Hamilton v. Bird , 650 F. App'x 585 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 24, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JAN B. HAMILTON,
Petitioner – Appellant,
Nos. 15-1400, 15-1433, 15-1488
v. (D.C. Nos. 1:15-CV-01691-LTB,
1:15-CV-01791-LTB and
DON BIRD, Pitkin County Jail; D. 1:15-CV-01792-LTB)
MULDOON, Captain, Fairplay, CO; THE (D. Colorado)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF COLORADO,
Respondents - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before GORSUCH, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
While incarcerated at the Pitkin County Jail in Colorado,1 pro se petitioner Jan
Hamilton appealed dismissal orders in three separate cases before the United States
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Ms. Hamilton was incarcerated at the time she filed her habeas petitions, but
she has since been released. Although a person must be “in custody” to obtain relief
under § 2254, Ms. Hamilton was also sentenced to five years’ probation in Case Nos.
15-1433 and 15-1488. Such “[p]robationary status is sufficiently ‘in custody’
pursuant to section 2254 to permit habeas relief.” Olson v. Hart, 965 F.2d 940, 942–
43 (10th Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, as recognized in
District Court for the District of Colorado. In each order, the district court denied Ms.
Hamilton’s petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and denied
Ms. Hamilton’s requests for a certificate of appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A).
I. BACKGROUND
In each of her three appeals, Ms. Hamilton alleges her underlying convictions
were based on false accusations by “religious extremists” who discriminated against
her based on her sexual orientation. Ms. Hamilton also raises other arguments in the
individual cases that are discussed below.
A. Case No. 15-1400
In Case No. 15-1400, Ms. Hamilton seeks a COA to challenge her conviction
in Case No. 14M143 in Pitkin County Court (First Conviction), which was based on
her guilty plea to four misdemeanors: one count of harassment and three counts of
violating a protective order. The county court sentenced Ms. Hamilton to four
Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011). In Case No. 15-1400, Ms.
Hamilton was sentenced only to a term of imprisonment without probation. But even
where a petitioner is unconditionally released, if she faces “collateral consequences”
resulting from a conviction, the case is not moot. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.
234, 237–38 (1968). And we have recognized “the possibility of collateral
consequences arising from a misdemeanor conviction, such as the chance that a later
sentence might be enhanced because of an earlier misdemeanor conviction or that
such a conviction could be used in some jurisdictions to impeach the petitioner in
later proceedings,” and such possibility “is sufficient to overcome mootness.” Oyler
v. Allenbrand, 23 F.3d 292, 294 (10th Cir. 1994). Thus, because Ms. Hamilton may
face similar collateral consequences resulting from her misdemeanor convictions, her
case is not moot.
2
months’ imprisonment on each count, to run consecutively, for a total of sixteen
months.
In her first effort to appeal, Ms. Hamilton sought relief directly from the United
States Supreme Court, by sending a letter to Justice Ginsburg describing the events
leading to her arrests and convictions in her various cases.
In addition, Ms. Hamilton attempted to appeal her First Conviction directly to the
Colorado Supreme Court. In her notice of appeal, Ms. Hamilton claimed her conviction
was “due to the outrageous sexual orientation discrimination of her Lesbian lifestyle” and
explained that fellow parishioners at her church demanded she “undergo ‘Conversion
Therapy’ to []cure her of being a Lesbian.” Ms. Hamilton also filed a “Writ of
Certiorari,” seeking “all damages, losses and attorneys fees commensurate with Colorado
State Law” and “further request[ing] that the Colorado Supreme Court rule ‘Conversion
Therapy’ . . . to be unconstitutional.” The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed Ms.
Hamilton’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction on May 7, 2015, because Ms. Hamilton sought
review of a county-court judgment, which must be appealed first to the district court.
On July 24, 2015, Ms. Hamilton, with the assistance of counsel, filed an appeal
with the Pitkin County District Court. Ms. Hamilton’s counsel identified different
grounds than those Ms. Hamilton has advanced in her pro se filings. In particular, counsel
argued (1) the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Hamilton
violated a protective order and (2) the trial court erred by failing to require a competency
evaluation for Ms. Hamilton. Nothing in the record shows whether the Pitkin County
District Court has ruled on Ms. Hamilton’s appeal.
3
On July 30, 2015, Ms. Hamilton filed a pro se Application for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado, in an action where she had already filed a civil complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Because Ms. Hamilton may not pursue civil rights and habeas claims in the same
action, the district court opened a new case to address the habeas petition. The district
court determined the petition failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and therefore ordered Ms. Hamilton to amend her petition.
