Moya v. Garcia , 895 F.3d 1229 ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                     FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    PUBLISH                                 Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            July 10, 2018
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                              Clerk of Court
    _________________________________
    MARIANO MOYA; LONNIE PETRY, on
    behalf of themselves and all others
    similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                                           No. 17-2037
    (D.C. No. 1:16-CV-01022-WJ-KBM)
    ROBERT GARCIA, Santa Fe County                                (D. N.M.)
    Sheriff; MARK CALDWELL, Warden of
    Santa Fe County Adult Correctional
    Facility; MARK GALLEGOS, former
    Warden Santa Fe County Adult
    Correctional Facility, in their individual
    capacities; BOARD OF
    COMMISSIONERS OF SANTA FE
    COUNTY,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    _________________________________
    ORDER
    _________________________________
    Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BRISCOE, LUCERO, HARTZ, HOLMES,
    MATHESON, BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, McHUGH, MORITZ, EID, and
    CARSON, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    This matter is before the court on the appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc.
    We also have a response from the appellees.
    Upon consideration, a majority of the original panel members grant panel
    rehearing in part and only to the extent of the limited changes made to the attached
    revised opinion. Panel rehearing is otherwise denied. The Clerk is directed to file the
    amended decision, with the original separate writing from Judge McHugh, effective the
    date of this order.
    In addition, however, the petition and the response were circulated to all of the
    judges of the court who are in regular active service. A poll was called, and a majority
    voted to deny the en banc petition. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). Consequently, the request
    for en banc consideration is denied.
    Chief Judge Tymkovich, as well as Judges Lucero, McHugh and Moritz voted to
    grant rehearing en banc.
    Entered for the Court
    ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
    2
    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    PUBLISH                            Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     July 10, 2018
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
    _________________________________
    MARIANO MOYA, LONNIE
    PETRY, on behalf of themselves and
    all others similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                                  No. 17-2037
    ROBERT GARCIA, Santa Fe County
    Sheriff; MARK CALDWELL,
    Warden of Santa Fe County Adult
    Correctional Facility; MARK
    GALLEGOS, former Warden of
    Santa Fe County Adult Correctional
    Facility, in their individual
    capacities; BOARD OF
    COMMISSIONERS OF SANTA FE
    COUNTY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    _________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Mexico
    (D.C. No. 1:16-CV-01022-WJ-KBM)
    _________________________________
    A. Nathaniel Chakeres (Todd A. Coberly with him on the briefs), of
    Coberly & Martinez, LLLP, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-
    Appellants.
    Brandon Huss of The New Mexico Association of Counties, Santa Fe, New
    Mexico, for Defendants-Appellees.
    _________________________________
    Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________
    This appeal involves claims of overdetention by Mr. Mariano Moya
    and Mr. Lonnie Petry. Both men were arrested based on outstanding
    warrants and detained in a county jail for 30 days or more prior to their
    arraignments. These arraignment delays violated New Mexico law, which
    requires arraignment of a defendant within 15 days of arrest. N.M. Stat.
    Ann. § 31-1-3; Rule 5-303(A) NMRA.
    The arraignment delays led Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry to sue under 42
    U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of due process, alleging claims against
         Sheriff Robert Garcia, Warden Mark Caldwell, and former
    Warden Mark Gallegos in their individual capacities under
    theories of personal participation and supervisory liability and
         the Board of Commissioners of Santa Fe County under a theory
    of municipal liability.
    The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to
    state a valid claim. We affirm because Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry failed to
    plausibly allege a factual basis for liability. 1
    1
    The complaint contains claims based on both substantive and
    procedural due process. Based on our disposition, we need not distinguish
    between the claims involving procedural and substantive due process.
    2
    I.    Standard of Review
    We engage in de novo review of the dismissal under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Albers v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 
    771 F.3d 697
    , 700
    (10th Cir. 2014). In engaging in this review, we credit the well-pleaded
    allegations in the complaint and construe them favorably to the plaintiffs.
    Thomas v. Kaven, 
    765 F.3d 1183
    , 1190 (10th Cir. 2014). To withstand
    dismissal, the plaintiffs’ allegations must “state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570
    (2007). The claim is plausible only if it contains sufficient factual
    allegations to allow the court to reasonably infer liability. Ashcroft v.
    Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009).
    II.   Supervisory Liability
    The individual defendants served as the sheriff and wardens of the
    jail where Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry were detained. These defendants could
    potentially incur liability under § 1983 if they had acted under color of
    state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But individual officials enjoy qualified
    immunity when their conduct does not violate “‘clearly established
    statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
    known.’” Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 
    816 F.3d 645
    , 655 (10th Cir.
    2016) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 
    555 U.S. 223
    , 231 (2009)).
    To avoid qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a
    plaintiff must show that
    3
            “‘the defendant’s [alleged conduct] violated a constitutional or
    statutory right’” and
            “the right was ‘clearly established at the time of the
    [violation].’”
    Thomas v. Kaven, 
    765 F.3d 1183
    , 1194 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Archuleta
    v. Wagner, 
    523 F.3d 1278
    , 1283 (10th Cir. 2008)). There are two questions
    at the first step:
    1.   whether the plaintiff has adequately alleged the violation of a
    constitutional or statutory right and
    2.   whether the defendant’s alleged conduct deprived the plaintiff
    of that right.
    See Dodds v. Richardson, 
    614 F.3d 1185
    , 1192-94 (10th Cir. 2010)
    (engaging in this two-part analysis of the first step of qualified immunity).
    The first question is whether Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry have
    adequately alleged a deprivation of due process. We need not decide this
    question because of our answer to the second question: in our view, the
    complaint does not plausibly allege facts attributing the potential
    constitutional violation to the sheriff or wardens. 2
    To prevail, Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry must have alleged facts showing
    that the sheriff and wardens had been personally involved in the underlying
    violations through their own participation or supervisory control. Dodds v.
    2
    Even in the absence of qualified immunity, Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry
    would have needed to adequately allege facts attributing the potential
    constitutional violation to the defendants.
    4
    Richardson, 
    614 F.3d 1185
    , 1195 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Brown v.
    Montoya, 
    662 F.3d 1152
    , 1163 (10th Cir. 2011) (“A § 1983 defendant sued
    in an individual capacity may be subject to personal liability and/or
    supervisory liability.”). The district court rejected both theories of
    liability. Here, though, Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry rely only on their theory
    of supervisory liability. For this theory, Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry blame the
    sheriff and wardens for the delays in the arraignments. In our view,
    however, the sheriff and wardens did not cause the arraignment delays. 3
    A plaintiff may succeed on a § 1983 supervisory-liability claim by
    showing that the defendant
         “promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility
    for the continued operation of a policy that . . . caused the
    complained of constitutional harm” and
         “acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged
    constitutional deprivation.”
    
    Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199
    . But the arraignments could not be scheduled by
    anyone working for the sheriff or wardens; scheduling of the arraignments
    lay solely with the state trial court.
    Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry disagree, relying on Wilson v. Montano, 
    715 F.3d 847
    (10th Cir. 2013). There two sheriff’s deputies arrested Mr.
    Wilson without a warrant. 
    Wilson, 715 F.3d at 850
    . He was taken to jail
    3
    The dissent disagrees with our causation analysis. In our view,
    however, the dissent stretches both the plaintiffs’ theory of liability and
    the standard of causation applicable to § 1983 claims.
    5
    and detained for eleven days without the filing of a complaint or an
    opportunity for a probable-cause determination. 
    Id. Mr. Wilson
    sued the
    sheriff and the warden, alleging that they (1) had routinely allowed
    deputies to make arrests without warrants and (2) had failed to file
    criminal complaints or bring the arrestees to court. 
    Id. at 851.
    The Wilson
    court upheld supervisory liability, reasoning that under New Mexico law
    the sheriff and the warden were responsible for running the jail and
    ensuring prompt probable-cause determinations. 
    Id. at 856-58.
