Adargo v. United States Parole Commission , 26 F. App'x 795 ( 2001 )


Menu:
  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    NOV 15 2001
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    JACK ADARGO,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 01-1269
    (D.C. No. 00-Z-746)
    UNITED STATES PAROLE                                   (D. Colo.)
    COMMISSION,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before HENRY , ANDERSON , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Petitioner Jack Adargo, a federal inmate appearing     pro se , appeals the
    district court’s denial of his habeas petition filed pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    .
    We dismiss the appeal because petitioner failed to file specific objections to the
    magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.
    I.
    In 1984, petitioner was convicted of robbery of a federally insured savings
    and loan institution. He was paroled in 1994, but was returned to custody several
    times after a series of parole violations. In 1999, while out on parole, petitioner
    was taken into custody again on a parole violation warrant. His parole was
    revoked after a parole revocation hearing held more than eight months after he
    was returned to custody. Petitioner filed a § 2241 petition claiming that the
    Parole Commission violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with
    a timely revocation hearing.
    It is undisputed that petitioner did not receive a timely parole revocation
    hearing. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 4214
    (c) (requiring hearing be held within ninety days;
    applicable to prisoners such as petitioner convicted for offenses committed before
    November 1, 1987). Petitioner’s case was referred to a magistrate judge who
    concluded in a report and recommendation that petitioner’s due process rights
    were not violated by the delay, however, because he did not contend, or present
    evidence demonstrating, that he was prejudiced in any way by the delay.      See
    -2-
    Harris v. Day , 
    649 F.2d 755
    , 761-62 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that, absent
    showing of prejudice, delay in holding revocation hearing on parole revocation
    warrant does not violate parolee’s due process rights). Petitioner was ultimately
    afforded a revocation hearing at which he was represented by counsel. He
    received notice of the evidence against him and was afforded an opportunity to
    present evidence and witnesses. He presented no evidence or defense and did not
    contest the conviction upon which his parole revocation was based. Accordingly,
    the magistrate judge recommended that his § 2241 petition be denied.
    Petitioner filed a half-page objection, stating only that he found it
    “incredible a delay by the parole commission did not violate the due process
    clause.” R. Doc. 23. The district court adopted the report and recommendation,
    stating it agreed with the magistrate judge’s recommendation and that petitioner
    had not raised any specific issue for the court’s consideration. R. Doc. 25.   1
    1
    Although the Parole Commission claims the objections were not timely
    filed, it does not claim petitioner waived appellate review as a result.    See Moore
    v. United States , 
    950 F.2d 656
    , 659 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining firm waiver rule
    for untimely filed objections). The magistrate judge’s report was filed on
    February 22, 2001 and informed petitioner that he was required to file any
    objections within ten days of its service. Petitioner filed his objections on March
    26, 2001. The district court stated the objections were untimely, but considered
    the pleading “in the interest of justice.” R. Doc. 25. However, the record and the
    district court docket sheet indicate that the report and recommendation was not
    served on petitioner until March 16, 2001. Thus, it appears that petitioner’s
    objections were timely filed within ten days of service of the report and
    recommendation on petitioner.        See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (requiring objections to
    be filed within ten days after being     served with a copy of the magistrate judge’s
    recommended disposition (emphasis added)).
    -3-
    II.
    Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a
    magistrate judge issues a ruling on a dispositive pretrial motion, a party has ten
    days after service to “serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed
    findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). We have held that failure
    to file a specific objection to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
    constitutes a waiver of appellate review.     United States v. 2121 E. 30th St.   ,
    
    73 F.3d 1057
    , 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Objections to the magistrate’s report must
    be specific enough to focus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal
    issues in dispute.   
    Id.
     We have held that the waiver rule need not be applied
    where the interests of justice so dictate.   
    Id.
    Here, petitioner has failed to comply with the specific objection
    requirement established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 and circuit precedent. He did not
    provide the district court with any meaningful notice as to the particular factual or
    legal errors he implicitly claims the magistrate judge committed. Further, we do
    not conclude that the interests of justice indicate that petitioner should be excused
    from the waiver rule. The arguments raised by petitioner in his § 2241 petition
    were thoroughly and persuasively rejected by the magistrate judge. On appeal,
    petitioner makes only a general assertion that he was denied a fair hearing, yet he
    does not articulate any way in which he was prejudiced by the delayed hearing,
    -4-
    nor does he assert any specific factual or legal error by the magistrate judge.
    Thus, the interests of justice do not warrant excusing petitioner from the waiver
    rule. 2
    Accordingly, we hold that petitioner waived appellate review by failing to
    file specific objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The
    appeal is DISMISSED. Petitioner’s request to proceed         in forma pauperis is
    DENIED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    Entered for the Court
    Stephen H. Anderson
    Circuit Judge
    2
    It is not clear whether the district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s
    report and recommendation de novo , despite the lack of an appropriately specific
    objection. Even if the district court did perform a        de novo review, that does not
    preclude application of the waiver rule.       See 2121 E. 30th St. , 
    73 F.3d at 1061
    (declining to lift the bar of appellate review despite the district court’s     sua sponte
    decision to conduct a de novo review where objections were not specific enough
    to preserve the issues for appellate review).
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-1269

Citation Numbers: 26 F. App'x 795

Judges: Anderson, Briscoe, Henry

Filed Date: 11/15/2001

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023