United States v. Kanode , 28 F. App'x 229 ( 2002 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                              No. 01-4325
    RICHARD A. KANODE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Bluefield.
    David A. Faber, District Judge.
    (CR-92-144)
    Submitted: December 20, 2001
    Decided: January 15, 2002
    Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Mary Lou Newberger, Acting Federal Public Defender, Edward H.
    Weis, First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Vir-
    ginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, John
    C. Parr, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia,
    for Appellee.
    2                      UNITED STATES v. KANODE
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Richard A. Kanode appeals the district court’s order revoking his
    supervised release and sentencing him to two years imprisonment.
    Kanode’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. Cali-
    fornia, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), raising one issue but asserting that, in his
    view, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Kanode has been
    notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not filed
    a brief. Finding that the issue raised by counsel is without merit and
    that the record discloses no reversible error, we affirm the district
    court’s order.
    Shortly after he began serving a three-year term of supervised
    release, Kanode was arrested and charged with battery of two men
    and two police officers, public intoxication, resisting arrest, and flee-
    ing from arrest. After hearing the government’s evidence at the revo-
    cation hearing, the district court revoked supervised release and
    imposed the statutory maximum sentence of twenty-four months. On
    appeal, defense counsel argues that the district court plainly erred in
    imposing a sentence that exceeded the guideline range of 8-14 months
    recommended under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    Manual (2000). He suggests that the 1994 amendments to the Chapter
    7 policy statements made them binding rather than advisory. Because
    Kanode did not raise this issue in the district court, we review only
    for plain error. United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732-36 (1993).
    We have held that the Chapter 7 policy statements are not binding.
    United States v. Davis, 
    53 F.3d 638
    , 642 (4th Cir. 1995). Although
    Davis dealt with the pre-amendment policy statements, we noted that
    the amendments merely require the district court to "consider" the
    Chapter 7 policy statements, which remain non-binding. See 
    id.
     and
    639 n.1. Other circuits have since expressly held that the 1994 amend-
    ments did not make the Chapter 7 policy statements binding. See
    UNITED STATES v. KANODE                         3
    United States v. George, 
    184 F.3d 1119
    , 1122 (9th Cir. 1999); United
    States v. McClanahan, 
    136 F.3d 1146
    , 1149 (7th Cir. 1998); United
    States v. Schwegel, 
    126 F.3d 551
    , 552 (3d Cir. 1997); United States
    v. Cohen, 
    99 F.3d 69
    , 70-71 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hofierka,
    
    83 F.3d 357
    , 360-61 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Escamilla, 
    70 F.3d 835
     (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. West, 
    59 F.3d 32
    , 34-37
    (6th Cir. 1995).*
    Pursuant to Anders, this court has reviewed the record for revers-
    ible error and found none. We therefore affirm the district court’s
    order revoking Kanode’s supervised release and imposing a two-year
    term of imprisonment. This court requires that counsel inform his cli-
    ent, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
    United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition
    be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
    then counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from repre-
    sentation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served
    on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    *Kanode claims the circuits that have ruled adversely to him on the
    issue did not consider that, had Congress intended not to make the Chap-
    ter 7 policy statements binding, it would have amended 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (b) (West 2000) to refer only to § 3553(a)(4)(A) or to include only
    the guidelines referred to in § 3553(a)(4)(B). We find this claim unper-
    suasive.