Lopez v. United States , 21 F. App'x 879 ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                 F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    NOV 15 2001
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    ANDREW LEO LOPEZ, doing
    business as ANDREW LEO LOPEZ,
    CPA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                 No. 01-2090
    (D.C. No. CIV-97-1303 BB/KBM)
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;                            (D.N.M.)
    TREASURY DEPARTMENT;
    INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE;
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
    REVENUE; JOELLA APODACA;
    PATRICIA ANDREWS; JAMES E.
    DUMERER; SAM CHAVEZ; DEBRA
    CORONA; MARY ENGDAHL;
    SANDY HAYES; REBA JOHNSON;
    PATRICIA MILLER; LOU NEZ;
    RICHARD A. SCULLY; LESLIE S.
    SHAPIRO; SCOTT ROSENZWEIG;
    LUCY TELLEZ; MATILDA
    WALLING, individually and in their
    official capacities; ROBERT M.
    RUBIN; STEPHEN M. WALKER,
    individually and as partner in Rogoff,
    Diamond and Walker a New Mexico
    Partnership; ROGOFF, DIAMOND
    AND WALKER, a New Mexico
    Partnership; AMERICAN INSTITUTE
    OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
    ACCOUNTANTS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before KELLY , BALDOCK , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Plaintiff Andrew Leo Lopez, a Certified Public Accountant proceeding
    pro se, appeals from orders of the district court denying him relief in his two
    consolidated cases. The first case was an appeal of an administrative decision by
    the Treasury Department to disbar him from practicing before the Internal
    Revenue Service (IRS). In the second case, plaintiff sought damages, injunctive
    relief and declaratory relief based on the disbarment proceedings. The district
    court affirmed the agency’s disbarment decision. In the civil suit, it dismissed the
    claims against some defendants and entered summary judgment in favor of the
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    -2-
    remaining defendants. We exercise jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and
    affirm.
    I. The Administrative Appeal
    The Treasury Department’s administrative decision to disbar plaintiff from
    practicing before the IRS was based on three instances of “disreputable conduct,”
    as defined in 
    31 C.F.R. § 10.51
    . Plaintiff challenges the administrative decision
    on the following grounds: (1) the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) applied the
    wrong standard of proof; (2) plaintiff was denied due process, including
    discovery; (3) the instances of disreputable conduct were not supported by
    substantial evidence; (4) the ALJ erred in refusing to impose sanctions against the
    attorneys prosecuting the administrative action; and (5) the ALJ was biased
    against plaintiff, thereby entitling him to a new administrative hearing before a
    different ALJ. He further complains that there was neither subject-matter
    jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction in the administrative proceeding.
    Because plaintiff is representing himself on appeal, his pleadings will be
    liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972). Our review of
    the Treasury Department’s administrative decision is governed by the
    Administrative Procedure Act, 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
    . We examine the agency’s
    action to determine whether it was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
    discretion. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt   , 
    199 F.3d 1224
    , 1231 (10th Cir.
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    2000). We will affirm the agency’s factual findings if they are supported by
    substantial evidence.    Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey   , 
    256 F.3d 1024
    ,
    1030 (10th Cir. 2001). We review de novo the legal issues and constitutional
    claims. 
    Id.
    We have carefully reviewed the administrative record and we have
    considered the arguments and authorities presented by the parties. Applying the
    standards set out above for review of an administrative decision, we affirm the
    Treasury Department’s decision for substantially the same reasons stated by the
    district court in its October 31, 2000 memorandum opinion.
    The district court’s memorandum opinion does not address plaintiff’s
    challenge to the agency’s jurisdiction or his claim that the ALJ should have
    sanctioned the prosecuting attorneys. Plaintiff has not presented any argument or
    authorities to support his jurisdictional challenge; therefore, we do not address it.
    See Phillips v. Calhoun , 
    956 F.2d 949
    , 953-54 (10th Cir. 1992) (party must
    support argument with legal authority). We also do not address his sanctions
    claim because he has not shown where in the record the issue was presented to the
    district court.   See Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp.   , 
    100 F.3d 818
    , 822
    (10th Cir. 1996) (court of appeals generally does not consider arguments not
    presented to district court);   Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co. , 
    53 F.3d 1531
    , 1546
    (10th Cir. 1995) (appellate court will not search record to find evidence to
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    support arguments); see also Ogden v. San Juan County , 
    32 F.3d 452
    , 455 (10th
    Cir. 1994) (plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse his obligation to fulfill the
    “fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate
    Procedure”) (citation omitted).
