United States v. Lipp ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 25 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-3187
(D.C. No. 98-3108-SAC)
MICHAEL LOUIS LIPP, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. At issue is whether
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
defendant’s counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to
object to the weight of marijuana set forth in the presentence investigation report
(PSI), which the court used to calculate defendant’s sentences on several drug
charges. The pertinent counts of conviction are: Count 1, conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute 2,000 pounds; Count 5, possession with intent to
distribute 135 pounds; Count 6, possession with intent to distribute 34 cultivated
plants; and Count 11, possession with intent to distribute 125 pounds.
The procedural history of this case is recounted in detail in the district
court’s decision denying § 2255 relief. See United States v. Lipp , 54 F. Supp. 2d
1025, 1027-28 (D. Kan. 1999). We will discuss only those matters relevant to
these proceedings. Defendant was represented through trial and sentencing by
John Ambrosio. At sentencing on December 21, 1993, the district court
determined that although the ultimate goal of the conspiracy was to possess and
distribute 2,000 pounds of marijuana, defendant’s participation in the conspiracy
was limited to the amounts involved in the three substantive possession counts of
which he was convicted. Therefore, the court attributed a total of 34 plants and
260 pounds of marijuana to defendant for sentencing purposes, which the PSI
calculated to equal a total of 121.3 kilograms of marijuana.
Defendant retained new counsel, Susan Hunt, to represent him on appeal,
where this court reversed defendant’s conviction on a firearms count. See United
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States v. Wacker , 72 F.3d 1453, 1480 (10th Cir. 1996) (as modified on denial of
rehearing). On remand, the district court imposed a new sentence having a
primary term of 120 months, the mandatory minimum for possession of more than
100 kilograms of marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b).
Defendant, who was represented by Ms. Hunt throughout the proceedings on
remand, did not object to the weight of marijuana used by the district court to
calculate the new sentence, nor did he appeal the sentence. Instead, acting
through Ms. Hunt, he filed the present § 2255 motion in which he argued that
Mr. Ambrosio was constitutionally ineffective. 1
Defendant alleged that on November 22, 1993, Mr. James Chappas, who
was counsel for a co-defendant, and Agent William Halvorsen, from the Kansas
Bureau of Investigation (KBI), reweighed the marijuana at issue and found that it
weighed less than 100 kilograms. Defendant further alleged that this information
was conveyed to Mr. Ambrosio prior to sentencing, but that Mr. Ambrosio failed
to use it to challenge the weights set forth in the PSI, upon which the district
court relied. In its response to defendant’s § 2255 motion, the government argued
that the court properly relied on the weights in the PSI in imposing sentence and,
1
Defendant raised several additional arguments in his § 2255 motion, but he
has not pursued any of them on appeal. Therefore, we will discuss only his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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therefore, that Mr. Ambrosio’s failure to challenge those weights did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion on
May 11, 1999. The sole witnesses at the hearing were Mr. Chappas and Agent
Halvorsen. Mr. Chappas testified about the circumstances surrounding the
November 22, 1993 weighing of the marijuana and about his observations that
day. According to Mr. Chappas’ notes, the marijuana at issue weighed 94.07
kilograms on November 22. See Appellant’s Supplemental App. at 11. When
asked whether he conveyed his findings to Mr. Ambrosio, Mr. Chappas stated that
he did not recall discussing his findings with Mr. Ambrosio, but that he may have
discussed whether a discrepancy in weight would affect his own client’s sentence.
See id. at 13.
Agent Halvorsen testified about how the marijuana had been stored since
its seizure in September 1990 (135 lbs. and 34 plants) and March 1991 (125 lbs.),
respectively, and about the KBI’s standard procedures for weighing marijuana.
He also testified about various factors that may have contributed to the
marijuana’s loss of weight during the years since its seizure. Specifically, he
testified that up until the end of trial in July 1993, the marijuana was stored in
climate-controlled, dehumidified environments, which would have dried it out.
Agent Halvorsen also testified that each time the marijuana was moved, some of it
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would shake out. Rather than indiscriminately add this “shake” back into one of
the batches of marijuana, Agent Halvorsen would destroy it. He estimated the
loss of shake to total about three or four dustpans full. Finally, Agent Halvorsen
testified that once the trial ended in July 1993, the marijuana was moved to
a secured storage area in the parking garage at the KBI’s headquarters. When he
and Mr. Chappas went to the storage area in November to weigh the marijuana,
they discovered that rodents had gotten into it and had “honeycombed through it.”
Id. at 30.
After the evidentiary hearing, the district court “invested a great deal of
time reviewing the relevant portions of the trial transcript, the exhibit sheet and
the PSI to inform and refresh the court’s own independent recollection of the
evidence relevant to Lipp’s sentence.” Lipp , 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (footnote
omitted). The court ultimately denied defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel because the evidence showed that “more than 100 kilograms of useable
marijuana was attributable to Lipp.” Id. The court concluded that “it properly
attributed more than 100 kilograms of marijuana to Lipp, and that it would do so
again today if it were to resentence Lipp even at this time.” Id.On appeal, defendant argues that the district court erred in concluding that
the evidence established that more than 100 kilograms were properly attributable
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to him. Defendant also argues that by allowing some of the marijuana to be
destroyed, the government violated his right to due process. 2
To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
establish both that his counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and
that this deficient performance was prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington ,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
“In reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, [w]e must accept the
district court’s underlying factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but we
review de novo whether counsel’s performance was legally deficient and whether
any deficiencies prejudiced [the Defendant].” United States v. Cook , 45 F.3d 388,
392 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted; alteration in original). “[A] court need
not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
2
The district court granted defendant a certificate of appealability pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B).
