Brown v. Jones , 218 F. App'x 805 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 28, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
C HA D BR OWN ,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
No. 06-6299
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-918-R)
(W .D. Okla.)
JUSTIN JONES, Director,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Chad Brow n, an Oklahoma state inmate appearing pro
se, seeks a Certificate of Appealability (COA) so that he may challenge the
district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. M r. Brown claims that he was denied due process during a prison
disciplinary proceeding because the evidence against him was insufficient. The
matter was assigned to a magistrate judge, who recommended that the petition be
denied because the record contained sufficient evidence to support a finding of
misconduct. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations
and denied M r. Brown’s petition. Because M r. Brown’s claim is not reasonably
debatable among jurists, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. See Slack v.
M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Background
In January 2005, while M r. Brown was serving a state sentence at the
Howard M cLeod Correctional Facility in Atoka, Oklahoma, correctional officials
charged him with menacing. Allegedly, an inmate made a sexual threat to a
female sergeant through the ladies’ restroom door, and M r. Brown was the only
inmate in the vicinity of the restroom at that time. See Aplt. Br. Ex. 1, 2, 7. M r.
Brown received notice of the charge against him on January 16, when correctional
officials gave him a copy of the offense report.
M aintaining his innocence, M r. Brown requested a hearing. He asked that
two correctional officers be called to testify that he was not the only one in the
hallway, and he also claimed that video surveillance tapes would show that he
was not the inmate who made the threat. Although the officers were not present
at M r. Brown’s hearing, their statements were made available to him. He was
apparently not given access to the video surveillance tapes he requested, however.
Following the hearing, M r. Brown was found guilty of menacing and
correctional authorities removed 365 days of credits that he had earned and
reduced his classification level for 90 days. M r. Brown was given a copy of the
Disciplinary Hearing Report, in which the hearing officer explained the specific
reasons why he had determined that M r. Brown was guilty. The hearing officer
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noted that he had relied on the reporting officer’s statement that M r. Brown was
the only inmate in the hallway at the time of the incident and the consistent
statement of another officer that he had not observed any other inmate leave the
unit after the threat was made.
M r. Brown pursued administrative remedies within the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections (“ODOC”), appealing the hearing officer’s decision to
the w arden and then the director of the O DOC. On M ay 9, 2005, the director’s
designee issued a decision affirming the finding of guilt and the imposition of
sanctions. The next day, Oklahoma adopted a provision allowing for judicial
review, Okla. Stat. tit. 57 § 564.1, which permits an inmate to appeal an adverse
ODOC final decision in a disciplinary appeal to the state district court within 90
days. M r. Brown did not pursue this remedy; instead, he filed a federal habeas
petition on August 11.
The state moved to dismiss the petition, alleging that M r. Brown had failed
to exhaust state remedies by not appealing the ODOC decision to the state district
court pursuant to § 564.1. Noting conflicting decisions by federal courts in
Oklahoma regarding the retroactivity of the statute and the lack of an
authoritative state court decision on the subject, the magistrate judge declined to
dismiss for failure to exhaust. Instead, he recommended sua sponte that the
district court dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
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Discussion
Before reaching the merits of M r. Brown’s claim, we must determine
whether he is entitled to a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); M iller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). W e will only grant a COA to a petitioner
who makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). M r. Brown may do so by establishing that “reasonable
jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
M r. Brown’s petition asserted that he was denied due process of law when
the hearing officer found him guilty of misconduct based on insufficient evidence.
W e have held that “an inmate’s liberty interest in his earned good time credits
cannot be denied ‘without the minimal safeguards afforded by the D ue Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Taylor v. W allace, 931 F.2d 698, 700
(10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985)). However,
because prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,
“the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”
Id. (quoting W olff v. M cDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)). Rather, the
inmate’s right to due process in a disciplinary proceeding requires only that he
receive: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an
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opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written
statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action.” Superintendent, M ass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454
(1985). Additionally, the factfinder’s conclusions must be supported by “some
evidence in the record.” Id.The district court, relying on the magistrate’s report, concluded that all
three due process requirements were met and that there was evidentiary support
for the finding of misconduct. W e agree, and no reasonable jurist could conclude
otherwise. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. M r. Brown was given advance written
notice of the charge against him when correctional officials provided him with a
copy of the offense report on January 16, 2005. He had a hearing on January 23,
in which he was entitled to present evidence, including statements by two alleged
witnesses. The hearing officer completed a Disciplinary Hearing Report, which
was provided to M r. Brown. In the report, the hearing officer pointed to
statements by corrections officers that M r. Brown was the only one in the vicinity
of the ladies’ restroom and that no other inmates were seen leaving the area at the
time of the incident. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding of
misconduct, notwithstanding M r. Brown’s complaint that he was not provided
various security tapes.
M r. Brown’s appeal also argues that he was denied due process because the
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hearing officer who found him guilty of misconduct was allegedly a witness to the
incident. This issue was not raised in his § 2241 petition and not ruled upon by
the district court. It is well established that we “will not consider an issue raised
for the first time on appeal.” Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229,
1232 (10th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, we DENY the request for a COA, DENY the request to
proceed IFP, and DISM ISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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