United States v. Garcia , 363 F. App'x 645 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                          FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    January 29, 2010
    TENTH CIRCUIT                    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                         No. 09-3269
    v.                                                       (D. of Kan.)
    MAXIMINO GARCIA,                               (D.C. No. 03-CR-20061-1-CM)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
    Maximino Garcia, a federal prisoner appearing pro se and in forma
    pauperis, 1 appeals the district court’s failure to compel the government to file a
    motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure. The district court found that Garcia’s motion was moot, because the
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    **
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
    panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    1
    Because Garcia is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally.
    See Hall v. Bellmon, 
    935 F.2d 1106
    , 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991).
    government had already filed, and the district court had already granted, a motion
    for sentence reduction pursuant to Rule 35.
    Because we lack jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    , we DISMISS the
    appeal.
    I. Background
    Garcia pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine on
    January 5, 2004, and was sentenced to 292 months’ imprisonment on April 6,
    2004. On August 19, 2005, the government filed a Rule 35(b) motion seeking a
    60-month reduction of Garcia’s sentence for substantially assisting in the
    prosecution of another. The district court granted the government’s motion that
    same day.
    Garcia filed a motion on July 26, 2007, requesting information concerning
    a reduction of his sentence under Rule 35. The July 26 motion suggested Garcia
    was unaware of the contents of both the government’s motion and the district
    court’s order of August 19, 2005, which had been filed under seal. The district
    court denied the motion, stating that Garcia should seek copies of those
    documents from his counsel.
    On July 27, 2009, Garcia filed the motion giving rise to this appeal. In that
    motion, he alleged the government did not fulfill its agreement to file a Rule 35
    motion to reduce his sentence in exchange for his substantial assistance. Garcia
    requested the district court compel the government to file such a motion. The
    -2-
    government responded to Garcia’s motion by noting that he had already
    received—on August 19, 2005—the relief he sought to compel. The district
    court, acknowledging that a Rule 35 reduction of 60 months had already been
    requested and granted, denied the July 27 motion as moot.
    Garcia filed his notice of appeal on September 21, 2009. On appeal, for the
    first time, he contends that his sentence was not reduced adequately due to an
    unconstitutional motive and bad faith.
    II. Discussion
    We lack jurisdiction to hear Garcia’s appeal under § 3742 and therefore
    must dismiss the appeal. “Jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant of a
    Rule 35(b) motion arises, if at all, under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a).” United States v.
    Neary, 
    183 F.3d 1196
    , 1197 (10th Cir. 1999). Section 3742 permits a defendant
    to appeal his sentence only if the sentence:
    (1) was imposed in violation of law;
    (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
    guidelines; or
    (3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range
    . . .; or
    (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline
    and is plainly unreasonable.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a)(1)S(4). Section 3742 does not normally permit review of
    the amount of a downward departure. See Neary, 
    183 F.3d at 1197
    .
    -3-
    The government moved to reduce Garcia’s sentence by 60 months pursuant
    to Rule 35(b)(2)(B). Upon the government’s motion, that rule allows the district
    court to reduce the sentence of a defendant who provides information within one
    year of sentencing that does not substantially assist the government until more
    than one year after sentencing. See F ED . R. C RIM . P. 35(b)(2)(B). The district
    court granted the government’s request, reducing Garcia’s sentence from 292 to
    232 months’ imprisonment.
    Garcia now contends that reduction of his sentence was inadequate. He
    asserts that the government promised him it would move for an adequate
    reduction in exchange for his cooperation, that his sentence was reduced by only a
    small margin, and that those circumstances evidence an unconstitutional motive
    and bad faith. Although Garcia does not reference § 3742 in his brief to this
    court, based on a broad construal of his statements, he appears, for purposes of
    that statute, to claim that his sentence was unlawfully imposed. Garcia’s
    allegations, however, are insufficient to support such a claim.
    First, Garcia fails to identify, and we cannot discern, which particular
    provisions of the law were supposedly violated. Second, Garcia does not allege
    specific facts that demonstrate an unconstitutional motive, irrationality, or bad
    faith influenced the sentence reduction he received. 2 Finally, Garcia does not
    2
    A district court may review the government’s refusal to file a substantial
    assistance motion only in limited circumstances, including to determine whether
    (continued...)
    -4-
    allege specific facts showing that the government breached an agreement with
    him by moving to reduce his sentence by less than it previously agreed it would. 3
    Accordingly, because Garcia does not set forth a sufficient claim under
    § 3742, the court is without jurisdiction to hear his appeal.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS the appeal.
    Entered for the Court,
    Timothy M. Tymkovich
    Circuit Judge
    2
    (...continued)
    is was “(1) animated by an unconstitutional motive, or (2) not rationally related to
    a legitimate government end.” United States v. Duncan, 
    242 F.3d 940
    , 947 (10th
    Cir. 2001) (analyzing 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (e) and USSG § 5K1.1 ); United States v.
    Evans, 
    955 F.2d 34
    , 35 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Because of their overlapping subject
    matter and similarities in language, it is instructive to examine and compare []
    § 5K1.1 and [] § 3553(e) when interpreting Rule 35(b).” (internal parentheticals
    omitted)). Also, “[a]bsent an unconstitutional motive, the extent to which a
    district court exercises its discretionary authority to depart downward is not
    subject to review.” United States v. Williams, --- F.3d ---, No. 08-3606, 
    2009 WL 5125273
     (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 2009).
    3
    In addition to reviewing the government’s decision not to file a
    substantial assistance motion for unconstitutional motive and irrationality, a
    district court may review such a refusal if the defendant claims the refusal
    violates an agreement. See Duncan, 
    242 F.3d at
    945 n.6.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-3269

Citation Numbers: 363 F. App'x 645

Judges: Anderson, Hartz, Tymkovich

Filed Date: 1/29/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023