United States v. Dorrough , 64 F. App'x 719 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 28 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 02-6237
(D.C. No. 01-CR-175-L)
WESLEY ALLEN DORROUGH, also (W.D. Oklahoma)
known as Allen Dorrough,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, PORFILIO and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
This case is the direct criminal appeal of defendant Wesley Allen
Dorrough’s conviction under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, for
agreeing, between August 2000 and November 2000, to help smuggle heroin into
the Federal Correctional Institution, El Reno, Oklahoma (El Reno), where he was
an inmate. Defendant also appeals his related conviction of the attempted
possession of a sympathy card containing heroin which had been mailed to him
and intercepted by prison officials. On appeal, defendant argues that evidence of
his three prior positive drug tests while incarcerated at El Reno should not have
been admitted and that the district court erred in refusing to allow a two-to-four
point reduction in the guideline calculation to reflect his limited role in the
offense. After our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the relevant case
law, we affirm.
As the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we will refer to them
only as necessary to explain our decision. Suffice it to say that defendant agreed
with the two ringleaders of a heroin smuggling operation to allow his name to be
used as the addressee of greeting cards sent into El Reno and containing heroin.
In return for taking this risk, defendant was rewarded with a portion of the heroin
shipment. He argues that the district court erred in allowing evidence of his three
prior positive drug tests to be introduced at trial, contending that two of the tests
had occurred before the dates of the conspiracy.
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The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of evidence of “other
crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides,
however, that admission of such evidence for other purposes, such as “proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident” is acceptable. Id. We review the district court’s decision to
admit evidence of defendant’s prior drug use for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Fitzherbert, 13 F.3d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1993).
The district court held a hearing to address the admissibility of the
drug-test evidence and concluded, after applying the factors set out in Fitzherbert,
that the evidence could be properly admitted. In Fitzherbert, this court set out the
following criteria for determining whether evidence of prior acts under
Rule 404(b) could be admitted:
(1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose;
(2) the evidence must be relevant;
(3) the trial court must make a rule 403 determination of
whether the probative value of the similar acts is
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice; and
(4) pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 105, the trial court shall, upon
request, instruct the jury that the evidence of similar acts
is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which
it was admitted.
Id. (quotation omitted).
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The district court found that the evidence was both relevant and offered for
a proper purpose because it would show defendant participated in the conspiracy
in exchange for drugs. In determining that the probative value of the evidence
was not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, the court noted that the
jury would already know defendant was an inmate in a federal prison and would
learn from defendant’s admissible confession of his drug use. The court agreed to
give a limiting instruction if so requested by defendant. Because the district court
properly applied the Fitzherbert factors in determining the admissibility of the
drug-test evidence, the eventual inclusion of that evidence at trial was not an
abuse of discretion.
As his second issue on appeal, defendant contends that the district court
erred in refusing to allow a two-to-four point reduction in the guideline
calculation for his role in the offense as a minimal, minor, or between minimal
and minor participant pursuant to USSG § 3B1.2. “A trial court’s determination
as to whether a defendant was a minimal or minor participant is a factual finding
that we review only for clear error.” United States v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1451,
1455 (10th Cir. 1994). Defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was a minimal or minor participant in the offense and thus eligible for a
§ 3B1.2 reduction. Id. “[A] defendant is not entitled to a reduction under 3B1.2
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simply because he is the least culpable among several participants in a jointly
undertaken criminal enterprise.” Id.
In denying the minimal role adjustment, the district judge noted his
familiarity with the case and with defendant’s particular role, having already
sentenced the other conspirators. R. Vol. VI at 462. While acknowledging that
defendant was not a leader of the organization, the court concluded that defendant
“was more than a minimal participant in . . . the use of his name. . . . [H]is role
in the conspiracy was more than simply a minimal player who did not understand
the scope and structure of the enterprise.” Id. at 462-63. In response to defense
counsel’s allusion to the other two levels of role adjustment anticipated by
§ 3B1.2–that of minor participant and that of a participant somewhere between
minimal and minor–the district court responded:
The Court is aware of the statute. . . . I feel that
Mr. Dorrough’s role is one which he is above the minimal participant
and at the level where he would not get any credit for his role.
The Court feels his role was such that was important to the
conspiracy, that he had an understanding of what the conspiracy and
purposes were and the ramifications of it.
He was not a leader and does not get additional points upward
for being a leader of the conspiracy, but his role was such that the
Court feels that he should not be given any adjustment as a leader or
as a minimal participant. His role was vital and key to the overall
end result of the conspiracy. And he had knowledge according to
what the Court understands from the testimony of what the purpose
and the full ramifications of the conspiracy were.
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Id. at 463-64.
We have reviewed the record in this case and find that the district court
properly considered all levels of adjustment under § 3B1.2. The court’s
conclusion that defendant was not a minimal or minor participant was not clearly
erroneous.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Chief Judge
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