After giving Ms. Hamilton multiple opportunities to amend, the district court
dismissed Ms. Hamilton’s habeas petition for failure to comply with Rule 8 and for
failure to exhaust state remedies. As the district court explained, “Ms. Hamilton’s
[Second Amended] Application is sometimes unintelligible and otherwise fails to set
forth facts supporting a claim for relief that is actionable in a habeas corpus proceeding.”
More specifically, “Ms. Hamilton asserts that various persons violated state and federal
criminal laws, but she does not allege any facts to show that her state court conviction is
invalid under federal law.” In addition, Ms. Hamilton did not establish that she had
exhausted her state appeals before seeking federal habeas relief.
B. Case No. 15-1433
In Case No. 15-1433, Ms. Hamilton seeks a COA to appeal her conviction in
Case No. 10CR76 in Pitkin County Court (Second Conviction), where she pled guilty
to a single misdemeanor for violating a protective order. On August 10, 2015, Ms.
Hamilton filed a § 2254 habeas petition with the District of Colorado. Ms. Hamilton
indicated she had appealed her Second Conviction to the Colorado Court of Appeals,
4
the Colorado Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court. Although Ms.
Hamilton alleged that her appeals to the Colorado Supreme Court were denied, she
acknowledged her appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals is still pending.
The district court dismissed Ms. Hamilton’s case on multiple grounds. First, it
concluded that Ms. Hamilton’s habeas petition failed to comply with Rule 8. Second,
the district court ruled Ms. Hamilton failed to state a viable claim under § 2254.
Finally, the district court reminded Ms. Hamilton of the requirement to exhaust her
state-court remedies.
C. Case No. 15-1488
In Case No. 15-1488, Ms. Hamilton seeks a COA to challenge her conviction
in Case No. 11CR38 in Pitkin County Court (Third Conviction), where she pled
guilty to a single misdemeanor for violating a protective order. On August 19, 2015,
Ms. Hamilton filed a § 2254 habeas petition with the District of Colorado. In her
petition, Ms. Hamilton indicated that she filed a direct appeal of her Third Conviction
with the Colorado Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme Court, and both
appeals were resolved on March 2, 2015. Ms. Hamilton also stated she initiated post-
conviction proceedings with the Colorado Supreme Court, but this petition had been
denied on March 2, 2015.2
2
In her § 2254 petition, Ms. Hamilton identifies both a direct appeal and
postconviction proceedings, but she states both were denied on March 2, 2015. Ms.
Hamilton has not provided a copy of any decision from the Colorado appellate courts.
Thus, it is unclear whether Ms. Hamilton filed a direct or postconviction appeal, or
both.
5
Although the district court questioned whether Ms. Hamilton had complied
with Rule 8, it was “able to discern” three claims in her § 2254 petition related to her
Third Conviction:
(1) violation of [Ms. Hamilton’s] Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights based on her sexual orientation; within this claim, she
includes conclusory allegations of malicious prosecution, cruel and
unusual punishment, excessive bail, no speedy trial, false imprisonment,
and lack of jurisdiction; (2) violation of [Ms. Hamilton’s] First
Amendment right to freedom of religion pursuant to a conspiracy
between Aspen police officers and private parties; [and] (3) failure to
enforce state criminal statutes.
The district court concluded Ms. Hamilton had waived any claim of constitutional
deprivations when she pled guilty to violating a protective order. The district court further
determined that, to the extent Ms. Hamilton challenged her guilty plea, she failed to
allege facts showing she had exhausted this issue in the state court. And to the extent
Ms. Hamilton asserted civil rights violations related to her confinement, the district court
ruled that Ms. Hamilton could not assert such claims in her habeas action. Finally, the
district court concluded Ms. Hamilton’s argument that the state court lacked jurisdiction
to convict her was a question of state law, which may not be raised under § 2254. The
district court therefore dismissed Ms. Hamilton’s petition and denied her request for a
COA.
II. DISCUSSION
A state prisoner must obtain a COA as a jurisdictional prerequisite to challenge a
federal district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-
El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). We will issue a COA “only if the applicant has
6
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). Where the district court rejects the petitioner’s constitutional claims on the
merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the district court
dismisses on procedural grounds, our review “has two components, one directed at the
underlying constitutional claims and one directed at the district court’s procedural
holding.” Id. at 484–85. “[A] COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. at 484. “Each component of the
§ 2253(c) showing is part of a threshold inquiry, and a court may find that it can dispose
of the application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue
whose answer is more apparent from the record and arguments.” Id. at 485.
Because Ms. Hamilton is proceeding pro se, we construe her filings liberally,
see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), “but our role is not to act
as h[er] advocate,” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009).