    Wilson differs from our case on who controlled the situation causing
    the overdetention. In Wilson, the sheriff and the warden were in control
    because (1) deputy sheriffs had arrested Mr. Wilson and (2) the warden’s
    staff had detained Mr. Wilson without a warrant. These facts proved
    decisive because (1) New Mexico law requires the sheriff to “diligently
    file a complaint or information,” N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-37-4, 29-1-1, and
    (2) the sheriff’s staff had never filed a complaint against Mr. Wilson.
    
    Wilson, 715 F.3d at 851
    , 853. Without a complaint, the court could not
    make a probable-cause determination. By preventing a probable-cause
    determination, the sheriff impeded the criminal-justice process; and the
    warden exacerbated the delay by detaining Mr. Wilson for eleven days
    without a court order. 
    Id. at 857-59.
    In contrast, the court was firmly in control here. Grand juries
    indicted Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry, and both individuals were arrested based
    6
    on outstanding warrants issued by the court. And after these arrests, jail
    officials notified the court that Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry were in custody.
    The arrests triggered New Mexico’s Rules of Criminal Procedure,
    which entitled Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry to arraignments within fifteen days.
    Rule 5-303(A) NMRA. Compliance with this requirement lay solely with
    the court, for an arraignment is a court proceeding that takes place only
    when scheduled by the court. See People v. Carter, 
    699 N.E.2d 35
    , 38
    (N.Y. 1998) (“Responsibility for scheduling an arraignment date and
    securing a defendant’s appearance lies with the court, not the People.”).
    The court failed to comply with this requirement, resulting in
    overdetention of Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry. These overdetentions were
    caused by the court’s failure to schedule and conduct timely arraignments
    rather than a lapse by the sheriff or wardens. See Webb v. Thompson, 643
    F. App’x 718, 726 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (Gorsuch, J., concurring
    in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he only relevant law anyone has cited
    to us comes from state law, and it indicates that the duty to ensure a
    constitutionally timely arraignment in Utah falls on the arresting officer—
    not on correctional officers.”).
    Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry argue that the sheriff and wardens could
    have mitigated the risk of overdetention by keeping track of whether
    detainees had been timely arraigned, requesting arraignments for those who
    had been overdetained, or bringing detainees to court prior to a scheduled
    7
    arraignment. But even if the sheriff and wardens had taken these actions,
    the allegations in the complaint give us no reason to think that the state
    trial court would have conducted the arraignments and ordered release any
    earlier than it did. Thus, the sheriff and wardens did not cause the
    overdetention.
    At most, the sheriff and wardens failed to remind the court that it
    was taking too long to arraign Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry. But even with such
    a reminder, the arraignments could only be scheduled by the court itself.
    See Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 
    197 F.3d 1245
    , 1248
    (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the county did not cause the overdetention,
    reasoning that the county could only ask for federal help and that the
    county lacked the “ability itself to bring the prisoner before the
    appropriate judicial officer”). 4
    4
    The dissent points out that (1) Estate of Brooks involved a federal
    detainee’s claim against a county and (2) our case involves a state
    detainee. Dissent at 14 n.7. This difference shrouds the underlying
    rationale in Estate of Brooks. There the court reasoned that the county’s
    policies did not cause the overdetention because the county lacked
    authority to release the detainee or bring him before a federal magistrate
    judge. Estate of 
    Brooks, 197 F.3d at 1248
    . Here the defendants did not
    cause the overdetention because they could not have initiated an
    arraignment and, as discussed below, the plaintiffs have disavowed any
    argument that the sheriff or wardens could have ordered release. See pp.
    10-11, below.
    Although the circumstances differed in Estate of Brooks, the court
    reasoned that the jailers’ limited powers prevented causation. That
    rationale is applicable and persuasive.
    8
    The plaintiffs rely in part on Armstrong v. Squadrito, 
    152 F.3d 564
    (7th Cir. 1998), and Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 
    954 F.2d 1470
    (9th
    Cir. 1992). In those cases, a clerical error prevented the court from
    discovering the arrests and the need to schedule arraignments. 5 But here,
    Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry do not allege a failure to tell the court of their
    arrests in sufficient time to conduct the arraignments within fifteen days.
    Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry also rely on Jauch v. Choctaw County, 
    874 F.3d 425
    (5th Cir. 2017), and Hayes v. Faulkner County, 
    388 F.3d 669
    (8th
    Cir. 2004). But the conclusions in Jauch and Hayes are not precedential,
    pertinent, or persuasive.
    In Jauch, the sheriff’s office adopted a procedure of holding
    defendants in jail without any court proceeding until the reconvening of
    the circuit court that had issued the capias warrants. 
    Jauch, 874 F.3d at 430
    , 435. This procedure resulted in detention for 96 days, with jail
    officials rejecting the defendant’s requests to be brought before a judge.
    
    Id. at 428.
    The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the sheriff could
    5
    Oviatt arguably implies that jailers can cause an arraignment delay
    by failing to remind a court to schedule the arraignment. To the extent that
    Oviatt draws this implication, we disagree.
    9
    incur liability for the institution of this unconstitutional policy. 
    Id. at 436-
    37. 6
    In our view, Jauch bears limited applicability. Jauch rested on
    Mississippi law and the jailers’ authority to release detainees when they
    had been detained too long without an opportunity for bail. 
    Id. In interpreting
    Mississippi law, the court pointed to Sheffield v. Reece, 
    28 So. 2d
    745, 748 (Miss. 1947), which had required sheriffs to prevent detention
    “‘for an unreasonable length of time.’” 
    Jauch, 874 F.3d at 437
    (quoting
    Sheffield, 
    28 So. 2d
    at 748). As Jauch pointed out, Sheffield had
    recognized the responsibility of the sheriff to release an arrestee who has
    been detained too long without bail. 
    Id. at 437.
    Here, however, Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry have not alleged that they
    could have been released. To the contrary, they expressly disavowed this
    theory in their opening brief:
    [The district court] . . . noted that the [county jail] was legally
    prohibited from releasing detainees without a valid court order.
    Yet Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry never argued that
    Defendants should have unconditionally released them from
    jail, so the fact that the [county jail] may have been prohibited
    from releasing them absent a court order is irrelevant.
    6
    On the basis of the sheriff’s policy, the county also incurred liability.
    
    Jauch, 874 F.3d at 436
    .
    10
    Appellants’ Opening Br. at 29 (citation omitted). In light of this disavowal
    of an argument that Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry should have been released,
    Jauch provides little guidance on what the sheriff and wardens could have
    done to avoid the due process violations other than remind the state trial
    court of its failure to schedule timely arraignments. 7
    Hayes, too, provides little that is pertinent or persuasive. There an
    arrestee alleged that (1) he should have been brought before a judge in a
    timely manner and (2) no one from the jail had told him when his court
    date was (even though one had been set at the time of arrest). Hayes v.
    Faulkner Cty., 
    388 F.3d 669
    , 672 (8th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit Court
    7
    In Jauch, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently denied a
    petition for rehearing en banc. See Jauch v. Choctaw Cty., 
    886 F.3d 534
    (5th Cir. 2018). Judge Southwick—joined by five other judges—dissented
    from the denial, arguing that the sheriff should have obtained qualified
    immunity. 
    Id. at 535
    (Southwick, J., dissenting). In making this argument,
    the dissent concluded that
         under Mississippi law, the state district court had the sole
    responsibility to schedule an arraignment and
         no federal law clearly established that the sheriff would violate
    the U.S. Constitution by following state law.
    
    Id. at 538-41.
    In reaching these conclusions, the dissent observed that
    under Mississippi law, the jailers could not prevent the overdetention
    because the state district court had the exclusive authority to schedule and
    conduct arraignments. See 
    id. at 535
    (“I cannot discern how these
    defendants had any effect on when this plaintiff was considered for
    release.”); 
    id. at 539
    (“There was no obligation on the sheriff to have Jauch
    arraigned because that is a duty that falls elsewhere.”); 
    id. at 538
    (“The
    clear responsibilities relevant to this case are those of the county’s circuit
    court judges.”).
    11
    of Appeals concluded that an extended detention without a first
    appearance, after an arrest by warrant, violated the Due Process Clause of
    the Fourteenth Amendment. 
    Id. at 673.
    The court added that responsibility
    for the arrestee’s overdetention fell on the jailers, who could not delegate
    responsibility for the first appearance to the court. 
