Fields v. Romer ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 30 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TROY LAMONTE FIELDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROY ROMER, Governor;
ARISTEDES W. ZAVARAS;
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, EMPLOYEES
KNOWN AND UNKNOWN; STATE
OF COLORADO; BOWIE COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, also
known as Bowie County Detention
Center, Bowie County Detention
Facility, Bowie County Sheriff
Department, and Bowie County Jail,
EMPLOYEES KNOWN AND
UNKNOWN; MARY CHOATE;
TONY RICHARDSON, COLORADO
CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYEES
No. 99-1331
KNOWN AND UNKNOWN; BOWIE
(D.C. No. 95-K-2013)
COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
(Colorado)
EMPLOYEES KNOWN AND
UNKNOWN; BRG HOLDING, INC.,
a Texas corporation,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
KARNES COUNTY, TEXAS, a
political subdivision of the State of
Texas; ROD ELLIS, Warden of the
Karnes County Correctional Center,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Fields is a state prisoner under the custody of the Colorado Department
of Corrections (CDOC). Following his transfer, along with other prisoners, to the
Bowie County Correctional Facility (BCCF) in Bowie County, Texas, Mr. Fields
filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging he was being subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. His action
for damages was severed from a pending class action filed on behalf of all
Colordo inmates who had been transferred to the BCCF due to overcrowding. As
a result of the class action, the inmates, including Mr. Fields, were transferred
back to Colorado. In the present damage action, the district court granted
defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Mr. Fields alleges that the conditions at the Bowie County Correctional
Facility (BCCF) were generally inhumane. He also describes three macing
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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incidents which occurred while he was housed there. Mr. Fields’ complaint
names as defendants, inter alia, the Governor of Colorado, Roy Romer; the
Executive Director of the CDOC, Aristedes Zavaras; the CDOC itself; the Sheriff
of Bowie County, Mary Choate; and the warden of the Bowie County Correctional
Center, Tony Richardson. 1
The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice against all
defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Adopting
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the court dismissed the
complaint against Mr. Richardson because he was not served with process, and
against the CDOC on the basis of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. It
dismissed the suit against all other defendants for Mr. Fields’ failure to allege
their personal participation in his treatment while at the BCCF.
Before proceeding to the merits, we address our jurisdiction over this
appeal. The district court’s final judgment was filed on April 19, 1999, giving
Mr. Fields sixty days from that date in which to timely file a notice of appeal.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Mr. Fields then filed a motion for extension of
his time to file a notice of appeal. The district court granted this motion on June
24, allowing Mr. Fields an extension to file his notice of appeal until July 23,
1
Mr. Fields named additional defendants, but he has not appealed the
dismissal of his complaint against them.
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thirty days later. Mr. Fields filed his notice of appeal on July 21, within that time
period.
Unfortunately, the court did not have the authority to grant Mr. Fields an
extension to that date. Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(C), an extension cannot
exceed sixty days after the final judgment, or “10 days after the date when the
order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later.” Because the sixty day
period had passed, the district court could only grant Mr. Fields an extension for
up to ten days after the June 24th order. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of
London v. Evans, 896 F.2d 1255, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 1990). Mr. Fields’ notice of
appeal is therefore untimely. See id. at 1257.
Mr. Fields arguably fits within the “unique circumstances” doctrine,
however, which “permits an untimely appeal to go forward ‘where a party has
performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing
an appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has
been properly done.’” Home & Family, Inc. v. England Resources Corp., 85 F.3d
478, 479 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169,
179 (1989)). Mr. Fields’ motion for an extension of time was timely filed and
from all appearances was properly done. Moreover, Mr. Fields did not request a
thirty-day extension, and thus he did not invite the court’s error. Cf. Weitz v.
Lovelace Health System, Inc., 214 F.3d 1175, 1179-1180 (10th Cir. 2000)
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(refusing to apply unique circumstances doctrine noting that party had invited the
error by requesting an extension the court had no authority to grant); Certain
Underwriters, 896 F.2d at 1258 (refusing to apply unique circumstances doctrine
where appellant requested a thirty-day extension although the Rules clearly stated
a ten-day extension was the maximum allowable). Had the district court not
assured Mr. Fields that he had thirty days from its June 24 order, but rather ten,
Mr. Fields would have likely filed a timely notice of appeal.
Nevertheless, a plain reading of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(c) notifies Mr.
Fields that the district court was without authority to grant him the thirty-day
extension. In such a situation, we have held that the unique circumstances
doctrine will not apply. See Weitz, 214 F.3d at 1180 (“an extension of time
granted by the court but clearly prohibited entirely by the Federal Rules does not
constitute unique circumstances salvaging an untimely notice of appeal”).
Moreover, Mr. Fields’ pro se status does not affect our analysis. See Van Skiver
v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991) (unique circumstances
doctrine did not save pro se appellant’s untimely notice of appeal). For this
reason, Mr. Fields cannot avail himself of this “disfavored doctrine,” Home &
Family, 85 F.3d at 481, to salvage our jurisdiction over his appeal. But see
United States v. Heller, 957 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that for purposes
of the unique circumstances doctrine, reliance by a pro se litigant on an
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affirmative assurance by a judge may be reasonable where similar reliance by
counsel is unreasonable); Pinion v. Dow Chemical, 928 F.2d 1522, 1533 n.11
(11th Cir. 1991) (noting in dicta that unique circumstances doctrine is more
compelling in cases involving pro se litigants).
Even if Mr. Fields’ pro se status and failure to invite the error converted his
case into one of unique circumstances, we would affirm the district court’s
dismissal in any event. A complaint must be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief. See Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999).
As an arm of the state, the CDOC is immune from Mr. Fields’ suit for
money damages under the Eleventh Amendment, see Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d
1042, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), and the action against the CDOC
was therefore properly dismissed. The dismissal was also appropriate with
respect to defendant Richardson because Mr. Fields failed to serve him with the
complaint. Mr. Fields does not assert any excuse or legal theory that would bring
Mr. Richardson within the jurisdiction of this court.
With respect to the macing incidents, a plaintiff is required to allege
personal involvement or participation in the incident to successfully assert a
section 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80
F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996). Mr. Fields argues that defendants were
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“ultimately responsible” for ensuring his safety. As the district court noted,
supervisor status, or “ultimate responsibility,” is simply insufficient to support
section 1983 liability. See id.Finally, Mr. Fields’ contention regarding the inhumane conditions at BCCF
is an argument that the conditions of confinement violated his Eighth Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1441. Although he alleges that defendants
must have known or should have known of the inhumane conditions as they
existed at BCCF, an allegation that they did in fact know of the conditions is
required to state a valid section 1983 claim. See Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490,
495-96 (10th Cir. 1998) (to establish liability under § 1983 for violating an
inmate’s right to humane conditions of confinement, it is not enough to establish
the official should have known of the risk of harm). 2
In sum, because we are persuaded Mr. Fields failed to timely file a notice
2
Although Mr. Fields makes additional allegations of error committed by
the district court, he does not further address these issues in his brief other than to
make his initial conclusory statements. Despite his pro se status, this court will
not sift through Mr. Fields’ brief in an attempt to construct legal arguments or
theories for him. See Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir.
1997).
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of appeal, we DISMISS for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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