Nagim v. Irving , 427 F. App'x 663 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    June 28, 2011
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    RONALD J. NAGIM;
    JANET NAGIM,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                                   No. 10-1531
    (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-01925-REB-KLM)
    STEPHEN M. IRVING; JOSEPH E.                          (D. Colo.)
    ABRAHAM, JR.; SANDRA
    ABRAHAM; JOSEPH E. ABRAHAM,
    III; ALICIA PELLEGRIN;
    LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TYMKOVICH and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    This appeal is resolved by application of our firm waiver rule. Ronald and
    Janet Nagim brought this action pro se in Colorado state court, alleging various
    claims against defendants, all of whom are residents of Louisiana. Defendants
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
    not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
    and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss for lack of personal
    jurisdiction, among other things. The district court referred the matter to a
    magistrate judge who reviewed the Nagims’ claims and agreed that personal
    jurisdiction was lacking. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended
    dismissal without prejudice and gave the Nagims fourteen days to file written
    objections to the report and recommendation. The magistrate judge explicitly
    warned the Nagims that “failure to serve and file specific, written objections
    waives de novo review . . . by the District Judge and also waives appellate review
    of both factual and legal questions.” R. at 179 (citations omitted). The
    magistrate judge added that “objections to [the] Recommendation must be both
    timely and specific to preserve an issue for . . . appellate review.” 
    Id. Despite this
    warning, the Nagims did not file written objections.
    Without any objections, the district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s
    report and recommendation for plain error and, finding none, dismissed the case.
    Thereafter, the Nagims initiated this appeal, and we afforded them an opportunity
    to show cause why their failure to object did not waive appellate review under the
    firm waiver rule. They declined that opportunity and instead filed a series of
    motions that seem to assert the merits of the case. Defendants, for their part, urge
    us to apply waiver principles and affirm the district court.
    “This court has adopted a firm waiver rule under which a party who fails to
    make a timely objection to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations
    -2-
    waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.” Morales-Fernandez
    v. INS, 
    418 F.3d 1116
    , 1119 (10th Cir. 2005). “This rule does not apply,
    however, when (1) a pro se litigant has not been informed of the time period for
    objecting and the consequences of failing to object, or when (2) the interests of
    justice require review.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    The first exception has no application here because the magistrate judge
    clearly alerted the Nagims that failing to file objections within fourteen days of
    the report and recommendation would waive appellate review of the merits of the
    case. We thus examine the second exception—whether the interests of justice
    warrant suspending the waiver rule. We conclude they do not. The concept of
    “interests of justice” is “elusive,” but we consider “factors such as a pro se
    litigant’s effort to comply, the force and plausibility of the explanation for his
    failure to comply, and the importance of the issues raised.” Duffield v. Jackson,
    
    545 F.3d 1234
    , 1238 (10th Cir. 2008). When considering
    whether the importance of the issues raised might trigger the interests
    of justice exception, we have said that, in many respects, the interests
    of justice analysis we have developed, which expressly includes
    review of a litigant’s unobjected-to substantive claims on the merits,
    is similar to reviewing for plain error.
    
    Id. (alteration and
    quotation omitted). A showing of plain error entails “(1) error,
    (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously
    affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    -3-
    The Nagims made no apparent attempt to comply with the filing deadline to
    file objections, and offer no explanation for their failure to do so. They could
    have sought an extension from the district court, but they did not; instead, they
    filed this appeal. We allowed them an opportunity to show cause why the waiver
    rule should not apply, but the Nagims’ response simply argued the merits of the
    case, without addressing the basis for the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
    On that score, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the
    individual defendants for want of personal jurisdiction because they are all
    residents of Louisiana. Notwithstanding “serious doubts that Defendants took any
    action in Colorado or directed at Colorado,” the magistrate judge determined that
    the Nagims “arguably alleged that Defendants purposefully directed their actions
    at Colorado.” R. at 172. Nevertheless, the magistrate judge concluded that
    exercising personal jurisdiction over these defendants “would offend traditional
    notions of fair play and substantial justice,” see Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v.
    Bartile Roofs, Inc., 
    618 F.3d 1153
    , 1161 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted),
    because none of the traditionally considered factors weighed in favor of
    exercising jurisdiction. 1 Further, the magistrate judge determined that rather than
    1
    These factors are
    (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state’s interests in
    resolving the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in receiving
    convenient and effectual relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s
    interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,
    (continued...)
    -4-
    transfer the action to the proper venue, dismissal without prejudice was
    appropriate because all of the Nagims’ claims appeared to be time-barred before
    they initiated this suit and, in any event, appeared to be meritless. Finally, the
    magistrate judge recommended that the claims against defendant Louisiana State
    University, a state entity, be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.
    We have examined the record, the parties’ materials, and the relevant
    legal authority, and we find no error in the magistrate judge’s proposed
    disposition. Accordingly, the interest-of-justice exception does not suspend
    application of the firm waiver rule, and the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED. The Nagims’ motion to seal attachments, which was provisionally
    granted, is DENIED as moot, and the Clerk is directed to return these materials
    to the Nagims. All other outstanding motions and requests for relief are
    DENIED. The Nagims’ motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis
    1
    (...continued)
    and (5) the shared interest of the several states or foreign nations in
    furthering fundamental social policies.
    Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 
    514 F.3d 1063
    , 1080
    (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation and brackets omitted).
    -5-
    is DENIED because they have failed to show a reasoned, non-frivolous argument;
    they are directed to pay the entire filing fee immediately.
    Entered for the Court
    Wade Brorby
    Senior Circuit Judge
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-1531

Citation Numbers: 427 F. App'x 663

Judges: Baldock, Brorby, De Brorby, Tymkovich

Filed Date: 6/28/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023