    Id. at 674.
    But Hayes sheds no light on what the jailers here could have done to
    ensure timely court proceedings. In Hayes, the Eighth Circuit apparently
    relied on a state procedural rule: Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.1.
    This rule requires arrestees to be brought before the court “‘without
    unnecessary delay.’” 
    Id. at 675
    (quoting Ark. R. Crim. P. 8.1).
    Like Arkansas, New Mexico requires “[e]very accused” to be
    “brought before a court . . . without unnecessary delay.” N.M. Stat. Ann.
    § 31-1-5(B). Arkansas’s version goes no further, omitting any mention of
    who is required to bring the arrestee to court. Ark. R. Crim. P. 8.1. New
    Mexico takes a different approach, clarifying elsewhere that the arresting
    officer is obligated to bring the defendant to court “without unnecessary
    delay.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-4(C). 8
    Unlike the Arkansas rule, New Mexico’s version of the rule does not
    impose any duties on the sheriff or warden to bring an arrestee to court in
    8
    This statute did not apply here, for the plaintiffs do not allege that
    they were arrested by officers subject to the defendants’ supervisory
    authority. We thus have no occasion to decide whether a cause of action
    could have been asserted against the arresting officers or their supervisors.
    12
    the absence of a scheduled arraignment. In light of this difference between
    the Arkansas and New Mexico rules, we see nothing in Hayes to tell us
    what the sheriff or wardens could have done to provide timely
    arraignments for Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry.
    The approach taken in Hayes is also inconsistent with our own
    precedent. The Hayes court attributed responsibility to the jailers based
    solely on federal law, not state law. By contrast, our precedent directs us
    to focus on state law when determining the scope of the defendants’
    responsibility to ensure prompt hearings. See Wilson v. Montano, 
    715 F.3d 847
    , 854 (10th Cir. 2013) (“We consider New Mexico state law insofar as
    it bears on the scope of each appellant’s responsibility to ensure a prompt
    probable cause determination.”).
    And as we have discussed, New Mexico law did not require the
    sheriff or wardens to bring Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry to court. Accordingly,
    once the arresting officers brought Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry to the jail and
    the court was notified of the arrests, New Mexico law required the court
    (not the sheriff or wardens) to schedule timely arraignments.
    Under New Mexico law, Jauch and Hayes provide little guidance to
    us in addressing the issue framed by Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry. They allege
    that the state trial court failed to schedule timely arraignments and that the
    sheriff and wardens told the court about the arrests early enough for timely
    arraignments. But Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry did not sue the court; they sued
    13
    the sheriff and wardens, officials that could not have caused the
    arraignment delays because of their inability to schedule the arraignments.
    III.   The Dissent’s Theory
    The dissent argues that we have analyzed the wrong right. According
    to the dissent, the right to an arraignment within fifteen days is “‘an
    expectation of receiving process,’” which cannot alone be a protected
    liberty interest. Dissent at 4-5, 8, 13 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 
    461 U.S. 238
    , 250 n.12 (1983)). Thus, the dissent reasons that the right at issue
    must be the right to freedom from pretrial detention rather than the right to
    a timely arraignment. Based on this reasoning, the dissent concludes that
    our misplaced focus on the arraignments has caused us to improperly focus
    on the state district court’s role and overlook actions that the defendants
    could have taken, such as releasing Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry.
    We have focused on the plaintiffs’ right to timely arraignment
    because that’s what the plaintiffs have alleged. As the dissent admits, Mr.
    Moya and Mr. Petry are imprecise about their asserted right, conflating the
    right to an arraignment within fifteen days of arrest and the right to
    pretrial release (or bail). This conflation is understandable because the
    rights are coextensive under their theory of the case.
    Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry recognize freedom from detention as an
    applicable liberty interest. See, e.g., Joint App’x at 7 (stating in the
    complaint that the New Mexico Constitution creates a right to pretrial
    14
    liberty); 
    id. at 83
    (asserting in district court briefing that Mr. Moya and
    Mr. Petry “have a liberty interest in not being unnecessarily detained
    without the opportunity to post bail”); Appellants’ Opening Br. at 16 (“The
    principal protected liberty interest that may be created by state law is the
    freedom from detention.”). But Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry also allege a right
    to an arraignment within fifteen days of arrest. See, e.g., Joint App’x at 14
    (alleging in the complaint that “[b]ecause detainees charged in New
    Mexico district courts . . . are guaranteed the right under state law to have
    their conditions of release set at the least restrictive level to assure their
    appearance and the safety of . . . the community within fifteen days of their
    indictment or arrest, they have a federally protected liberty interest in this
    right”); 
    id. at 69
    (asserting in district court that “Plaintiffs had a liberty
    interest in having bail set within fifteen days of their arrest”); Appellants’
    Opening Br. at 36 (“In summary, under settled procedural due process
    principles, Defendants deprived Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry of their liberty
    interest in a prompt pretrial arraignment . . . .”).
    Under the theory articulated by Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry, the
    defendants violated the right to freedom from detention by failing to
    ensure timely arraignments. See, e.g., Appellants’ Opening Br. at 41 (“The
    Complaint alleged that the failure to implement any policies ensuring that
    detainees appear before a district court within fifteen days of indictment or
    arrest caused Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry to be injured.”). The rights are
    15
    coextensive to Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry because to them, a violation of the
    right to a timely arraignment resulted in violation of their right to freedom
    from prolonged detention. 9
    Yet the dissent disregards the claim of delay in the arraignment
    because this claim would founder based on the absence of a due-process
    violation. The dissent may be right about the absence of a due-process
    violation from a delay in an arraignment. 10 But in our view, we should
    interpret the claim and appeal based on what the plaintiffs have actually
    said rather than which possible interpretation could succeed. In district
    court, the plaintiffs based their claim on the delays in arraignments. And
    on appeal, the plaintiffs have consistently framed their argument based on
    the arraignment delays. The dissent’s theory is not the theory presented by
    the plaintiffs. 11
    9
    This link is illustrated by the plaintiffs’ definition of the class. In the
    complaint, Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry identified the class to include everyone
    detained at the same facility as the named plaintiffs within the previous
    three years “who [had not been] brought before a district court within
    fifteen days of their indictment or arrest to have their conditions of release
    set or reviewed.” Joint App’x at 12-13. Timely arraignment is so
    fundamental to Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry’s claims that the fifteen-day
    demarcation defines class membership.
    10
    As noted above, we have assumed for the sake of argument that the
    arraignment delays would result in a deprivation of due process. See p. 4,
    above.
    11
    For this reason, we need not decide whether Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry
    would have stated a valid claim if they had alleged a broader right to
    16
    As discussed above, the defendants were powerless to cause timely
    arraignments because arraignments are scheduled by the court rather than
    jail officials. The dissent agrees.
    But the dissent theorizes that jail officials could have simply
    released Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry. This theory is not only new but also
    contrary to what Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry have told us, for they expressly
    disavowed this theory: “Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry never argued that
    Defendants should have unconditionally released them from jail . . . .”
    Appellants’ Opening Br. at 29; see pp. 10-11, above. Thus, Mr. Moya and
    Mr. Petry have waived reliance on that theory as a basis for reversal. See
    Modoc Lassen Indian Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
    
    864 F.3d 1212
    , 1224 n.8 (10th Cir. Jul. 25, 2017) (stating that a theory
    never raised was waived as a basis for reversal).
    Even if it were otherwise appropriate to raise the issue sua sponte,
    the dissent’s theory would create a Catch-22 for jailers. Under New
    Mexico law, jailers commit a misdemeanor and must be removed from
    office if they deliberately release a prisoner absent a court order. N.M.
    Stat. Ann. § 33-3-12. Thus, a jailer would be forced to choose between
    committing a crime and facing civil liability under § 1983.
    freedom from pretrial detention (unrelated to Rule 5-303(A)’s fifteen-day
    requirement). We are deciding only the validity of the theory advanced by
    Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry.