Indeed, we limit our review to “an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a
general assessment of their merits” rather than “full consideration of the factual or legal
bases adduced in support of the claims.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336.
7
A. Case No. 15-1400
In Case No. 15-1400, Ms. Hamilton raises several arguments to challenge her First
Conviction. First, Ms. Hamilton maintains that her conviction stemmed from disputes
with parishioners at the First Baptist Church in Aspen, and that the Pitkin County Court
did not have jurisdiction to interfere with such ecclesiastical matters. Ms. Hamilton also
argues her underlying convictions violated multiple constitutional rights because the
convictions were based on improper sexual-orientation discrimination. Finally, Ms.
Hamilton asserts her trial counsel was ineffective when he “fail[ed] to investigate
disingenuous reports,” failed to interview witnesses, and failed to introduce evidence that
there was no protective order in place at the time of Ms. Hamilton’s arrest. We do not
address the merits of Ms. Hamilton’s claims because we agree with the district court that
she must exhaust her state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief.
“[A] state prisoner bringing a federal habeas corpus action bears the burden of
showing that [s]he has exhausted available state remedies,” which requires a showing that
“a state appellate court has had the opportunity to rule on the same claim presented in
federal court.” Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 398 (10th Cir. 1992). Here, there is no
evidence in the record demonstrating that a Colorado appellate court has ruled on any of
the above claims. Ms. Hamilton was convicted in the Pitkin County Court and attempted
to appeal her conviction directly to the Colorado and United States Supreme Courts.
When those courts denied her appeals, and particularly when the Colorado Supreme
Court explained that county-court decisions must first be appealed to a district court,
Ms. Hamilton filed her appeal with the Pitkin County District Court. But Ms. Hamilton
8
has not produced evidence or even alleged that the Pitkin County District Court has
reached a decision on her appeal.
Moreover, the claims Ms. Hamilton raised in her state appeal do not correspond
with the claims she raises here. In her appeal to the Pitkin County District Court, Ms.
Hamilton argued only that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ms. Hamilton violated a protective order and the trial court erred by failing to require a
competency evaluation for Ms. Hamilton. With respect to her first argument, Ms.
Hamilton argued there was no protective order in place when she was arrested for
violating a protective order, and she asserts the same as part of her ineffective-assistance
claim here. But this is the only ground that Ms. Hamilton has raised both here and in her
appeal to the Pitkin County District Court. Her remaining claims have not been presented
in an appeal to a Colorado state court. And without a decision from the Colorado courts
on the same claims raised in her federal cases, Ms. Hamilton has not exhausted her state-
court remedies. Accordingly, we dismiss Ms. Hamilton’s appeal and deny her request for
a COA with respect to her First Conviction.3
B. Case No. 15-1433
Ms. Hamilton’s claims in Case No. 15-1433 suffer from similar exhaustion
defects. Ms. Hamilton seeks a COA to challenge her Second Conviction on a single
count of violating a protective order. Ms. Hamilton alleges she was illegally arrested
and incarcerated for over two years before trial. She also claims judges and other
3
We also deny Ms. Hamilton’s Motion to Reconsider Denial of Appointed
Counsel, and her Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal Without Prepayment of
Costs or Fees, which she filed in Case No. 15-1400.
9
court staff ignored her complaints of corruption and discrimination by the Aspen
Police Department. Although Ms. Hamilton pled guilty to the charge of violating a
protective order, she contends her plea was based on ineffective assistance of
counsel—namely, Ms. Hamilton asserts her counsel “orchestrated” and
“manipulated” her plea agreement.
In her § 2254 petition to the District of Colorado, Ms. Hamilton asserted that
she appealed her conviction to the Colorado Court of Appeals, the Colorado Supreme
Court, and the United States Supreme Court. Her appeals to the Colorado and United
States Supreme Courts were dismissed. But Ms. Hamilton explicitly stated that her
appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court is still pending. In the time since she filed her
petition with the federal district court, Ms. Hamilton has not produced evidence or
argued that the Colorado Court of Appeals has now denied her claims, nor has she
established that she raised the same claims before the Colorado Court of Appeals that
she raises here. We therefore dismiss Ms. Hamilton’s appeal and deny her request for a
COA, based on her failure to exhaust state remedies.4
C. Case No. 15-1488
In Case No. 15-1488, Ms. Hamilton seeks a COA to appeal her Third
Conviction, based on her guilty plea to one count of violating a protective order. In
4
We also deny Ms. Hamilton’s Habeas Corpus for Immediate Release from
Illegal Custody Due to Lack of Jurisdiction of Secular Courts in Ecclesiastical
Church Controversies; her Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal Without
Prepayment of Costs or Fees; and her Complaint to Disqualify Tim Tymkovich Chief
Justice of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for Bias and
Prejudice, which she filed in Case No. 15-1433.
