Harper v. Guthrie , 660 F. App'x 620 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 30, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ROBERT J. HARPER, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-8125
(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00082-ABJ)
SCOTT M. GUTHRIE; MARK M. (D. Wyo.)
GIFFORD, individually, and in his official
capacity as Wyoming State Bar
Association Counsel; SHANNON
HOWSHAR, individually, and in her
official capacity as Wyoming State Bar
Association Assistant; JENNIFER
CALKINS-SCOGGINS; DONNA CAY
HEINZ, individually, and in her official
capacity on Wyoming’s Commission on
Judicial Conduct and Ethics; MATTHEW
H. MEAD, individually, and in his official
capacity as Wyoming State Governor,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Robert J. Harper, Jr., a Wyoming prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint and its denial of his motion for
an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. Because the notice of appeal was
untimely and no motion for an extension was granted, we lack jurisdiction to reach
the merits of the dismissal order at this time. However, we can and do address the
district court’s denial of Mr. Harper’s motion for an extension of time. We vacate
that order and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Dismissal Order
The district court entered its dismissal order on October 20, 2015. Under Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), Mr. Harper had thirty days to file a notice of appeal. His
notice of appeal was not filed until November 25, 2015, and he concedes it was
untimely. “This court has jurisdiction only to review district court judgments from
which a timely notice of appeal has been filed.” Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d 1300,
1304 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007)). In the
absence of a timely notice of appeal or a valid order extending the time to file notice
of appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider this portion of his appeal.1
1
If, on remand, the district court determines that excusable neglect or good
cause warrants an extension of time, it may grant one, thereby validating
Mr. Harper’s previously filed notice of appeal. See N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Corr.
Med. Servs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1033, 1039 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[S]o long as the order
appealed from remains unchanged in both its form and its content, a premature notice
of appeal retains its validity [once a motion to extend the time to file a notice of
appeal is granted].” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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II. Denial of Motion for an Extension of Time
Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), however, Mr. Harper had an additional thirty
days to file (in the district court) a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of
appeal. See Bishop v. Corsentino, 371 F.3d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 2004). The district
court may grant such a motion upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.
Id.; see also United States v. Lucas, 597 F.2d 243, 245 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting that
“a district court retains limited jurisdiction beyond the running of the total appeal
period” to address a timely filed motion for an extension of time). Mr. Harper timely
filed a motion for an extension of time, citing the limited number of staff at the
prison and the unavailability of legal materials and services as factors contributing to
his inability to timely file his notice of appeal.
The district court denied Mr. Harper’s motion as moot, noting that this Court
had already assigned a case number to his appeal: “Plaintiff . . . filed a Notice of
Appeal on November 25, 2015, which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals assigned
Appeal Number 15-8125 on November 27, 2015. His request is therefore moot.”
R., Vol. 2 at 343 (citations omitted). The district court made no findings as to
whether Mr. Harper’s motion demonstrated excusable neglect or good cause.
Meanwhile, this Court tolled briefing on the merits and issued an order
directing Mr. Harper to address why, given the late notice of appeal, the appeal
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In response, Mr. Harper filed a
revised motion for an extension of time, a memo and affidavit in support of the
motion, and a motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. After the appellees
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filed an opposition to the revised motion for an extension, Mr. Harper filed a reply.2
The jurisdictional issue was then referred to this merits panel, and briefing on the
merits proceeded.
Mr. Harper is a pro se litigant, so we view his filings liberally. See Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to
be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.”). Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4) provides that “[a]n appeal must not be
dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal, or for failure to
name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.” We liberally
construe the requirements of this rule, and even “when papers are technically at
variance with the letter of Rule 3, a court may nonetheless find that the litigant has
complied with the rule if the litigant's action is the functional equivalent of what the
rule requires.” Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Even if a notice fails to properly designate the order from
which the appeal is taken, this Court has jurisdiction if the appellant's intention was
clear.” Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Sines v.
Wilner, 609 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e should not be hypertechnical in
ruling that a notice of appeal does not challenge a judgment or order that the
appellant clearly wished to appeal.”).
2
Although the parties apparently assumed this Court has the authority to
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, we do not. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(5)(A) (vesting such authority in the district court).
4
In light of these considerations, we construe Mr. Harper’s filings in response
to this Court’s order as the functional equivalent of a formal notice of appeal that was
timely filed insofar as he seeks to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion
for an extension of time. Taken together, these filings—all of which were filed
within the appeal period following the order denying the motion for an extension—
show that Mr. Harper clearly intended to appeal that order. In particular, his reply in
support of the revised motion for an extension refers to both the district court’s denial
of his earlier motion for an extension and his filings in response to this Court’s order
tolling briefing on the merits, which included the revised motion for an extension
along with a supporting memo and affidavit. Having determined that we have
jurisdiction over this portion of Mr. Harper’s appeal, we now turn to the underlying
order.
“A district court's order refusing to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
is itself an appealable final judgment . . . which this court reviews only for abuse of
discretion.” Bishop, 371 F.3d at 1206 (internal quotation marks omitted). Failure to
apply the correct legal standard in ruling on a motion constitutes an abuse of
discretion. Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A clear
example of an abuse of discretion exists where the trial court fails to consider the
applicable legal standard or the facts upon which the exercise of its discretionary
judgment is based.”). As stated above, the decision of whether to grant or deny a
motion for an extension of time to file an appeal depends on whether the movant has
shown either excusable neglect or good cause. Bishop, 371 F.3d at 1206.
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We conclude the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Harper’s
motion without addressing whether he had shown excusable neglect or good cause.
Instead, the court determined that the motion was moot because his appeal had
already been assigned a case number by this court. However, “the mere acceptance
and filing of a notice of appeal by a district court is [not] tantamount to the granting
of the requisite extension of time.” Lucas, 597 F.2d at 245 (“[T]he acceptance of a
notice of appeal for filing is a mere clerical function.”). We have an independent
duty to examine our own jurisdiction. Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d
1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001). As this appeal reveals, the acceptance of a notice of
appeal does not guarantee that we have jurisdiction over the appeal. The district
court did not apply the relevant standards for determining whether there was
excusable neglect or good cause, and therefore it abused its discretion by denying
Mr. Harper’s motion for an extension.
III. Conclusion
The order denying Mr. Harper’s motion for an extension of time to file a
notice of appeal is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings thereon.
This court lacks jurisdiction to consider any other issues at this time, and all pending
motions are denied as moot.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
6