    17
    According to the dissent, jailers can eventually defend themselves
    based on the Supremacy Clause. But Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry do not
    challenge the constitutionality of the state law preventing release in the
    absence of a court order. See Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United
    States, 
    197 F.3d 1245
    , 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of a
    § 1983 claim involving overdetention when the county defendant was
    required under state law to hold the plaintiff detainee until receiving an
    order from the United States and the plaintiff made no allegation that the
    statute was unconstitutional).
    Even if Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry had challenged the constitutionality
    of the state law, the Supremacy Clause would supply cold comfort to a
    jailer facing this dilemma, particularly in light of the dissent’s
    acknowledgment that there is no bright-line rule for when a delayed
    arraignment becomes a due-process violation. See Dissent at 5-11. We need
    not decide whether the Constitution would subject jailers to this Catch-22.
    * * *
    The state trial court’s alleged failure to schedule timely arraignments
    cannot be attributed to the sheriff or wardens. Thus, the complaint does not
    plausibly allege a basis for supervisory liability of the sheriff or wardens.
    IV.   Municipal Liability
    Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry also assert § 1983 claims against the county,
    alleging that it failed to adopt a policy to ensure arraignments within
    18
    fifteen days. These claims are based on the alleged inaction by the sheriff
    and wardens. But, as discussed above, the sheriff and wardens did not
    cause the arraignment delays. Thus, the county could not incur liability
    under § 1983 on the basis of the alleged inaction. See Schneider v. City of
    Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 
    717 F.3d 760
    , 777 (10th Cir. 2013).
    Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of the claims against the county.
    V.    Leave to Amend
    In opposing dismissal, Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry stated generically
    that amendment would not be futile and that they should have the
    opportunity to amend if an element were deemed missing from the
    complaint. The district court dismissed the complaint without granting
    leave to amend. Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry argue that the district court erred
    by refusing to allow amendment of the complaint.
    Generally, leave to amend should be freely granted when justice
    requires, but amendment may be denied when it would be futile. Full Life
    Hospice, LLC v. Sebelius, 
    709 F.3d 1012
    , 1018 (10th Cir. 2013). We
    conclude that the district court did not err because amendment would have
    been futile based on the plaintiffs’ submissions.
    We ordinarily apply the abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing
    a denial of leave to amend. Fields v. City of Tulsa, 
    753 F.3d 1000
    , 1012
    (10th Cir. 2014). But here, the district court denied leave to amend based
    on futility. In this circumstance, “our review for abuse of discretion
    19
    includes de novo review of the legal basis for the finding of futility.”
    Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 
    565 F.3d 1232
    , 1249 (10th Cir. 2009).
    The complaint fails to allege a factual basis for supervisory or
    municipal liability. To cure the pleading defect, the plaintiffs needed to
    add factual allegations tying the arraignment delays to a lapse by the
    sheriff or wardens. The plaintiffs did not say how they could cure this
    pleading defect. Instead, they stated only that amendment would not be
    futile if the complaint had omitted an element. They did not tell the district
    court what they could have added to attribute the arraignment delays to the
    sheriff or wardens.
    Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry have failed to say even now how they could
    have cured this defect in the complaint. As a result, the district court did
    not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint. See Hall
    v. Witteman, 
    584 F.3d 859
    , 868 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend when the
    claimant had failed to explain how an amendment would cure the
    deficiencies identified by the district court).
    VI.   Conclusion
    Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry allege a deprivation of due process when
    they were detained for more than fifteen days without arraignments. We
    can assume, without deciding, that this allegation involved a constitutional
    20
    violation. But Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry sued the sheriff, wardens, and
    county, and these parties did not cause the arraignment delays. Thus, the
    district court did not err in dismissing the complaint or in denying leave to
    amend.
    21
    17-2037, Moya v. Garcia
    McHUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part.
    Mariano Moya was arrested pursuant to a valid bench warrant and booked into a
    Santa Fe County jail. The warrant, issued by New Mexico’s First Judicial District Court,
    commanded any authorized officer to (1) arrest Mr. Moya and (2) bring him “forthwith”
    before said court. New Mexico’s law enforcement officers complied with the first
    directive, but not the second. As a result, Mr. Moya sat in jail for more than two months.1
    When finally brought before a judge—sixty-three days after he was first detained—the
    judge set bond at $5,000 and directed the state to release Mr. Moya from custody
    immediately. The same thing happened to Lonnie Petry, except that his jail stay was only
    about half as long.
    Believing their prolonged detentions to be systemic of a policy and practice
    affecting dozens, if not hundreds, of similarly situated arrestees, Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry
    brought this § 1983 action against the Board of Commissioners of Santa Fe County (“the
    County”) and three County officials who were responsible for implementing policy at the
    jail. The majority affirms the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to allege plausibly
    that any of these defendants violated their constitutional rights. Respectfully, I disagree. I
    would reverse the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against the County.
    1
    Because the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
    we presume Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are true. See Dahn v. Amedei, 
    867 F.3d 1178
    ,
    1185 (10th Cir. 2017).
    But because the Defendants did not violate clearly established law, I would hold that the
    individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and, on that basis alone, partially
    affirm the district court’s order.
    I.     PLAINTIFFS’ THEORIES OF HARM
    To begin, it is important to be clear about the nature of the alleged constitutional
    violations. Plaintiffs’ claims fall “into a category of claims which unfortunately have
    become so common that they have acquired their own term of art: ‘overdetention,’ i.e.,
    when the plaintiff has been imprisoned by the defendant for longer than legally
    authorized, whether because the plaintiff’s incarcerative sentence has expired or
    otherwise.” Dodds v. Richardson, 
    614 F.3d 1185
    , 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) (some internal
    quotation marks omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs argue that their overdetention supports
    both a procedural due process claim and a substantive due process claim. Although the
    majority does not distinguish between these theories, see Maj. Op. at 2 n.1, I think it
    worthwhile to consider how Plaintiffs’ allegations fit within each framework.
    A.    Procedural Due Process
    “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which
    deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process
    Clause of the . . . Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 332
    (1976) (quotations omitted). “To assess whether an individual was denied procedural due
    process, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess a
    protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable; and, if so, then
    2
    (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process.” Merrifield v. Bd. of Cty.
    Comm’rs, 
    654 F.3d 1073
    , 1078 (10th Cir. 2011).2
    Starting with the first prong, “[p]rotected liberty interests may arise from two
    sources—the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.” Kentucky Dep’t of
    Corr. v. Thompson, 
    490 U.S. 454
    , 460 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
    have already held that the “right of an accused to freedom pending trial is inherent in the
    concept of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
    Amendment.” 
    Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1192
    ; Meechaicum v. Fountain, 
    696 F.2d 790
    , 791–92
    (10th Cir. 1983).3
    2
    In Jauch v. Chocraw Cty., 
    874 F.3d 425
    , 431 (5th Cir. 2017), the Fifth Circuit
    analyzed a comparable procedural due process claim under the framework set forth in
    Medina v. California, 
    505 U.S. 437
    , 443 (1992), rather than the framework set forth in
    Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 332 (1976). In this case, both parties have assumed
    that the Mathews framework applies. For purposes of this dissent, I will presume without
    deciding that the Mathews framework is applicable.
    3
    There is no serious question that Plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest
    arising from the Due Process Clause itself. “[T]o determine whether due process
    requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of
    the interest at stake.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 
    408 U.S. 564
    , 570–71 (1972)
    (citation omitted). The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment “denotes not
    merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
    engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, [and so
    on]. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
    ‘liberty’ must be broad indeed.” 
    Id. at 572
    (citation omitted) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska,
    
    262 U.S. 390
    , 399 (1923)). In this case, the Plaintiffs allege they were deprived of
    freedom from bodily restraint—the very core of liberty itself. This a state cannot do
    without affording adequate process. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 
    430 U.S. 651
    , 674
    (1977) (“It is fundamental that the state cannot hold . . . an individual except in
    accordance with due process of law.”).