10
her § 2254 petition filed with the District of Colorado, Ms. Hamilton indicated she
filed a direct appeal with the Colorado Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme
Court, and that both appeals were resolved on March 2, 2015. Ms. Hamilton also
stated she initiated post-conviction proceedings with the Colorado Supreme Court,
but this petition was also denied on March 2, 2015. Beyond stating that her appeals
were denied, Ms. Hamilton has not provided a copy or description of any decision by
the Colorado appellate courts. Accordingly, we cannot determine whether Ms.
Hamilton raised the same claims in her state-court proceedings that she raises here.
But even if we read Ms. Hamilton’s petition and briefing generously and
assume she satisfied the exhaustion requirement, she has not shown that reasonable
jurists could debate whether she has stated a valid claim for denial of her
constitutional rights. The district court addressed multiple claims in Ms. Hamilton’s
§ 2254 petition, which she reasserts on appeal. First, Ms. Hamilton claims many of
her constitutional rights were violated as a result of sexual-orientation discrimination
by private parties, Aspen police officers, and Colorado state court judges. Second,
Ms. Hamilton alleges she was denied access to cancer treatment while incarcerated.
Third, Ms. Hamilton claims that Colorado law enforcement and state courts failed to
enforce state criminal statutes. Finally, Ms. Hamilton claims ineffective assistance of
counsel, asserting that she pled guilty because she was manipulated by her counsel,
the district attorney, and the trial court judge.
With respect to Ms. Hamilton’s allegations of constitutional violations, she
waived such claims when she pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge of violating a
11
protective order. See United States v. Salazar, 323 F.3d 852, 856 (10th Cir. 2003)
(“[I]t is well established that a voluntary and unconditional guilty plea waives all
non-jurisdictional defenses.”). Indeed, “[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly
admitted in open court that [s]he is in fact guilty of the offense with which [s]he is
charged, [s]he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Criminal defendants who plead guilty “may only
attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea.” Id.
Ms. Hamilton challenges the validity of her guilty plea based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, but she has not identified any specific conduct by her counsel that
could be considered ineffective. “We review a challenge to a guilty plea based on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel using the two-part test announced in
Strickland v. Washington.” United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570 (10th Cir.
1993). “Under this test, the defendant must show that his counsel’s performance ‘fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and that the deficient performance
resulted in prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984)). “To show prejudice in the guilty plea context, the defendant must establish
that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [s]he would not
have pleaded guilty and insisted on going to trial.’” Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). In other words, where a habeas petitioner challenges a guilty
plea, she must establish that reasonable jurists could debate whether “there was a fair
and just reason to withdraw [her] plea” and that, “absent counsel’s failure to
12
[properly] advise him . . . , [s]he would have gone to trial.” United States v. Viera,
674 F.3d 1214, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Hamilton has not met this burden. She asserts that her counsel was
ineffective and that her counsel manipulated her. But beyond these conclusory
statements, Ms. Hamilton has not identified any specific facts or evidence to show
that her counsel acted improperly or ineffectively in negotiating a plea agreement. Nor
does Ms. Hamilton allege any facts to show that her guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary. And because Ms. Hamilton has not shown that she would have gone to trial
if her counsel had not acted deficiently in advising her to accept the plea agreement,
she cannot show prejudice. As a result, we deny her request for a COA on her
ineffective-assistance claim.
With respect to Ms. Hamilton’s claim that she was denied cancer treatment
while incarcerated, this is a challenge to Ms. Hamilton’s conditions of confinement.
The district court correctly held that Ms. Hamilton may not assert such a claim in a
habeas action; the proper avenue is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Standifer v.
Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1280 (10th Cir. 2011). Similarly, Ms. Hamilton’s allegations of
failure to enforce state law cannot be asserted in a § 2254 case. See Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“We have stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief
does not lie for errors of state law. . . . In conducting habeas review, a federal court is
limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862,
865 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[C]laims of state law violations are not cognizable in a federal
13
habeas action.”). Because we cannot decide claims related to conditions of confinement
and violations of state law in this habeas proceeding, we deny the request for a COA for
these claims.5
III. CONCLUSION
Ms. Hamilton has not exhausted her state remedies for many of her claims, and
she has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. We
therefore deny her requests for COA and dismiss her appeals.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
5
We also deny Ms. Hamilton’s Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal
Without Prepayment of Costs or Fees, and her Complaint to Disqualify Tim
Tymkovich Chief Justice of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States
for Bias and Prejudice, which she filed in Case No. 15-1488.
14