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sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 697.
Based upon our review, we conclude that defendant has not shown any
prejudice resulting from his counsel’s failure to object to the weight of the
marijuana set forth in the PSI on the ground that three years after its seizure, it
weighed less than 100 kilograms. Although defendant has objected only to the
performance of his original counsel, Mr. Ambrosio, the same lack of prejudice
would defeat any claim he might have against his current counsel, Ms. Hunt, for
her failure to object to the weight of marijuana used by the district court to
calculate defendant’s sentences.
At the time defendant was resentenced in 1997, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines provided that “[u]nless otherwise specified, the weight of
a controlled substance set forth in the [drug quantity] table refers to the entire
weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the
controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), note A. The application notes
further provided, however, that
[m]ixture or substance does not include materials that must be
separated from the controlled substance before the controlled
substance can be used. . . . [I]n the case of marihuana having
a moisture content that renders the marihuana unsuitable for
consumption without drying (this might occur, for example,
with a bale of rain-soaked marihuana or freshly harvested marihuana
that had not been dried), an approximation of the weight of the
marihuana without such excess moisture content is to be used.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.1).
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The district court concluded that more than 100 kilograms were properly
attributed to defendant for sentencing purposes. First, the court credited
Agent Halvorsen’s testimony about the reasons why the marijuana weighed
less in November 1993 than it did when seized several years earlier. See Lipp ,
54 F. Supp. 2d at 1035. Second, the court concluded that even if it did not take
into account Agent Halvorsen’s explanations, more than 100 kilograms were still
properly attributable to defendant. Specifically, the court found that the evidence
at trial established that the 125 pounds of marijuana involved in Count 11 was in
a processed and useable state. See id. at 1035-36. Therefore, the court reasoned,
even if it attributed to defendant only the lesser weights of November 1993 for
the partially processed marijuana in Count 5 and the 34 plants in Count 6, when
those weights were added to the 125 pounds from Count 11, the total weight of
marijuana would still exceed 100 kilograms. See id. at 1036.
Defendant attacks the district court’s reliance on Agent Halvorsen’s
explanations on the grounds that neither the destruction of the shake nor the
ingestion of marijuana by rodents would account for the amount of weight loss
demonstrated. These challenges fail to recognize that the district court did not
find that either loss of shake or ingestion by rodents was solely responsible for
the weight loss. Rather, the court found that the weight loss was due to a
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combination of both factors, together with the natural rotting and dehydration of
the vegetative matter.
Defendant also attacks the district court’s reliance on Agent Halvorsen’s
explanations on due process grounds. He contends that the government destroyed
potentially exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process rights by
destroying the shake and by allowing rodents to destroy part of the marijuana.
The government argues that we should not address this issue, because defendant
failed to raise it to the district court. Defendant counters by arguing that he tried
to raise this argument to the district court, but the government objected and the
district court refused to hear the argument. Our review of the record does not
support defendant’s version of events.
Defendant’s counsel did initially ask to file a supplemental brief at the end
of the evidentiary hearing, but later offered to withdraw the request, stating that
the court already had all the issues before it. See Appellant’s Supplemental
App. at 49-50. Additionally, counsel subsequently stood mute when the court
invited her to present argument on any issues that were not already briefed.
See id. at 51. Thus, it appears that the court gave counsel an opportunity to raise
the present due process argument, but counsel failed to take it.
In any event, the due process argument fails on the merits. As in United
States v. Donaldson , 915 F.2d 612, 614 (10th Cir. 1990), “[t]he marijuana
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destroyed here had exculpatory value only in the sense that if its weight was less
than the court found, the sentencing range would be affected.” Therefore, to
show that destruction of the marijuana violated his right to due process, defendant
had to show “bad faith on the part of the [government] in failing to preserve
potentially useful evidence.” Id. “[B]ecause defendant[] offered no evidence of
bad faith by the government, [his] argument on this issue must fail.” Id.Defendant also attacks the district court’s determination that even
disregarding Agent Halvorsen’s explanations, more than 100 kilograms of
marijuana were properly attributable to defendant. First, defendant contends that
the court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that the weight of marijuana
attributable to defendant could properly include some water weight. Defendant
apparently interprets the sentencing guidelines as requiring that weight be
calculated based on marijuana that is bone dry–like the brittle and dusty plants
Mr. Chappas described seeing in November 1993. The plain language of the
guidelines, however, requires only that the weight calculation exclude excess
water that makes the marijuana unuseable. Therefore, if the district court
correctly determined that the water contained in the marijuana at the time it was
seized did not make the marijuana unuseable, then the court did not commit legal
error by including the weight of that water in the weight of marijuana attributable
to defendant.
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Second, defendant contends that the district court was clearly erroneous
when it found that the 125 pounds of marijuana involved in Count 11 was in
a processed and useable form at the time it was seized. Defendant notes that the
PSI stated that this marijuana was seized from the barn, and argues that this fact
shows the marijuana was not yet fully dried. Our reading of the record, however,
supports the district court’s finding. Therefore, that finding was not clearly
erroneous.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err when it determined
that more than 100 kilograms of marijuana were properly attributable to
defendant. Therefore, even if the failure of either of defendant’s counsel to
object to the weight of the marijuana set forth in the PSI was unreasonable, that
failure did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, the district court properly
denied defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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