    3
    In this case, however, Plaintiffs assert that the protected liberty interest grounding
    their procedural due process claims arises not from the Due Process Clause itself, but
    rather from New Mexico law. This is fine. See Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 483–84
    (1995) (“States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are
    protected by the Due Process Clause[, b]ut these interests will be generally limited to
    freedom from restraint . . . .” (citation omitted)). But it is imperative that we accurately
    identify the exact nature of the state-created liberty interest Plaintiffs seek to protect. In
    presenting their case, Plaintiffs have tended to conflate the right to freedom (or bail) with
    the right to procedures requiring timely bail hearings. Although both are rights created by
    New Mexico law, see State v. Brown, 
    338 P.3d 1276
    , 1282 (N.M. 2014) (“The New
    Mexico Constitution affords criminal defendants a right to bail . . . .”); Rule 5–303(A)
    NMRA (providing that defendants shall be arraigned within fifteen days of a triggering
    event, such as an arrest), only the former can be a protected liberty interest. That is
    because “an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest
    protected by the Due Process Clause.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 
    461 U.S. 238
    , 250 n.12
    (1983); accord Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 
    816 F.3d 645
    , 657 (10th Cir. 2016)
    (“[N]ot all state laws create constitutionally protected liberty interests.”).
    To the extent Plaintiffs argue that New Mexico’s fifteen-day rule “creates a liberty
    interest protected by constitutional procedural due process,” their position “reflects a
    confusion between what is a liberty interest and what procedures the government must
    follow before it can restrict or deny that interest.” See Elliott v. Martinez, 
    675 F.3d 1241
    ,
    1245 (10th Cir. 2012). In other words, “[t]hey ‘collapse the distinction between the
    4
    interest protected and the process that protects it.’” 
    Id. (quoting Town
    of Castle Rock v.
    Gonzales, 
    545 U.S. 748
    , 772 (2005) (Souter, J., concurring) (alterations omitted)). And
    Plaintiffs are inconsistent in how they frame their protected liberty interest, sometimes
    relying on New Mexico’s fifteen-day rule as an end unto itself and sometimes hinting at
    the fundamental underlying right to be free of restraint. Compare Aplt. Br. at 16 (“New
    Mexico[] . . . guaranteed Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry the opportunity to obtain pretrial
    release no later than fifteen days after arrest.”), and 
    id. at 32
    (“[I]t should have been clear
    to Defendants that, based on New Mexico law and settled due process principles, pretrial
    detainees have procedural due process rights to adequate procedures allowing them to
    timely obtain bail.”) (emphasis added)), with 
    id. at 16
    (“The principal protected liberty
    interest that may be created by state law is the freedom from detention.”), and 
    id. at 18
    (“Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry . . . had a protected liberty interest in obtaining a prompt bail
    determination”).
    I would, accordingly, begin the procedural due process analysis by clarifying that
    Plaintiffs’ only relevant protected liberty interest is in their right to “freedom pending
    trial.” 
    Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1192
    ; see Baker v. McCollan, 
    443 U.S. 137
    , 144 (1979)
    (finding that arrestee was “deprived of his liberty” when detained in county jail for three
    days). That right may be duly honored via a timely bail determination, but the timely bail
    determination is a means, not an end. The source of Plaintiffs’ liberty interest does not
    much matter, but it can be said to arise from either the United States Constitution, see
    
    Baker, 443 U.S. at 144
    ; 
    Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1192
    , the New Mexico Constitution, see
    
    Brown, 338 P.3d at 1282
    , or both. Although New Mexico is free to create procedural
    5
    rights protecting the underlying right to bail, as it has done here, see Rule 5–303 NMRA,
    the failure of its state officials to protect state-law procedural rights is not a Fourteenth
    Amendment violation, so long as federal due process requirements (which may well be
    lower) are satisfied. We would not be the first court to note the irony that, were the rule
    otherwise, its effect would be to subject states offering more procedural protections to
    stricter federal oversight. See Hewitt v. Helms, 
    459 U.S. 460
    , 471 (1983); Fields v. Henry
    County, 
    701 F.3d 180
    , 186 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that such a policy could even
    discourage states from creating their own systems of procedural rights for fear of
    triggering federal liability).
    The sufficiency of the process afforded Plaintiffs—the adequacy and timeliness of
    their bail determinations—implicates the second prong of the procedural due process test,
    not the first. As to this latter question, we ask whether Plaintiffs were afforded all the
    process that was their due. See Thompson, 490 U.S at 460. I would have no difficulty
    holding that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they were not afforded an appropriate
    level of process. See Jauch v. Choctaw Cty., 
    874 F.3d 425
    , 434 (5th Cir. 2017)
    (“[B]lithely waiting months before affording the defendant access to the justice system is
    patently unfair in a society where guilt is not presumed.”); Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v.
    Pearce, 
    954 F.2d 1470
    , 1476 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying the Mathews v. Eldridge
    balancing test and finding a county jail’s procedures for avoiding overdetention to be
    inadequate); cf. Porter v. Epps, 
    659 F.3d 440
    , 445 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Detention of a
    prisoner for over thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a
    6
    facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    B.      Substantive Due Process
    “Substantive due process bars ‘certain government actions regardless of the
    fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’” Brown v. Montoya, 
    662 F.3d 1152
    ,
    1172 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
    523 U.S. 833
    , 840 (1998)).
    Under our precedent there are “two strands of the substantive due process doctrine. One
    strand protects an individual’s fundamental liberty interests, while the other protects
    against the exercise of governmental power that shocks the conscience.” Seegmiller v.
    LaVerkin City, 
    528 F.3d 762
    , 767 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U.S. 760
    , 787 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). “A fundamental
    right or liberty interest is one that is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’
    and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” 
    Id. (quoting Chavez,
    538 U.S. at 775
    (plurality opinion)). “Conduct that shocks the judicial conscience, on the other hand, is
    deliberate government action that is ‘arbitrary’ and ‘unrestrained by the established
    principles of private right and distributive justice.’” 
    Id. (quoting Lewis,
    523 U.S. at 845).
    From this point in the analysis, our precedent is decidedly less clear.
    Substantive due process limits what the government may do in both its legislative
    and executive capacities. And the Supreme Court has said that the doctrinal strand to be
    applied “differ[s] depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a
    governmental officer that is at issue.” 
    Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846
    . Here, Plaintiffs challenge
    executive action, which the Court has said violates substantive due process “only when it
    7
    can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional
    sense.” 
    Id. at 847
    (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Seegmiller,
    however, we refused to read Lewis as “establish[ing] an inflexible dichotomy” between
    cases challenging legislative and executive 
    action. 528 F.3d at 768
    . In that case, which
    also involved executive action, the district court had found “that the only appropriate
    standard with which to measure [the substantive due process] claim is the shocks the
    conscience standard.” 
    Id. at 767.
    We held that was error. 
    Id. Although we
    had “no qualms
    agreeing with the district court that the [Defendant’s] conduct would not meet the
    requirements of the shocks the conscience test,” we proceeded to analyze the challenged
    executive action under the “fundamental liberty” framework. See 
    id. at 769–72
    & 769
    n.2. “[T]he distinction between legislative and executive action,” we explained, “is
    ancillary to the real issue in substantive due process cases: whether the plaintiff suffered
    from governmental action that either (1) infringes upon a fundamental right, or (2) shocks
    the conscience.” 
    Id. at 768.
    Those two tests, we continued, “are but two separate
    approaches to analyzing governmental action under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
    Id. at 769.
    “They are not mutually exclusive,” we concluded, and “[c]ourts should not
    unilaterally choose to consider only one or the other of the two strands. Both approaches
    may well be applied in any given case.” 
    Id. More recent
    opinions from this court have called the Seegmiller framework into
    doubt. See Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 
    787 F.3d 1076
    , 1078–79 (10th Cir. 2015) (“If
    the infringement is the result of executive action, the Supreme Court has instructed us to
    ask whether that action bears a ‘reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate
    8
    governmental objective’ or if instead it might be ‘characterized as arbitrary, or
    conscience shocking.’” (quoting 
    Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846
    , 847)); 
    id. at 1079
    n.1 (“[W]e can
    say with certainty . . . that Chavez did not expressly overrule Lewis’s holding that the
    ‘arbitrary or conscience shocking’ test is the appropriate one for executive action so we
    feel obliged to apply it.”); Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 
    567 F.3d 1169
    , 1182 (10th Cir.
