Cook v. Baca , 12 F. App'x 640 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 29 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ELIZABETH H. COOK, FRANK
BOWDEN, and JAMES COOPER,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
No. 00-2180
v. (D. Ct. No. CIV-99-322-BB)
(D. N. Mex.)
JIM BACA, in his capacity as Mayor
of the City of Albuquerque and CITY
OF ALBUQUERQUE,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, LUCERO , Circuit Judge, and BROWN , ^ District
Judge.
Appellants appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment against
them on their First Amendment claims. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge for the District of
^
Kansas, sitting by designation.
The appellants are members of a government watchdog group called
Concerned Citizens of Albuquerque. The appellants opposed a transportation tax
proposal which came before the citizens of Albuquerque for approval on March
31, 1999. Appellee Jim Baca, the mayor of Albuquerque, was a supporter of the
proposed tax.
Albuquerque provides its citizens with water service and mails a monthly
billing statement to those who utilize the city’s water service. Every water bill
provides a space for the mayor of Albuquerque to address a short informational
message to the city’s citizens. On the March, 1999 water bill, Mayor Baca used
the space to advocate the passage of the transportation tax.
On March 25, 1999, the appellants filed suit in federal district court
alleging that Mayor Baca and the city of Albuquerque had violated their rights
under the First Amendment of the Constitution. On July 27, 1999, the appellants
requested access to the water bill in order to distribute a political message of their
own. The city denied the appellants access to the bill. Subsequently, the
appellants filed a supplemental complaint alleging further violations of their First
Amendment rights. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed and, on
April 25, 2000, the district court granted the appellees’ motion and dismissed the
case. This appeal followed.
II.
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We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo applying
the same legal standard applicable in the district court. St. Charles Inv. Co. v.
C.I.R. , 232 F.3d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 2000).
The appellants argue that the mayor’s message on the water bill and the
city’s refusal to place the appellants’ own message on the bill amounted to: (1) an
unconstitutional denial of free speech; (2) unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination; (3) unconstitutional prior restraint; and (4) an unconstitutional use
of public funds. The district court held that the water bill was a non-public
forum, and thus the government’s speech restraint was subject only to a
reasonableness analysis. The court further found that restricting the water bill
message exclusively to the mayor of the city was reasonable. Ancillary to this,
the court found that the restriction was not based on viewpoint discrimination, but
rather on a policy restricting access to the particular non-public forum to the
mayor alone. The court went on to rule that even if the restriction operated as a
prior restraint, the prior restraint was constitutional because the forum was non-
public and the restraint was reasonable. Finally, the district court found that
government funds are inevitably used to promote government objectives that are
contrary to certain taxpayers’ beliefs and convictions. Where government funds
are used for minimal advocacy of a government initiative, there is no ominous
threat to the First Amendment and thus no violation.
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For substantially the same reasons given by the district court, we agree that
the appellants’ First Amendment rights were not violated by the actions of the
appellees. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of appellees’ motion for
summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED PER CURIAM
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