Goodwin v. Sugrue ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 4 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MARK ARNOLD GOODWIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 03-6320
(D.C. No. 02-CV-517)
JOHN E. SUGRUE, Warden; (W.D. Okla.)
KATHLEEN HAWK, Director of
Bureau of Prisons,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Mark Arnold Goodwin, a federal inmate proceeding pro se,
appeals the order denying his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking a
sentence reduction based on his completion of a Residential Drug Abuse Program
(the Program), under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). A federal magistrate judge
recommended that the petition be denied, and the district court adopted the
recommendation after a de novo review. The court also denied Mr. Goodwin’s
post-trial motion to reconsider. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291and affirm.
In December of 1996, Mr. Goodwin was sentenced to 120 months’
imprisonment plus five years’ supervised released on his convictions for
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a stolen
firearm. In early 1997, he sought the benefit of § 3621(e)(2)(B), which allows a
sentence reduction of up to one year upon completion of the Program, but only for
those convicted of nonviolent offenses. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) informed
Mr. Goodwin that he was not eligible for early release under § 3621(e)(2)(B)
because his firearm conviction placed him outside the class of nonviolent
offenders, but he was granted permission to participate in the Program anyway.
Mr. Goodwin entered the Program in August of 1997. In August of 1998, the
BOP notified him that he was conditionally eligible for early release. In January
of 2001, however, the BOP notified him that he was not eligible for early release,
-2-
pursuant to Lopez v. Davis , 531 U.S. 230, 244 (2001) (holding BOP had
discretion and authority to deny early release to category of prisoners whose
current offense was a felony involving carrying, possession, or use of firearm).
Mr. Goodwin maintains that the BOP’s withdrawal of his eligibility for early
release violated his rights.
On appeal, Mr. Goodwin asserts that (1) the BOP applied retroactively a
judicial decision to deny him early release in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause, (2) the denial of early release violated his due process rights, (3) the BOP
did not apply the correct rules to him, which improperly caused him to be denied
early release, and (4) the BOP’s attempt to change the regulation governing
eligibility for early release under § 3621(c)(2)(B) was invalid because the
procedure did not comport with the Administrative Procedure Act.
Because he is a federal prisoner, Mr. Goodwin is not required to obtain a
certificate of appealability for review of the order denying his § 2241 petition.
Bledsoe v. United States , 384 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2004). We review de
novo the district court’s decision to deny a writ under § 2241. Id.
As a preliminary matter, we recognize that Mr. Goodwin did not exhaust
administrative remedies. This failure to exhaust does not implicate this court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Garrett v. Fleming , 362 F.3d 692, 694 n.2 (10th Cir.
2004). Therefore, we have considered the merits of Mr. Goodwin’s appeal.
-3-
We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal and the parties’ briefs.
Applying the standard set out above, we affirm the district court’s order denying a
writ under § 2241 for the same reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s
comprehensive and exhaustive recommendation, the district court’s order
adopting the recommendation, and the district court’s order denying
reconsideration.
The district court granted Mr. Goodwin’s motion to proceed without
prepayment of costs and fees on appeal. He is reminded that he is obligated to
continue making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
-4-