    2009) (clarifying that “when legislative action is at issue, . . . only the traditional
    [fundamental rights] substantive due process framework is applicable”). Neither Browder
    nor Dias was heard by the full court. “Because one panel of our court cannot overrule
    prior panel decisions and earlier panel decisions control over later ones,” Storagecraft
    Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, 
    744 F.3d 1183
    , 1191 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014), I would normally treat
    Seegmiller’s gloss on Lewis as binding and ask whether Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that
    they “suffered from governmental action that either (1) infringes upon a fundamental
    right, or (2) shocks the conscience.” 
    Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 768
    (emphasis added).
    Notwithstanding our normal rule about favoring earlier panel decisions, it is an
    open question in my mind whether Seegmiller is binding on this point. First, our
    published decision in Brower characterizes Seegmiller’s analysis as dicta. 
    Browder, 787 F.3d at 1079
    , n.1. Second, in a recent unpublished opinion, Chief Judge Tymkovich, who
    wrote for the panel in Seegmiller and joined then-Judge Gorsuch’s panel opinion in
    Browder, explained that he is in accord with Browder and Dias and that, to the extent
    Seegmiller is inconsistent, the earlier case is properly dismissed as dicta. See Dawson v.
    Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 17-1118, 
    2018 WL 1256477
    , at *9–10 (10th Cir. Mar. 9, 2018)
    (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring) (“Our Circuit has settled on the following solution: if the
    9
    case involves a legislative act, only the ‘rights’ strand applies. On the other hand, when
    the case involves executive action by a government official or entity, we apply the
    ‘shocks the conscience’ test.” (citations omitted)).
    Following Lewis, the district court in this case applied only the “shocks the
    conscience” test. See Moya v. Garcia, No. 1:16-CV-01022-WJ-KBM, 
    2017 WL 4536080
    , at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 13, 2017) (“To establish a substantive due process
    violation, Plaintiffs must show Defendants’ behavior was ‘so egregious, so outrageous,
    that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’” (quoting 
    Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847
    n.8)). On appeal, the parties have argued past each other without ever
    focusing on the tension in our case law. Neither side cited either Seegmiller or Broward.
    Plaintiffs’ opening brief did not even reference the “shocks the conscience” test at all,
    asserting instead a “fundamental liberty interest in pretrial release” as the basis for their
    substantive due process claim. Aplt. Br. at 21. Defendants in turn did not engage with
    Plaintiffs’ “fundamental liberty” analysis, urging instead that the district court be
    affirmed because Plaintiffs “failed to allege conscience-shocking conduct on the part of
    the defendants.” Aplee. Br. at 34–36. Plaintiffs then asserted in their reply brief that their
    “allegations, if proven, shock the conscience.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 21. And at oral
    argument Plaintiffs effectively adopted the Seegmiller view, stating “there’s two ways
    you can get to substantive due process violations,” Oral Arg. 2:30–2:57. That is, either
    the “shocks the conscience” standard or the fundamental rights standard will do. 
    Id. I need
    not and, writing only for myself, cannot resolve the crosswinds in our case
    law. I have already explained that Plaintiffs have plausibly pleaded a deprivation of their
    10
    procedural due process rights. That is grist enough for me to engage with the majority’s
    causation analysis.4
    II.    CAUSATION
    Properly understood, Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is the unconstitutional deprivation
    of their liberty through overdetention. As to causation, Plaintiffs’ argument is
    straightforward: they allege the sheriff and wardens jointly held the keys to their jail
    cells. By keeping Plaintiffs behind bars—day after day after day—the sheriff and
    wardens were deliberately indifferent to their constitutional right to freedom pending
    trial.
    In finding causation lacking, the majority focuses on the state court’s conduct,
    rather than the Defendants’ conduct. As portrayed by the majority, Mr. Moya and Mr.
    Petry “blame the sheriff and wardens for the delays in the arraignments.” Maj. Op. at 5.
    Because the sheriff and wardens had no power to schedule the arraignments, the
    majority’s thinking goes, the sheriff and wardens had no power to prevent or cure the
    alleged constitutional violations. See 
    id. (“the sheriff
    and wardens did not cause the
    arraignment delays”); 
    id. at 8
    (“[T]he sheriff and wardens did not cause the
    4
    Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should be permitted to litigate their claims only
    under the rubric of procedural due process. We have previously said that “[w]here a
    plaintiff has recourse to an ‘explicit textual source of constitutional protection,’ a more
    general claim of substantive due process is not available.” Shrum v. City of Coweta, 
    449 F.3d 1132
    , 1145 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 395
    (1989)). Our sister circuits are divided as to whether overdetention claims sound in
    procedural or substantive due process. See 
    Jauch, 874 F.3d at 430
    (collecting cases).
    Although I would hold that Plaintiffs have pleaded a plausible procedural due process
    claim, I decline to opine on whether a substantive due process claim might also be viable.
    11
    overdetention. At most, the sheriff and wardens failed to remind the court that it was
    taking too long to arraign Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry.”); 
    id. at 19
    (“The state trial court’s
    alleged failure to schedule timely arraignments cannot be attributed to the sheriff or
    wardens.”). But, in my view, causation follows from the constitutionally cognizable
    injury that Plaintiffs alleged. Here we see why “a ‘careful description’ of the allegedly
    violated right,” 
    Browder, 787 F.3d at 1078
    , is so crucial. On my reading of the complaint,
    Plaintiffs are not seeking to hold the sheriff and wardens accountable for the court’s
    scheduling decisions; instead, they are seeking to hold them accountable for the lengthy
    detentions that no court authorized.5 Again, a timely bail hearing is a means to securing
    Plaintiffs’ protected liberty interests, not an end unto itself.
    The majority explains that it focused on the right to a timely bail hearing “because
    that’s what the plaintiffs have alleged,” Maj. Op. at 14, all the while conceding that
    Plaintiffs have also alleged a violation of their “right to freedom from detention,” 
    id. at 16
    . Under the majority’s framing, these rights “are coextensive to Mr. Moya and Mr.
    Petry because to them, a violation of the right to a timely arraignment resulted in
    violation of their right to freedom from prolonged detention.” 
    Id. But the
    majority’s own
    description demonstrates that these rights are not one and the same.6 The state-law
    5
    Recall the Complaint alleges that the bench warrants authorizing Plaintiffs’
    arrests “commanded any authorized officer to ‘arrest [Plaintiff], and bring him forthwith
    before this court.’” Joint App’x 10–11, Compl. ¶¶ 26, 33; see Forthwith, Black’s Law
    Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“1. Immediately; without delay. 2. Directly; promptly; within
    a reasonable time under the circumstances; with all convenient dispatch.”).
    6
    According to the majority, the interchangeability of the liberty interests is
    illustrated by Plaintiffs’ definition of the putative class, which would include only those
    12
    procedural right to a timely arraignment is protective of, not coextensive with, the right to
    liberty. The majority assumes without deciding that Plaintiffs alleged a violation of the
    state-law procedural right to a timely arraignment and then concludes that their
    constitutional claims fail because the warden and sheriffs did not cause the violation of
    state procedural law. That analysis works fine as far as it goes, but it is incomplete. The
    majority never considers whether the complaint adequately alleges a violation of the
    more fundamental right. Nor does it consider whether the individual defendants’ alleged
    conduct deprived Plaintiffs of that right. In my view, this more fundamental question is
    fairly alleged in the complaint and presented in Plaintiffs’ briefing. Therefore, I think this
    court is obliged to consider it, not least because it is an “interpretation [that] could
    succeed.” Maj. Op. at 17.
    By focusing on the arraignment rather than the detention, the majority naturally
    finds that the causal force lies with the state court’s conduct, rather than with the jailers’
    conduct. And by focusing on the state court’s conduct, rather than the jailers’ conduct,
    the majority reaches a result heretofore unseen in an overdetention case. As best I can
    tell, our decision today puts us at odds with every circuit to consider the apportionment of
    blame between state courts and state jailers where a § 1983 plaintiff alleges that he or she
    was overdetained. See 
    Jauch, 874 F.3d at 430
    , 436 (county’s policy of indefinitely
    detaining arrestees until the court next convened was “the moving force” behind the
    detainees held for longer than the fifteen days allowed under New Mexico law. Maj. Op.
    at 16 n.9. This is a non sequitur. Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition tells us nothing
    about whether their complaint plausibly alleges individual due process claims on any
    theory fairly presented.
