Udero v. Apfel ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    AUG 10 1998
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    SUSAN M. UDERO,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 98-2014
    (D.C. No. CIV-96-1269)
    KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner                         (D. N.M.)
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff Susan M. Udero appeals from an order of the district court
    affirming the Commissioner’s determination that while she was eligible for
    disability benefits for a closed period, she is no longer entitled to benefits. We
    reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
    We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his factual
    findings were supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record and
    to determine whether he applied the correct legal standards. See Castellano v.
    Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 
    26 F.3d 1027
    , 1028 (10th Cir. 1994).
    Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
    as adequate to support a conclusion.” 
    Id.
     (quotations omitted). In the course of
    our review, we may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for
    that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 
    933 F.2d 799
    ,
    800 (10th Cir. 1991).
    Ms. Udero alleged disability following an on-the-job injury. The
    administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Ms. Udero had been disabled
    from August 30, 1991, until January 15, 1994, at step five of the five-step
    sequential process, see Williams v. Bowen, 
    844 F.2d 748
    , 750-52 (10th Cir.
    1988). He further determined at step five, that after January 15, 1994, she was no
    longer disabled as she could perform the full range of light and sedentary work as
    long as she could change positions as necessary.
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    Because the ALJ conceded that Ms. Udero was disabled until 1994, we do
    not review whether she was entitled to benefits during that closed period. The
    Commissioner accepts that the medical records during the closed period set forth
    impairments severe enough to entitle her to disability benefits. We, therefore,
    review only the ALJ’s decision that, due to medical improvement, Ms. Udero was
    no longer disabled after January, 15, 1994. We must determine whether that
    conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
    On appeal, Ms. Udero raises two arguments. We reject her argument that
    the ALJ failed to consider her problems with urinary incontinence. The record
    shows that she had not sought treatment for this symptom since 1992. Indeed, in
    January 31, 1994, one physician noted that she did not suffer from urinary
    incontinence. See App. at 354.
    Ms. Udero also argues the ALJ did not consider the combined effect of her
    impairments in determining that she was no longer disabled after January 15,
    1994, as her disability continued past that date. We conclude that the record does
    not contain substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.
    In a closed period case, the ALJ determines that a claimant was disabled
    for a specific period of time which both started and stopped prior to the date of
    the ALJ’s decision. See Pickett v. Bowen, 
    833 F.2d 288
    , 289 n.1 (11th Cir.
    1987). In deciding when to end a closed period of disability, the ALJ must
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    identify specific medical evidence, see Burress v. Apfel, 
    141 F.3d 875
    , 880 (8th
    Cir. 1998) (“objective medical evidence” must show “discrete improvement” in
    claimant’s condition to support choice of closed period date), which leads him to
    conclude the claimant can perform substantial gainful activity.
    In his decision, the ALJ determined that the medical evidence showed
    Ms. Udero’s condition had improved as of January, 15, 1994. He stated that
    Ms. Udero no longer had any limitations on her ability to perform sedentary work
    with a sit-stand option. The ALJ cited to several medical sources to support his
    conclusion. We take issue with each.
    The ALJ cited to a July 1993 occupational therapist’s functional capacity
    evaluation which stated that Ms. Udero retained the physical ability to perform
    sedentary work as long as it allowed for a sit-stand option. The ALJ also cited to
    a January 1994 medical evaluation which he stated indicated that Ms. Udero took
    no medication for pain. See App. at 86, 353. The evaluating physician reported
    that Ms. Udero was taking over-the-counter pain medication, but was a poor
    historian and was unable to relate the exact dosage. See 
    id.
     He prescribed pain
    medication and recommended chronic pain management. See id. at 355-56. The
    evaluating physician noted that Ms. Udero might have an occult fracture in the
    coccyx area which could be “extremely painful.” Id. at 355; see Lester v. Chater,
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    81 F.3d 821
    , 832-33 (9th Cir. 1995) (physician’s medical opinion includes not
    only clinical findings and test interpretations, but also subjective judgments).
    The ALJ noted that Ms. Udero’s treating psychiatrist’s report documented
    significant improvement in her condition as of January 6, 1994. The report
    shows, however, that although the psychiatrist expected that Ms. Udero would be
    able to return to gainful employment, she currently had “numerous” psychological
    barriers and was experiencing anxiety and depression making it difficult for her to
    learn new skills. See App. at 374. The psychiatrist noted that he and the
    psychologist working with Ms. Udero were “proceeding cautiously” with career
    counseling. 
    Id.
