Pelletier v. United States , 653 F. App'x 618 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 27, 2016
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
GLEN PELLETIER; CARRIE LYNN
PELLETIER; HOBIE MATTHEW
WITT,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 15-1358
(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-01377-WJM-CBS)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; (D. Colo.)
JOHN LONGSHORE, Field Director,
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Denver District;
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; STEVEN M.
BRANCH, Field Office Director, Salt
Lake City Field Office,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, MATHESON, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
Submitted on the briefs: **
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Plaintiff-Appellant Glen Pelletier, 1 a citizen of Canada, appeals from a vast
array of orders and judgments by the district court, including the order denying
his third motion to reconsider under Rule 60(b) and granting Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on his habeas petition (ECF No. 157), as well as the
court’s final judgment (ECF No. 158). Because we find no merit in any of Mr.
Pelletier’s arguments, we affirm the district court’s judgments.
Background
Immigration enforcement agents detained Mr. Pelletier on August 28, 2008,
and removal proceedings have continued since his release on bond. His next
hearing in immigration court is scheduled for November 29, 2019. Mr. Pelletier’s
claims against the government in this separate case are primarily based on
Defendants’ failure to issue Mr. Pelletier a Form I-94 Arrival Departure Record
upon his entry into the United States. 2 This failure, Mr. Pelletier asserts, prevents
him from establishing that he entered the United States lawfully in June 2006. In
the first appeal of this case, Pelletier v. United States, 588 F. App’x 784 (10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Mr. Pelletier brought this case together with his wife Carrie Lynn
Pelletier and his stepson Hobie Matthew Witt, both U.S. citizens. For simplicity,
this decision will only refer to Mr. Pelletier.
2
8 C.F.R. § 235.1(h) establishes who is issued a Form I-94. Mr. Pelletier
contends that the district court incorrectly applied the word “and” in this section
to mean “or.” His reading of § 235.1(h) would have entitled him to a Form I-94.
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Cir. 2014), we affirmed the district court’s judgment on Mr. Pelletier’s Fourth
Amendment and suppression claims, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), due process, and equal protection appeals,
and reversed the dismissal of his application for a writ of habeas corpus. We
remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the habeas claim. The
parties are familiar with the remaining facts and lengthy procedural history in this
case, and we need not restate them here.
Discussion
A. Rule 60(b) Motion
Rule 60(b) permits relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding in
limited circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). On appeal, we review an order
denying Rule 60(b) relief only to determine whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying relief; our review does not extend to the underlying
judgment. Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 2016). We
recognize Mr. Pelletier’s contention that our review is de novo given his claim
that the underlying judgment is void. See Stubblefield v. Windsor Capital Grp.,
74 F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 1996). But because Mr. Pelletier has not made a
colorable argument that the underlying judgment is void, our normal standard of
review applies. Relief under Rule 60(b) “is ‘extraordinary and may only be
granted in exceptional circumstances.’” Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222,
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1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 576
(10th Cir. 1996)).
1. Fourth Amendment & Suppression Claims
In his third Rule 60(b) motion (ECF No. 152), Mr. Pelletier asked the
district court to reconsider its rulings on his Fourth Amendment and suppression
claims—judgments that this court explicitly affirmed on appeal. “When a case is
appealed and remanded, the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of
the case and ordinarily will be followed by both the trial court on remand and the
appellate court in any subsequent appeal.” United States v. West, 646 F.3d 745,
747–48 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). This
“mandate rule” establishes that “an appellate mandate binds a lower court on
remand.” 18B Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 4478.3 (2d ed.
Apr. 2016 update). Mr. Pelletier’s Fourth Amendment and suppression claims are
controlled by this court’s earlier mandate and the district court correctly
determined it had no authority to stray from our holdings. We affirm the district
court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(b) on these claims.
2. APA, Due Process, & Equal Protection Claims
In the same motion, Mr. Pelletier also requested the district court
reconsider its decisions on his APA, due process, and equal protection
claims—claims that we dismissed on appeal for lack of jurisdiction without
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addressing the merits. 3 “Law of the case principles do ‘not bar a district court
from acting unless an appellate decision has issued on the merits of the claim
sought to be precluded.’” Wilmer v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 69 F.3d 406, 409
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Caterino, 29 F.3d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir.