    13
    constitutional injury); Hayes v. Faulkner Cty., 
    388 F.3d 669
    , 674 (8th Cir. 2004)
    (county’s policy of waiting for the court to schedule a hearing “ignore[d] the jail’s
    authority for long-term confinement” and was “deliberately indifferent to detainees’ due
    process rights”); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 
    152 F.3d 564
    , 579 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[J]ailers
    hold not only the keys to the jail cell, but also the knowledge of who sits in the jail and
    for how long they have sat there. They are the ones directly depriving detainees of
    liberty.”); 
    Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1476
    –77 (holding that due process required sheriff to enact
    reasonable procedures for decreasing erroneous incarcerations).7 The majority
    distinguishes Armstrong and Oviatt because, in those cases, “a clerical error prevented
    the court from discovering the arrests and the need to schedule arraignments,” so there
    would have been no basis for placing blame on the state court. Maj. Op. at 9. And in our
    case, by contrast, “Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry do not allege a failure to tell the court of their
    arrests in sufficient time to conduct the arraignments within” the time required under
    state law. 
    Id. at 9.
    I agree with the majority that Armstrong and Oviatt are distinguishable.
    But that distinction does not change the underlying reasoning that the jailers are the ones
    directly depriving the detainees of their protected liberty interest in freedom pending trial.
    And, in any event, Jauch and Hayes are not so easily distinguished.
    7
    Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 
    197 F.3d 1245
    (9th Cir. 1999),
    is not to the contrary. That case also involved an overdetention claim brought under
    § 1983 against a county, but there the county acted pursuant to an order from the United
    States Marshals Service. 
    Id. at 1246.
    Distinguishing Oviatt, the Ninth Circuit held that
    “[w]hereas Oviatt was a case involving whether the left hand knew what the right hand
    was doing, this is a case involving whether my left hand knows what your right hand is
    doing.” 
    Id. at 1248.
    In this case, we consider only state actors, and so Brooks is easily
    distinguishable.
    14
    In Jauch, the plaintiff, Jessica Jauch, was indicted by a grand jury, arrested, and
    put in jail, where she waited for ninety-six days before she was brought before a 
    judge. 874 F.3d at 428
    . She later brought suit under § 1983 against the county and the sheriff,
    alleging, inter alia, violations of both procedural and substantive due process. 
    Id. The district
    court denied Ms. Jauch’s motion for summary judgment and instead ordered
    judgment in favor of the defendants. 
    Id. The Fifth
    Circuit reversed, holding that (a) the
    sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity and (b) Ms. Jauch was entitled to judgment
    in her favor on her procedural due process claim. 
    Id. at 429,
    437.
    The majority distinguishes Jauch on the ground that its causation analysis “rested
    on Mississippi law,” which “recognize[s] the responsibility of the sheriff to release an
    arrestee who has been detained too long without bail.” Maj. Op. at 10 (citing 
    Jauch, 874 F.3d at 437
    ). As the Fifth Circuit explained, however, it merely cited Mississippi law for
    the unremarkable propositions that (1) the sheriff is responsible for those incarcerated in
    his jail, see 
    Jauch, 874 F.3d at 436
    –37 (citing Miss. Code. Ann. § 19-25-69), and (2)
    county sheriffs are responsible “to hold detainees in a manner consistent with their oaths
    to uphold the federal and state constitutions,” 
    id. at 437
    (citing Sheffield v. Reece, 
    28 So. 2d
    745, 748 (Miss. 1947)). New Mexico law does not differ on either point, except
    perhaps that it extends those responsibilities to its wardens as well. See N.M. Stat. Ann.
    § 33–3–1 (“The common jails shall be under the control of the respective sheriffs. . . .”);
    
    id. § 33–1–2(E)
    (stating “‘warden’ . . . means the administrative director of a correctional
    facility”); Wilson v. Montano, 
    715 F.3d 847
    , 856–57 (10th Cir. 2013) (relying on these
    provisions to conclude that, under New Mexico law, wardens and sheriffs share
    15
    responsibility for the policies and customs at county jails and for any failure to
    adequately train their subordinates); see also N.M. Const. art. XX, § 1 (requiring “[e]very
    person elected or appointed to any office” to take an oath to support the federal and state
    constitutions).
    Next, the majority finds Jauch of limited guidance because Mr. Moya and Mr.
    Petry expressly disavowed any argument that the sheriff and wardens could have or
    should have released them from custody without a valid court order. Maj. Op. at 10–11.
    Respectfully, I am not persuaded. Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry argue there was “plenty
    Defendants could, and should, have done short of releasing Mr. Moya and Mr. Petry to
    ensure that they received prompt bail determinations.” Aplt. Br. at 29. For instance, they
    suggest, the sheriff and wardens could have reviewed court dockets to determine whether
    arraignments were being timely scheduled, and if not, they could have requested
    immediate arraignments. Or they could have physically brought Mr. Moya or Mr. Petry
    before a judicial officer at any time. But alas “we cannot know what . . . could have
    [been] done to allow bail, because [the jailers] did nothing at all.” 
    Jauch, 874 F.3d at 437
    n.10.8 Even on the majority’s view of Plaintiffs’ alleged liberty interest, its causation
    8
    The Fifth Circuit recently decided against rehearing Jauch en banc. See Jauch v.
    Choctaw Cty., No. 16-60690, 
    2018 WL 1542262
    (5th Cir. Mar. 29, 2018). Six judges
    voted in favor of rehearing; they would have held that qualified immunity applies. 
    Id. at *6
    (Southwick, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). But the dissenting judges
    seemingly were not in agreement as to whether Jauch’s holding as to Choctaw County
    also should have been reconsidered. See 
    id. at *7.
    In any event, they were not blind to the
    possibility that jailers have the power to prevent constitutional violations in cases like
    these. See 
    id. (“[A] a
    county should not be allowing a prisoner’s pretrial release to be
    unaddressed for extended periods. Judges and jailers could cooperate to minimize delays
    in consideration. . . . Even a sheriff, though not having the power to schedule a hearing,
    16
    analysis is “overly rigid.” Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 
    197 F.3d 1245
    , 1250 (9th Cir. 1999) (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (noting that the county could have
    reminded the relevant authorities of the detainee’s right to see a magistrate; thus, “the
    County was not helpless to avoid the injury to [the detainee] and so was a legal cause of
    his injury”).
    Nor does the majority meaningfully distinguish the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in
    Hayes. In that case, the plaintiff, James M. Hayes, was ticketed for not having automobile
    tags and vehicle insurance. 
    Hayes, 388 F.3d at 672
    . Mr. Hayes failed to appear at his
    municipal court hearing, and so bench warrants were issued for his arrest. 
    Id. On April
    3,
    1998, he was stopped for a traffic violation, arrested on the warrants, given a court date
    of May 11, and jailed. 
    Id. Mr. Hayes
    did not post a $593 cash-only bond and remained in
    jail until appearing before the court on May 11, thirty-eight days after his arrest. 
    Id. He too
    brought suit under § 1983 against the county and sheriff. 
    Id. The Eighth
    Circuit
    affirmed the district court’s entry of judgment against the sheriff in his individual
    capacity, finding that a “law enforcement officer cannot reasonably believe that holding a
    person in jail for 38 days without bringing him before a judicial officer for an initial
    appearance is constitutional.” 
    Id. at 675
    . The majority explains that it cannot follow
    Hayes because the Eighth Circuit’s approach, which “attributed responsibility to the
    jailers based solely on federal law, not state law,” is “inconsistent” with Tenth Circuit
    precedent that “directs us to focus on state law when determining the scope of the
    might rattle the cage on behalf of such a prisoner so that those who have the authority to
    do something will hear.” (emphasis deleted)).
    17
    defendants’ responsibility to ensure prompt hearings.” Maj. Op. at 13 (emphasis deleted)
    (citing 
    Wilson, 715 F.3d at 854
    ).9 Again, I differ with the majority, which in my view
    focuses on the wrong deprivation and thus the wrong actor.
