Haas v. Tulsa Police Department Ex Rel. City of Tulsa , 58 F. App'x 429 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 5 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID HAAS; WILLIAM LEE
GREGORY,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
TULSA POLICE DEPARTMENT, ex No. 02-5043
rel. CITY OF TULSA, D.C. No. 00-CV-928-EA
(N.D. Oklahoma)
Defendant,
and
DAVID R. CROW; STEVEN K.
MIDDLETON; DONALD R.
DERAMUS; DAVID KNUDSON;
SUE KRUSE,
Defendants - Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , BRISCOE , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendants-appellants, officers with the Tulsa Police Department, appeal
from a district court order denying in part their motion for summary judgment on
the ground of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs-appellees, the owner and clerk of a
store selling adult media in Tulsa, asserted many federal and state claims against
the officers and the city in connection with an arrest and associated seizure of
materials at the store pursuant to a state obscenity law. The district court granted
summary judgment against plaintiffs on all claims alleged against the city and on
most claims alleged against the officers. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of
that ruling, and their motion remains pending. The district court also, however,
rejected the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity as to plaintiffs’ claims under
the First and Fourth Amendments for improper seizure of constitutionally
protected materials. It is that aspect of the district court’s order for which the
officers now seek review. We conclude we lack appellate jurisdiction under the
rule of Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511 (1985) and its progeny. We therefore
dismiss the appeal.
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Before considering whether the substance of the officers’ appeal qualifies
for interlocutory review under Mitchell , however, we note that plaintiffs have also
raised the possibility of a threshold procedural impediment to our jurisdiction.
Specifically, they contend their pending motion for reconsideration falls within
the scope of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, thereby triggering the tolling provisions of
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) and, hence, forestalling appellate jurisdiction until the
motion is resolved.
The officers argue plaintiffs’ motion has no tolling effect because (1) it was
filed after the notice of appeal and (2) it relates to claims, resolved adversely to
plaintiffs, distinct from the matters raised on this appeal. Neither point is
availing. The Supreme Court held some time ago, based on language in Rule 4(a)
that remains unchanged, that the Rule gave the district court “express authority to
entertain a timely motion . . . under Rule 59, even after a notice of appeal had
been filed.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co. , 459 U.S. 56, 59 (1982); s ee
Stone v. INS , 514 U.S. 386, 396 (1995) (indicating continuing vitality of Griggs
analysis). The same section of Rule 4, stating that “[i]f a party timely files [a
Rule 59 motion] . . . the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry
of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion,” Rule 4(a)(4)(A), also
indicates that the tolling consequences of a Rule 59 motion apply regardless of
whether the motion was filed by a party other than the appellant or was directed
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to a part of the judgment not adverse to the appellant and, thus, distinct from the
matters for which the appellant seeks review. See, e.g. , Diaz v. Romer , 961 F.2d
1508, 1510 (10 th Cir. 1992); F.E.L. Publ’ns., Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago ,
739 F.2d 284, 284-85 (7 th Cir. 1984).
There is, however, a different reason why plaintiffs’ motion does not affect
our jurisdiction. The district court’s order granting summary judgment against
plaintiffs in some respects and denying it in others was not a final judgment. See
Anderson v. Deere & Co. , 852 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10 th Cir. 1988) (applying
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). Thus, plaintiffs’ purported Rule 59 motion was, in reality,
“nothing more than an interlocutory motion invoking the district court’s general
discretionary authority to review and revise interlocutory rulings prior to entry of
final judgment, and, as such, did not call into play the timing and tolling
considerations attendant upon [Rule 59] motions.” Wagoner v. Wagoner ,
938 F.2d 1120, 1122 n.1 (10 th Cir. 1991); see Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. ,
240 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10 th Cir. 2001). Hence, plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration of those aspects of the district court’s order resolved adversely to
them does not impede the officers’ separate effort to obtain appellate review of
the district court’s denial of their qualified immunity defense with respect to
plaintiffs’ First and Fourth Amendment claims.
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We turn, then, to the question whether the district court’s rejection of the
officers’ qualified immunity defense is, in substance, an appealable interlocutory
decision. We must inquire whether the ruling was a “purely legal determination
fit for [interlocutory] appellate resolution,” or just a factual determination that
plaintiffs “ha[ve] presented evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment”
and, thus, not fit for immediate review. Garrett v. Stratman , 254 F.3d 946, 952 &
n.8 (10 th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted) (applying Mitchell and Johnson v.
Jones , 515 U.S. 304 (1995)). On its face, the district court’s holding that the
officers had “fail[ed] to satisfy their burden of showing that no genuine issues of
material fact exist and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law” on
the pertinent claims, Aplts. App. Vol. II at 537, 544, certainly appears to fall
within the non-appealable category.
Notwithstanding that generic reference to Rule 59 evidentiary standards,
however, interlocutory jurisdiction could still be appropriate if the availability of
qualified immunity nevertheless ultimately turned on a distinct question of law.
Gross v. Pirtle , 245 F.3d 1151, 1156-58 (10 th Cir. 2001). However, a review of
the case materials confirms that the rejection of qualified immunity here clearly
rested on the issue of evidentiary sufficiency, and “we are without jurisdiction to
scrutinize the district court’s conclusion beyond taking that quick look.” Garrett ,
254 F.3d at 956; see Gross , 245 F.3d at 1157-58. The officers argued that they
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had relied on legal advice from the district attorney’s office in seizing plaintiffs’
materials and, consequently, were entitled to qualified immunity regardless of the
impropriety of their actions, citing the “extraordinary circumstances” doctrine
discussed in Hollingsworth v. Hill , 110 F.3d 733, 740-41 (10 th Cir. 1997).
Specifically referring to the factual conditions for application of this doctrine, the
district court held summary judgment was inappropriate because of the presence
of “genuine issues of material fact as to what advice was given by the attorneys,
whether it was unequivocal and specifically tailored to the facts, whether
complete information was provided to the advising attorneys, the competence of
the attorneys, and how soon after the advice was received action was taken.”
Aplts. App. Vol. II at 536-37. The points identified by the district court involve
material issues of fact rooted in the evidentiary record, and “we are without
jurisdiction to delve further into the record to ‘ assess [] . . . the district court’s
evidentiary conclusions.’” Garrett , 254 F.3d at 955 (quoting Gross , 245 F.3d at
1157-58 (emphasis added)).
The officers try to manufacture an abstract issue of law for review, by
suggesting that the district court rejected their qualified immunity defense only
because they failed to present direct testimony from those whose legal advice they
relied on in seizing plaintiffs’ materials. At the outset of their brief, they frame
the issue for review as follows: “Is a police officer asserting the ‘exceptional
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circumstances’ qualified immunity exception required to present the testimony of
the judge or attorney the officer relied upon[?]” Aplts. Br. at 1. But one searches
the rest of their brief in vain for a developed argument focused on this legal point.
Instead, the brief goes on to address precisely the sufficiency-of-the-evidence
issue we lack jurisdiction to reach. See id. at 12-15. Indeed, it could hardly do
otherwise. As the quoted passage from the district court’s order plainly shows,
the denial of the officers’ motion for summary judgment turned on the
inconclusive substance, not the testimonial source, of the evidence relating to the
extraordinary-circumstances exception.
The appeal is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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