    II. The Civil Lawsuit
    Plaintiff sued several private and governmental parties for various
    constitutional torts based on the defendants’ actions in the administrative
    disbarment proceeding. The district court (1) granted absolute immunity to the
    ALJ, the agency prosecutors and the IRS Director of Practice; (2) granted the
    motion to dismiss filed by defendant American Institute of Certified Public
    Accountants (AICPA); (3) granted summary judgment to defendants Stephen M.
    Walker and Rogoff, Diamond and Walker (the Walker defendants); (4) dismissed
    the claims against the Treasury Department and the IRS because they are not
    entities against which suit may be brought; (4) dismissed the claims against
    Secretary Rubin and the IRS Commissioner; and (5) granted summary judgment to
    the remaining defendants. Thereafter, the district court entered a judgment that
    included dismissal of plaintiff’s civil case.
    On appeal, plaintiff challenges the ruling that the ALJ and others involved
    in prosecuting the administrative action are immune from suit. He further claims
    that the district court erred in resolving his other claims against him. He asserts
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    that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. He requests that
    his case be remanded to be heard by a different district court judge.
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
    the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
    McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 
    149 F.3d 1125
    , 1128 (10th Cir. 1998).
    Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and
    the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v.
    Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our review of an order
    of dismissal for failure to state a claim also is de novo. See Witt v. Roadway
    Express, 
    136 F.3d 1424
    , 1431 (10th Cir. 1998).
    Plaintiff is correct that genuine issues of material fact will preclude entry
    of summary judgment. Although he has alleged that disputed material facts exist,
    he has not identified any. Rather, the matters he characterizes as factual issues
    are issues of law, on which the district court ruled against him. Moreover, vague
    references to the existence of disputed facts, without identifying the factual
    matters in dispute are insufficient.   See Kidd v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 
    88 F.3d 848
    , 853 (10th Cir. 1996) (conclusory allegations not supported by evidence are
    insufficient to resist summary judgment). Accordingly, plaintiff has not identified
    any disputed material facts that would preclude summary judgment.
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    Plaintiff’s claims against the ALJ, the IRS Director of Practice,         and the
    agency prosecutors were based on their official acts in the agency disbarment
    proceeding. The record reflects that at a hearing the district court granted them
    absolute immunity. Because these parties are entitled to absolute immunity, they
    were properly dismissed from the case. See Butz v. Economou, 
    438 U.S. 478
    ,
    512-17 (1978).
    The Walker defendants were granted summary judgment on their arguments
    that plaintiff’s claims were time-barred and the statements were absolutely
    privileged. Plaintiff advanced claims against these defendants for defamation,
    malicious abuse of process and conspiracy to commit malicious abuse of process,
    based on testimony given in February of 1994 by defendant Stephen M. Walker
    pertaining to the administrative proceeding         . Plaintiff’s complaint was filed in
    October of 1997. The district court fully addressed the statute-of-limitations
    defense in relation to defamation claims against several federal defendants in its
    October 31, 2000 memorandum opinion. Also in that memorandum opinion, the
    district court addressed plaintiff’s constitutional malicious process claims as they
    related to several federal defendants. Applying the standards set out above, we
    affirm the summary judgment granted to the Walker defendants for substantially
    the same reasons stated in the memorandum opinion for granting summary
    judgment to the federal defendants on similar claims.
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    Plaintiff’s claims against the AICPA were based on vicarious liability for
    the statements of defendant Walker. They were dismissed for failure to state
    a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff offers no authority for his
    position that the AICPA, a national professional organization of CPAs, is
    vicariously liable for Mr. Walker’s statements. Accordingly, dismissal was
    proper.
    Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants were disposed of in the
    thorough and comprehensive memorandum opinion referenced above. We have
    carefully reviewed the record on appeal, as well as the briefs submitted by the
    parties. Applying the standards set out above, we affirm the district court’s
    disposition of these claims for substantially the same reasons stated in the
    October 31, 2000 memorandum opinion.
    Finally, plaintiff requests a remand to a different district court judge.
    Because we affirm the district court’s judgment, there will be no remand.
    Even so, “conclusions, rumors, beliefs, and opinions are not sufficient to form a
    basis for disqualification.” Hinman v. Rogers, 
    831 F.2d 937
    , 939 (10th Cir.
    1987).
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    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
    New Mexico is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    Entered for the Court
    Bobby R. Baldock
    Circuit Judge
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