Reed v. McKune , 153 F. App'x 511 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 8, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
LUKE REED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-3477
(D.C. No. 03-CV-3492-GTV)
DAVID R. MCKUNE, Warden, (D. Kan.)
Lansing Correctional Facility;
WILLIAM L. CUMMINGS, Secretary
of Corrections Designee, Kansas
Department of Corrections; PATRICK
MCKEE, General Manager of Food
Service/Aramark, Lansing
Correctional Facility; MIKE NEVE,
Deputy Warden, Lansing Correctional
Facility; E. L. RICE, Unit Team
Member, Lansing Correctional
Facility; KURT HOLTHAUS, Unit
Team Member, Lansing Correctional
Facility; COLLETTE
WINKELBAUER, Classification
Member, Lansing Correctional
Facility,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER *
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Luke Reed, an inmate in a Kansas correctional facility, has filed an
appellate brief contending that the district court erred in dismissing his
civil-rights action. We determine that Mr. Reed, who is proceeding pro se, has
not timely filed a document in this court which may be construed as a notice of
appeal. As a consequence, we dismiss this appeal.
BACKGROUND
In the district court, Mr. Reed brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that defendants had violated his constitutional rights by (1) refusing to pay for
1997 damage to his property, (2) providing an inadequate diet and unsanitary
conditions, (3) retaliating for his filing prison grievances procedures, and (4)
imposing unlawful discipline. Early in the litigation, on August 13, 2004, the
district court denied Mr. Reed’s motion for appointment of counsel and motions
for service of process. Mr. Reed filed a notice of appeal of this decision. Because
the order was not a final or immediately appealable decision and no extraordinary
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circumstances were present, this court lacked jurisdiction over the proposed
appeal. See Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1981).
While Mr. Reed’s attempt at an interlocutory appeal was pending, the
district court addressed the merits of the case. It concluded that the applicable
statute of limitations barred Mr. Reed’s claim for property damages. As for issues
concerning food and unsanitary kitchen conditions, the district court dismissed
these claims because the alleged situation was unpleasant, but insufficiently
serious to amount to a civil-rights violation. Alternatively, Mr. Reed failed to
allege a culpable state of mind and, in one instance, failed to exhaust the prison
grievance process. Mr. Reed’s retaliation claim was dismissed for lack of
causation allegations, and the unlawful discipline claim was dismissed without
prejudice because the imposed fine had not been invalidated.
The district court entered an order and separate judgment dismissing the
entire action on November 30, 2004. Mr. Reed did not file a timely notice of
appeal after that disposition. However, he filed a motion for appointment of
appellate counsel on December 20, 2005.
DISCUSSION
Under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, federal appellate
jurisdiction is “condition[ed] . . . on the filing of a timely notice of appeal.” Smith
v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992). A notice of appeal must “specify the party or
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parties taking the appeal; . . . designate the judgment, order or part thereof being
appealed; and . . . name the court to which the appeal is taken.” Fed. R. App. P.
3(c)(1)(A)-(C). The appellate court “has jurisdiction to review only the judgment
or part of the judgment designated in the notice of appeal.” Averitt v. Southland
Motor Inn of Okla., 720 F.2d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 1983).
Notices of appeal, however, are construed liberally. Smith, 502 U.S. at 248.
“[W]hen papers are technically at variance with the letter of Rule 3, a court may
nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if the litigant’s action
is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted). The convention of liberal construction extends to an
avoidance of “denying review of issues that the parties clearly intended to
appeal.” Averitt, 720 F.2d at 1180.
Moreover, in Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645-46 (10th Cir.
1988) (en banc), the Tenth Circuit held that Rule 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows a premature notice of appeal filed from a nonfinal
judgment to ripen upon entry of a subsequent final judgment and save the appeal.
The Lewis rule, however, has its limitations. Although a subsequent order may
ripen a notice of appeal of a nonfinal order, the notice confers jurisdiction over
only those orders in existence at the time it was filed. Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 973 F.2d 843, 846 (10th Cir. 1992). The filing of a final order “does not
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automatically effectuate the appeal of every judgment or order rendered in the
entire case.” Id. A second or amended notice is necessary to preserve the final
adjudication for review.
Another limitation implicit in the Lewis standard is that the order leading to
the premature notice of appeal must have independent indicia of finality. As the
Supreme Court has explained, Rule 4(a)(2) does not “permit[] a notice of appeal
from a clearly interlocutory decision . . . to serve as a notice of appeal from the
final judgment.” FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S.
269, 276 (1991). Rather, it “permits a notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to
operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only when a district court
announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the
entry of judgment.” Id. In such a case, “a litigant’s confusion is understandable,
and permitting the notice of appeal to become effective when judgment is entered
does not catch the appellee by surprise.” Id. See also Hinton v. City of Elwood,
Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that the “court’s reasoning in
Lewis was that an interlocutory order disposing of less than all the claims, though
lacking in technical formal finality, would likely remain unchanged in its form and
content”) (quotation omitted).
This court has considered whether the principles expressed in either Smith
or Lewis provide us with jurisdiction over this appeal. Mr. Reed’s motion for
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appointment of counsel on appeal provides the sole possibility for a Smith
analysis. That motion broadly refers to the violation of his constitutional rights
and his entitlement to relief. However, it does not specify the order appealed
from–the denial of appointed counsel or the entry of final judgment. Accordingly,
the motion lacks a basic requirement under Rule 3 and cannot be considered the
functional equivalent of a notice of appeal.
It could be argued that Mr. Reed’s premature notice of appeal triggered the
ripening principle recognized in the Lewis case. We note that only one district
court order was in existence at the time Mr. Reed filed his notice. The existing
order merely denied his motion for appointment of counsel and motions for service
of process. It is apparent that this order was clearly interlocutory, with no indicia
of finality. As a consequence, the notice of appeal was ineffective to confer
jurisdiction upon this court for our review of any issue.
CONCLUSION
We DISMISS Mr. Reed’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We deny as moot
Mr. Reed’s motion for appointment of counsel on appeal and grant his motion to
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proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. We remind Mr. Reed of his obligation to
continue making partial payments until he has paid the entire fee.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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