    Nothing in Wilson requires us to adopt the majority’s analytical approach. Nor
    does Wilson preclude us from following our sister circuits’ persuasive reasoning in
    comparable cases. In Wilson, the plaintiff, Michael Wilson Sr., was arrested without a
    warrant and booked into a New Mexico county 
    jail. 715 F.3d at 850
    . He was detained for
    eleven days before he was released by order of a magistrate judge. 
    Id. Because Mr.
    Wilson was arrested without a judicial finding of probable cause, his ensuing § 1983
    action sounded in the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth. 
    Id. We held
    that the
    district court correctly denied the sheriff’s and warden’s motions to dismiss for failure to
    state a claim and for qualified immunity. 
    Id. at 857–58.
    In reaching that conclusion, as
    9
    I agree with the majority that Hayes “attributed responsibility to the jailers based
    solely on federal law, not state law.” Maj. Op. at 13. And for that reason, the majority’s
    comparative analysis of Arkansas and New Mexico criminal procedure rules is but a
    distraction. See 
    id. at 12–13.
    True, under New Mexico law, “[w]hen a warrant is issued in
    a criminal action, . . . the defendant named in the warrant shall, upon arrest, be brought
    by the [arresting] officer before the court without unnecessary delay.” N.M. Stat. Ann.
    § 31-1-4(C). The majority reads that rule and apparently concludes that, because the
    arresting officer is vested with statutory responsibility to ensure a prompt hearing, the
    arresting officer (and, one supposes, that officer’s supervisors) is alone responsible for
    ensuring the state court promptly schedules a hearing. But § 31-1-4(C) does not make the
    arresting officer responsible for protecting a defendant’s constitutional rights to the
    exclusion of anyone else’s responsibility. Nor is it clear why the arresting officer would
    be the proximate cause of an overdetention violation, which will not ripen until some
    indeterminate amount of time has passed and in which, typically, the detainee will no
    longer be held under the arresting officer’s authority. Under the majority’s approach,
    there is no § 1983 remedy to be had, no matter how long an arrestee is unconstitutionally
    held without an arraignment.
    18
    the majority rightly notes, we “consider[ed] New Mexico state law insofar as it bears on
    the scope of [a defendant’s] responsibility to ensure a prompt probable cause
    determination.” 
    Id. at 854.
    Likewise, here, we ought to consider New Mexico law insofar
    as it bears on the scope of Defendants’ responsibility to ensure that detainees are not
    deprived of their right to freedom pending trial. The majority puts it somewhat
    differently. My colleagues look to New Mexico law only insofar as it bears on the scope
    of the Defendants’ responsibility to ensure a prompt bail hearing. Finding no such
    requirement in state law, the majority concludes the Defendants did nothing
    unconstitutional. But ensuring a prompt bail hearing is just one possible means of
    ensuring that Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are not violated. Other means will also
    suffice. Most obviously, the Defendants could have simply released Mr. Moya and Mr.
    Petry from custody.10 To the extent doing so would have been inconsistent with
    Defendants’ duties under state law, it is no matter, because federal constitutional law
    trumps. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
    Wilson is not in tension with Jauch or Hayes. The New Mexico sheriff and warden
    in Wilson could no more force the state court to make a probable cause determination
    than the sheriffs in Mississippi (Jauch) or Arkansas (Hayes) could force their state courts
    to make a bail determination. Any reference in Wilson to a duty to “ensure” a state court
    10
    I recognize that Plaintiffs have expressly disavowed that argument, see Maj. Op.
    at 10–11 (citing Aplt. Br. at 29), but I comment on it anyway to acknowledge the reach of
    my reasoning. In any case, Plaintiffs identified tactics short of outright release that the
    defendants in this case could have adopted. 
    See supra
    . In my view they have sufficiently
    alleged causation at this stage of the proceedings.
    19
    proceeding must simply mean that state officials have a duty to seek the state court’s
    cooperation. And should the state court fail to cooperate, it will be left to the sheriff and
    warden to desist from holding detainees when they lack continued constitutional
    authority to do so. See 
    Wilson, 715 F.3d at 853
    n.6 (noting that it is settled law that
    defendants “who effected the plaintiffs’ arrests and detentions[ ] could be held liable for
    the plaintiffs’ prolonged detentions without probable cause” (emphasis added)). Again, in
    my view it is the “prolonged detentions,” not the absence of a bail hearing or probable-
    cause hearing, that is the fundamental due process concern.
    The majority’s chosen approach, moreover, comes with troubling implications. By
    (a) looking to state law to determine the scope of state officials’ responsibility to ensure
    prompt bail hearings, and (b) conceptualizing Plaintiffs’ liberty interest as an interest in a
    state court proceeding, rather than in liberty itself, the majority sanctions a system by
    which states could regularly violate detainees’ constitutional rights by holding them
    indefinitely on account of untimely state courts, without any fear of their collaborating
    municipalities or state officials ever incurring monetary penalties under § 1983. Such an
    outcome is not farfetched. We know from Jauch that, in at least one part of Mississippi,
    the only court empowered to set bail would sometimes go months between sessions. And,
    accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, as we must, we can infer that courts in Santa Fe
    County—New Mexico’s third-most populous—routinely fail to schedule arraignments
    with any earnest.
    The majority’s causation analysis also lacks a logical endpoint. What if the state
    court had scheduled Mr. Moya’s arraignment a month later than it did? What about a year
    20
    later? As I read the majority opinion, even then Mr. Moya would have no actionable
    § 1983 claim. 
    See supra
    , n.9. To be sure, I agree with the majority that New Mexico
    sheriffs and wardens are powerless to force New Mexico courts to schedule bail hearings
    in a timely fashion. Only New Mexico courts can do that. But the solution is not to grant
    jailers refuge behind judges cloaked with absolute immunity, enabling the jailers to
    violate the Constitution with impunity.11 The better solution is to hold state officials and
    municipalities responsible for the constitutional violations they themselves commit. True,
    the effect could be that New Mexico sheriffs and wardens respond by releasing pre-trial
    detainees, some of whom may have been arrested for alleged violent acts or pose a risk of
    flight, without the deterrence of bail. But it is our role to assure that New Mexico runs its
    criminal-justice system with the timeliness that the Fourteenth Amendment commands. If
    it does not, there should be consequences: either pre-trial detainees go free pending trial,
    or they will be entitled to civil damages against the state’s officials and municipalities so
    that they may be compensated for the violations of their civil rights.
    III.   QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
    As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, state officials “are entitled to qualified
    immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right,
    and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” District
    of Columbia v. Wesby, 
    138 S. Ct. 577
    , 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 
    566 U.S. 11
              It is no answer to say that Plaintiffs’ complaint was deficient for not alleging
    that they were arrested by officers subject to the defendants’ supervisory authority, as the
    majority opinion could be read to suggest. See Maj. Op. at 12 n.8. The arresting officer
    can no more force the court to act than can the sheriff or warden.
    21
    658, 664 (2012)). “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be
    a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of
    authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.”
    Becker v. Bateman, 
    709 F.3d 1019
    , 1023 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). The
    Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed that courts must not define clearly established
    law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the
    official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.” 
    Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590
    (internal quotation marks omitted). “This demanding standard protects ‘all
    but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” 
    Id. at 589
    (quoting
    Malley v. Briggs, 
    475 U.S. 335
    , 341 (1986)).
    In my view, the complaint plausibly alleges that Sheriff Garcia, Warden Caldwell,
    and Warden Gallegos violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. But I recognize that
    conclusion is not foretold. No opinion from this court or the Supreme Court has ever
    clearly established that a jailer violates the Constitution by detaining an individual
    lawfully arrested in anticipation of an untimely scheduled arraignment. That principle of
    law, to be sure, is clearly established in at least two of our sister circuits, but that is not
    enough for the law to be clearly established here. I would thus affirm the district court’s
    order insofar as it dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against the sheriff and wardens on the basis
    of qualified immunity, and so I partially concur in the majority’s result. But because
    municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity, I would reverse and remand to the
    district court for further proceedings against the County.
    Thus, as to the County, I respectfully dissent.
    22