United States v. Lahi , 1 F. App'x 776 ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JAN 4 2001
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                   No. 00-2048
    (D.C. No. CR-99-871-JC)
    ROEL LEE LAHI,                                        (D. N.M.)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TACHA, McKAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Defendant Roel Lee Lahi pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault
    on a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 2241(c), and 2246(2)(A) and (D).
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    As part of the plea, Mr. Lahi stipulated that he had 1) used force in committing
    the offenses, and 2) that the victims were under his care and custody at the time
    the crimes occurred. At sentencing, the court imposed enhancements based on
    those stipulations.
    In this appeal, he presents a single issue for the court’s consideration. Mr.
    Lahi maintains, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
    (2000), that
    his sentence must be vacated because he was not put on notice that he was subject
    to increased penalties under the Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, he argues
    the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancements violates Apprendi.
    Because we conclude Mr. Lahi has not presented a colorable Apprendi claim,
    however, we dismiss this matter for lack of jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
    § 3742(a).
    The only relief which Mr. Lahi seeks is remand for new sentencing. Thus,
    we turn first to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) for guidance in determining the proper scope
    of our jurisdiction. Under that statute, we possess jurisdiction to review
    sentences imposed “in violation of law, or as a result of an incorrect application
    of the Guidelines.” See United States v. Garcia, 
    919 F.2d 1478
    , 1479 (10th Cir.
    1990). Because Mr. Lahi argues neither with specificity, the United States
    maintains we have no authority to consider the issue presented.
    -2-
    2
    In contrast, appellant maintains, based on the Apprendi decision, that the
    issue presented is not one related to sentencing, but rather, one regarding the
    sufficiency of the indictment. Mr. Lahi argues the indictment was flawed because
    it did not mention either the “use of force” or “care and custody” enhancement
    factors which were used to increase Mr. Lahi’s sentence. He maintains the failure
    to mention those factors in the indictment renders it insufficient to support the
    crime charged. See United States v. Bullock, 
    914 F.2d 1413
    , 1414 (10th Cir.
    1990) (noting “that the failure of an indictment to state an offense is a fatal defect
    that may be raised at any time”). The argument follows that the resulting
    sentence is, therefore, illegal.
    The essence of Mr. Lahi’s argument relates to the sentence itself.
    Specifically, he maintains the indictment did not include elements which were
    essential to the sentencing procedure. He does not take issue with any other
    aspect of the process, and, indeed, admits that prior to Apprendi there was no
    constitutional issue to raise. Moreover, he does not seek remand to withdraw his
    guilty plea to begin the process over. Rather, he seeks only reconsideration of the
    sentence. Thus, it is the sentence, and not the indictment procedure, which is at
    the core of his argument.
    Although not argued as such in the opening brief, we conclude this is an
    argument regarding the constitutional validity of the sentence. See Garcia, 919
    
    -3- 3 F.2d at 1479-81
    (discussing legislative history of § 3742(a) and noting
    Congressional intent to limit review of sentences imposed within a proper
    Guideline range); see also United States v. Neary, 
    183 F.3d 1196
    , 1198 (10th Cir.
    1999) (defining facially illegal sentences “as those based on race, gender, or other
    considerations contravening clearly established public policy”). Consequently,
    we consider the arguments presented in that context.
    In doing so, however, we conclude Mr. Lahi does not state a reviewable
    claim. He maintains Apprendi applies to cases where, as here, the sentence
    imposed is within the statutory maximum. This argument is unavailing. See
    United States v. Hishaw, No. 99-6258, 
    2000 WL 1862788
    (10th Cir. Dec. 20,
    2000) (concluding defendant could not prevail in showing plain error on Apprendi
    claim where he admitted cocaine possession and received a sentence within the
    statutory maximum proved at trial).
    The maximum penalty for the crime charged is life imprisonment.
    18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Mr. Lahi was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment. That
    is at the low end of the applicable guideline range and is significantly lower than
    the potential maximum. Because the sentence is well below the maximum
    penalty, Mr. Lahi has not presented a colorable Apprendi claim. United States v.
    Doggett, 
    230 F.3d 160
    , 166 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Angle, 
    230 F.3d 113
    ,
    121 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Mack, 
    229 F.3d 226
    , 235 n.12 (3d Cir.
    -4-
    4
    2000); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 
    220 F.3d 926
    , 934 (8th Cir.), cert.
    denied, ___ U.S. ___, No. 00-6746, 
    2000 WL 1634209
    (U.S. Nov. 27, 2000); see
    also United States v. Jones, Nos. 97-1377 & 97-1463, 
    2000 WL 1854077
    (10th
    Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (concluding district courts may not impose a sentence in
    excess of the statutory maximum unless drug quantity is included in the
    indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt). As a result, he cannot make
    an arguable “violation of law” claim under § 3742(a). 1
    Consequently, the appeal is DISMISSED.
    Entered for the Court
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    1
    We express no view on whether this result would change under a different
    factual scenario.
    -5-