    The ALJ also concluded that Ms. Udero’s reports of extremely poor
    memory and concentration were not supported in the record. The ALJ
    acknowledged that one record in March 1994 related more severe problems, but
    he concluded that “by January 1994 the claimant’s psychiatric impairment had
    improved to a non-severe level.” Id. at 101. However, in the July 1993
    functional capacity evaluation, the occupational therapist noted that Ms. Udero
    had cognitive problems which resulted in her having difficulty remembering the
    order of parts to be placed during a one minute test despite extensive practice
    prior to the test. See id. at 280. He also noted that she had poor problem solving
    skills, including a lack of awareness of problems. See id. at 282.
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    The ALJ gave “[s]ignificant credit” to Ms. Udero’s complaints of pain and
    other problems during the closed period of disability. Id. at 90. He did not,
    however, find sufficient support in the record to support her current subjective
    claims of limitations. See id. The ALJ did not state why he found Ms. Udero to
    no longer be credible regarding her subjective complaints after the closed date.
    See Huston v. Bowen, 
    838 F.2d 1125
    , 1133 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Findings as to
    credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and
    not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” (footnote omitted)).
    The record supports Ms. Udero’s complaints of severe pain. See App. at
    355-56. Further, in March of 1994, Ms. Udero’s psychiatrist recommended she be
    admitted to an in-patient treatment program for pain management. See id. at 379.
    Ms. Udero’s testimony of severe pain is not inconsistent with the objective
    medical evidence contained in the medical records and the ALJ failed to support
    his decision to find her testimony not credible.
    The record shows that Ms. Udero continued to receive psychological
    counseling approximately twice a month after the closed period. The ALJ cites
    these reports as showing that Ms. Udero was well-oriented and had an appropriate
    affect. While these reports show that her mood and affect were appropriate, she
    continued to feel anxiety and depression and was tearful during the sessions. See
    App. at 375 (1/12/94); 377 (2/23/94); 378 (3/23/94); 379 (3/29/94); 382 (5/11/94);
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    384 (5/25/94). These reports do not differ significantly from reports prior to
    January, 15, 1994. See id. at 291 (11/3/93: tearful during much of the session,
    angry and depressed, well oriented, thoughts clear); 292 (10/13/93: angry and
    tearful, mood and affect appropriate and oriented in all spheres); 293 (9/29/93:
    having some difficulty sleeping, feels anxious, tearful during interview, well
    oriented, thoughts clear and goal directed).
    At the hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert (VE) whether jobs
    would be available if, in addition to the restriction of alternating sitting and
    standing, Ms. Udero also had mental problems of depression, did not relate well
    to people, and was perhaps affected by agoraphobia. The VE opined that no
    employment would be available. See id. at 422. Based on the above cited
    reports, the record does not show substantial evidence of improvement in
    Ms. Udero’s mental condition. The ALJ failed to explain why he disregarded the
    VE’s conclusion that any potential jobs would be eliminated due to Ms. Udero’s
    psychological problems.
    The ALJ did not specifically explain or otherwise relate the significance of
    the January 15, 1994 date to any definable medical improvement. Instead, he
    simply asserted that, based upon the objective medical evidence, Ms. Udero had
    experienced medical improvement as of that date to the extent that she could
    perform substantial gainful employment existing in the national economy. To
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    reach this conclusion, the ALJ had to ignore evidence in the record which
    conflicted with his conclusion. This he may not do. See Switzer v. Heckler, 
    742 F.2d 382
    , 385-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (Secretary’s attempt to use only portions of
    report “favorable to her position, while ignoring other parts, is improper”); Smith
    v. Bowen, 
    687 F. Supp. 902
    , 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Although the ALJ is not
    required to reconcile every ambiguity and inconsistency of medical testimony, he
    cannot pick and choose evidence that supports a particular conclusion.” (citation
    omitted)).
    We conclude that the ALJ’s decision in this case is not supported by
    substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The judgment of the United States
    District Court for the District of New Mexico is REVERSED with directions to
    remand to the Commissioner with instructions to reinstate Ms. Udero’s disability
    benefits, including retroactive payments, until the Commissioner conducts a
    further hearing and determines that Ms. Udero’s condition has improved to the
    point that she is actually capable of substantial gainful activity. See Pacheco v.
    Sullivan, 
    931 F.2d 695
    , 698 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing White v. Heckler, 
    774 F.2d 994
    , 996-97 (10th Cir. 1985)).
    Because we have held that Ms. Udero continued to be disabled after the
    end date chosen by the ALJ, this new hearing will be for determining whether her
    benefits should be terminated and the standards of 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1594
    (f)(1)-(8)
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    will apply. Should medical improvement be found, any repayment of benefits
    received pursuant to this order and judgment will be governed by 
    42 U.S.C. § 423
    (g). We hold that this appeal was brought in good faith. See id.
    423(g)(2)(B); see also White, 
    774 F.2d at 997
    .
    Entered for the Court
    David M. Ebel
    Circuit Judge
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