Mavrovich v. State of Kansas , 56 F. App'x 451 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 18 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ANDREW S. MAVROVICH,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 02-3323
D.C. No. 99-CV-3274-DES
STATE OF KANSAS; ATTORNEY (D. Kansas)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
KANSAS,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
On August 16, 1999, Petitioner pro se Andrew Mavrovich filed an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The district court considered the merits of Petitioner’s claims in
determining that he was not entitled to habeas relief. Petitioner now appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his application. We hold that Petitioner’s application
does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for § 2254 actions. We therefore
vacate the district court’s judgment and remand this case to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction.
Section 2254 grants federal court jurisdiction over an application for a writ
of habeas corpus only when the applicant is “in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “[W]hile the concept of ‘in custody’ does not require that the
petitioner be physically confined and extends beyond incarceration to parole on an
unexpired sentence, it does not extend to the ‘situation where a habeas petitioner
suffers no present restraint from a challenged conviction’ at the time of the filing
of the habeas petition.” Harvey v. Shillinger, 76 F.3d 1528, 1537 (10th Cir.
1996), quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1989).
“[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not
only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under
review . . . .” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541
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(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). In an effort to determine whether the
district court had jurisdiction over Petitioner’s application, we entered an order on
January 28, 2003, observing that Petitioner did not appear to have been “in
custody on the conviction being challenged in this case when he filed his petition
for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the district court.” We directed
Petitioner to explain “whether he was incarcerated, on parole, on probation, or
had his liberty restrained in any way by the state as a result of this conviction.”
In response, Petitioner filed a document stating that he was on parole until
November 11, 1998. Petitioner seems to assume that all he needs to establish is
that he was “in custody” at the time he initiated challenges to his sentence in state
court. For example, he points out that he filed a challenge in state court in March
1997. The relevant jurisdictional inquiry, however, is not whether Petitioner
began proceedings in state court while his liberty was restrained. Rather, the
question is whether he filed his federal habeas application while his liberty was
restrained. Because Petitioner’s parole ended in November 1998, he was not “in
custody” when he filed his § 2254 application in August 1999.
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We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment and remand this case to
the district court with instructions to dismiss the application for lack of
jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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