1994)). But, “[a] legal decision made at one stage of litigation, unchallenged in a
subsequent appeal when the opportunity to do so existed, becomes the law of the
case for future stages of the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have
waived the right to challenge that decision at a later time.” Concrete Works of
Colo., Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 992 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 353 (10th Cir. 1993)). We agree with the district
court that “[i]f an issue is dismissed for failure to file a notice of appeal,” as the
claims were here, it is “the functional equivalent of not appealing.” Pelletier v.
United States, No. 11-cv-01377-WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 4387909, at *13 (D. Colo.
July 17, 2015). The district court’s original holdings on these claims—rejecting
Mr. Pelletier’s “and/or” argument on its merits—became the law of the case.
The law of the case doctrine does not necessarily prevent the district court
from reconsidering its own holdings. It may do so, however, only in “three
‘exceptionally narrow’ exceptions: (1) when the evidence in a subsequent trial is
substantially different; (2) when controlling authority has subsequently made a
3
All of these arguments hinge on Mr. Pelletier’s “and/or” argument.
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contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues; or (3) when the decision
was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Concrete Works of
Colo., 321 F.3d at 993 (quoting Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 262 F.3d
1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 2001)). Mr. Pelletier contends that the district court’s
previous holdings are “clearly erroneous orders causing manifest injustice.” Aplt.
Br. at 15. He bases his argument again on his “and/or” theory. In reviewing its
original holding on this issue to determine if it was indeed clearly erroneous or
manifestly unjust, the district court once again evaluated this “and/or” theory.
Noting that it was conducting this review “in the rapidly thinning interests of
justice,” the district court again rejected Mr. Pelletier’s reading of 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.1(h). Explaining that this reading would only include Bermudian citizens
and Bahamian nationals that are Canadian permanent residents, the court
concluded “that this would be an extremely small subset of individuals and
plainly not what the Government sought to address through § 235.1(h)(1)(i).”
Pelletier, 2015 WL 4387909, at *14. Finding no clear error, the court therefore
refused to depart from the law of the case and denied relief under Rule 60(b). We
cannot say the district court abused its discretion in so ruling and therefore affirm
this portion of the court’s order as well. 4
4
We reiterate that our review is restricted to whether the district court
abused its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b). We do not reach the
merits of Mr. Pelletier’s “and/or” argument.
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B. Summary Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
On remand, the only claim remaining before the district court was Mr.
Pelletier’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The government moved for
summary judgment on this claim, which the district court granted. We review the
district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standard as the district court. Ribeau v. Katt, 681 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir.
2012). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
To the extent that Mr. Pelletier is attempting to use his habeas petition on
remand as a vehicle to relitigate his APA, constitutional, and suppression claims,
we hold that these arguments are precluded by the law of the case doctrine and
mandate rule, as explained above. It remains unclear what relief Mr. Pelletier
seeks via his habeas petition. To the extent that Mr. Pelletier seeks modification
of or release from the conditions of his bond, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) expressly bars
judicial review of “any action or decision by the Attorney General under this
section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or
denial of bond or parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). To the extent Mr. Pelletier seeks
release from his removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips courts of
jurisdiction “to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from
the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings,
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adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Because the district court could not provide relief to Mr.
Pelletier, Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm
the district court’s grant of Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
Other Appeals
Mr. Pelletier attempts to appeal the district court’s order denying his first
motion to reconsider, entered on June 19, 2014 (ECF No. 133). But he failed to
file an appeal of that order within 60 days as required by Rule 4(a)(1)(B), Fed. R.
App. P., and we therefore dismiss this portion of his appeal. Mr. Pelletier also
attempts to appeal the district court’s order entered on February 4, 2013,
dismissing his habeas and suppression claims (ECF No. 110). We have already
ruled on an appeal from this order, however. Pelletier, 588 F. App’x 784. We
therefore also dismiss this portion of his current appeal. We have considered all
of Mr. Pelletier’s arguments in favor of his remaining appeals. 5 Finding them
without merit, we affirm the district court’s judgment on the remaining issues.
AFFIRMED. We DISMISS that portion of the appeal which seeks to
5
Mr. Pelletier also appeals the: Order denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend
their summary judgment response and denying as moot plaintiffs’ motion to
accept untimely exhibit (ECF No. 157); Order denying plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration of order striking plaintiffs’ second motion for reconsideration
(ECF No. 149); and Order striking plaintiffs’ second motion for reconsideration
(ECF No. 145).
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challenge the district court’s February 4, 2013 and June 19, 2014 orders.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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