had admitted to committing a
series of bank robberies and, over the course of doing so, had learned, through trial and
error, how to prevent a dye pack from exploding. In sentencing the defendant, the district
court departed upward because of “‘the sophistication’ shown in [the defendant’s]
treatment of the dye packs . . . .” Id. at 1081. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this upward
departure in two sentences:
The [sentencing] court was . . . permitted “without limitation” to take into
account information about Castro-Cervantes which had not been taken into
account by the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4. The Guidelines do not take
into account the sophistication of the robber and, therefore, this factor is a
proper ground for the sentencing court to take into consideration.
Id. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the holding in Castro-Cervantes is correct,
we conclude it has little, if any, relevance here. Unlike the defendant in Castro-
Cervantes, the defendants in this case committed only a single robbery, and thus cannot
themselves be characterized as “sophisticated” robbers. Nor, for the reasons outlined
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above, can the single robbery committed by defendants reasonably be characterized as
“sophisticated.”
Because a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard could not have found that the
robbery at issue was “sophisticated,” Johnson and Jimmie Perkins have satisfied their
burden under the third prong of the plain error test. That leaves only the fourth prong,
under which they must persuade us that the constitutional Booker error committed by the
district court “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Serrata, 425 F.3d at 919. We conduct the fourth-prong analysis “less
rigidly” in cases, such as this, involving constitutional Booker error than in cases
involving non-constitutional Booker error, meaning that we “do not require the
exceptional showing required to remand a case of non-constitutional error.” Dazey, 403
F.3d at 1178.
In United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647, 671 (10th Cir. 2005), we recently
outlined the types of “[e]vidence that would tend to support an exercise of our discretion
under” the fourth prong in a case involving constitutional Booker error. We noted that
such evidence “might include, for example: (a) a sentence increased substantially based
on a Booker error . . . ; (b) a showing that the district court would likely impose a
significantly lighter sentence on remand . . . ; (c) a substantial lack of evidence to support
the entire sentence the Guidelines required the district court to impose . . . ; (d) a showing
that objective consideration of the § 3553(a) factors warrants a departure from the
sentence suggested by the Guidelines . . . ; or (e) other evidence peculiar to the defendant
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that demonstrates a complete breakdown in the sentencing process . . . .” Id.
Although many of these factors weigh against Johnson and Jimmie Perkins, we
conclude that the district court’s reliance on a rarely-used factor, and one that it not
supported factually, weighs heavily in Johnson’s and Jimmie Perkins’ favor. Further, we
note that the two-level upward departure imposed by the district court substantially
increased both defendants’ sentences from what they otherwise would have been.
Specifically, the two-level upward departure increased Jimmie Perkins’ Guideline range
from 188-235 months to 235-293 months. In light of the fact that the district court chose
to impose a sentence at the top of the Guideline range, this means that the Booker error
effectively increased Jimmie Perkins’ sentence by 58 months. As for defendant Johnson,
the two-level upward departure increased his Guideline range from 235-293 months to
292-365 months. Given the district court’s decision to impose a sentence in the middle of
the Guideline range (324 months), the Booker error resulted in a substantial increase in
Johnson’s sentence. We therefore conclude that these factors, considered together, weigh
in favor of us exercising our discretion to remand Johnson’s and Jimmie Perkins’ cases
for resentencing.9
c) Additional arguments - defendant Anthony Perkins
Defendant Anthony Perkins makes two other arguments regarding his sentence,
both of which are without merit. First, he asserts that the constitutional Booker error
9
On remand, the district court is free to consider whether the other factors it
originally cited in support of the upward departure are sufficient, in the absence of a
finding of sophistication, to again warrant an upward departure from the Guideline range.
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committed by the district court in his case, i.e., imposing a series of enhancements based
upon judicially-found facts, was structural in nature. We have previously rejected that
identical argument. See Dowlin, 408 F.3d at 668 (holding that constitutional Booker
error is not structural); Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 734 (holding that non-constitutional
Booker error is not structural). Second, he argues that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to impose a sentence beyond that which was authorized under the Sentencing
Guidelines by the jury’s factual findings. That argument flies directly in the face of both
18 U.S.C. § 3231, which affords district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over
federal criminal prosecutions, as well as the remedial holding in Booker, which
effectively authorized district courts, in their discretion, to take into account judicially-
found facts in imposing criminal sentences.
The convictions of defendant Richard Johnson, as well as the sentence imposed on
defendant Anthony Perkins, are AFFIRMED. The cases of defendant Richard Johnson
and defendant Jimmie Perkins are REMANDED to the district court for resentencing.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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