Sebastian Juan v. Lynch , 662 F. App'x 642 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 6, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MARIA MAGDALENA SEBASTIAN
JUAN; JENNIFER ALVARADO
SEBASTIAN,
Petitioners,
v. No. 15-9539
(Petition for Review)
LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States
Attorney General,
Respondent.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Maria Magdalena Sebastian Juan (“Sebastian”), a citizen of Guatemala,
petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The parties are familiar with
the facts of this case, which we need not recite here. Exercising jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny her petition.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I
We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
substantial evidence. Witjaksono v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir. 2009).
Under the substantial evidence standard, the record must compel reversal. Id.; see
also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). To secure asylum,
Sebastian must demonstrate that she is a “refugee,” defined as a person outside of her
country who is “unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A). An applicant can establish persecution
by: (1) demonstrating past persecution, which gives rise to a rebuttable presumption
of future persecution; (2) demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution; or
(3) demonstrating “past persecution so severe as to demonstrate compelling reasons
for being unwilling or unable to return,” even absent any danger of future
persecution. Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation
omitted) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)). Sebastian asserts refugee status based on the
first and second prongs.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the harms Sebastian
suffered in Guatemala were insufficiently “extreme” to rise to the level of past
persecution. See Tanuwidjaja v. Holder, 352 F. App’x 281, 283 (10th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (quoting Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998)); see
also Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding no past
2
persecution when asylum applicant was repeatedly beaten and robbed for years, twice
resulting in serious injury). Moreover, during the two years before she entered the
United States, Sebastian lived without major incident. Although she received some
threats during that period, “[t]hreats alone generally do not constitute actual
persecution.” Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003).
Sebastian argues that the BIA impermissibly ignored evidence and
mischaracterized the record. We disagree. Although the BIA recounted the facts in
neutral language, such objective descriptions do not amount to mischaracterization.
Nor does the BIA need to expressly state that it considered specific facts in its
persecution analysis. Reciting those relevant facts is sufficient to show
consideration. See Mena-Flores v. Holder, 776 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015)
(noting the BIA’s obligation to consider a case does not require it to “expressly parse
or refute on the record each individual argument offered by the petitioner”
(quotations and alteration omitted)).
Relatedly, Sebastian argues that the BIA failed to evaluate the evidence
cumulatively. See Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2011). But again,
the BIA does not need to explicitly state that it weighed the record cumulatively. Its
aggregate assessment is evident on the face of the BIA’s decision and its reliance on
the immigration judge’s order: both describe the multiple bases from which
Sebastian claims past persecution, but conclude that this evidence is insufficient for
asylum.
3
Sebastian also contends that the BIA ignored expert and country conditions
evidence relevant to her claims. However, the BIA’s failure to expressly elaborate
on the country condition documentation does not compel a conclusion that it ignored
the evidence. Moreover, even if a country’s broader cultural and political context
generally supports an asylum applicant’s claim, such evidence “does not substitute
for an analysis of the facts of each applicant’s individual circumstances.” de la
Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).
Thus, although the evidence submitted supports Sebastian’s claims generally, it does
not compel a conclusion that she personally suffered harm rising to the level of
persecution. Accordingly, we affirm the BIA’s finding of no past persecution.
“Without a showing of past persecution, an [asylum applicant] must
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that [she] will be individually persecuted
in the future.” Witjaksono, 573 F.3d at 977. Sebastian’s claim of future persecution
is based on the same events and country conditions that she relies upon to establish
past persecution. Having determined that those events do not rise to the level
required to prove past persecution, we conclude that they also do not demonstrate a
well-founded fear of future persecution. See Gallego-Arroyave v. Holder, 505 F.
App’x 749, 754 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
II
Because Sebastian has not met the standard for asylum, she necessarily has not
met the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Karki v. Holder,
715 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2013). Similarly, Sebastian relies on the same evidence
4
to support her claim that she will face a substantial likelihood of torture upon
returning to Guatemala under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Because
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Sebastian is unlikely to face
future persecution in Guatemala, “it is likewise against the odds that she would be
tortured by the government or a proxy for the government.” Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 979(quotation omitted). Thus, Sebastian is ineligible for CAT relief.
III
For the foregoing reasons, Sebastian’s petition for review is DENIED. Her
motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
5