Bingham Livestock Transportation, Inc. v. Mead , 67 F. App'x 511 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 6 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BINGHAM LIVESTOCK
TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 01-4215
v. (D. Utah)
(D.Ct. No. 01-CV-6-ST)
KENNETH M. MEAD,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Submitted on the briefs. **
Gregory G. Skordas of Gustin, Christian, Skordas & Caston, Salt Lake City, Utah;
Anthony J. McMahon, Bethesda, Maryland, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C.; Paul M.
Warner, United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah; Douglas N. Letter and
Steve Frank, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellee.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Before HARTZ and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Bingham Livestock Transportation, Inc., brought this action for injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Inspector General of the United States
Department of Transportation. The United States District Court for the District of
Utah denied Bingham Livestock’s motion for summary judgment and granted the
government’s motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment.
Bingham Livestock appeals. Due to recent events that occurred during the
pendency of this appeal, we dismiss this appeal as moot.
Bingham Livestock is a trucking business located in Utah. Based on
allegations it violated, among other things, certain provisions of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§ 395.3, 395.8, the Inspector
General’s Office, in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, began
an investigation of Bingham Livestock’s business activities. A few months later,
agents from the Inspector General’s Office and other federal and local agencies
executed a search warrant on Bingham Livestock’s premises. The agents seized
some of Bingham Livestock’s business records during the search.
-2-
Bingham Livestock filed a complaint in district court, 1 seeking, in relevant
part, an order (1) declaring the Inspector General’s investigation of Bingham
Livestock beyond his authority; (2) declaring the Inspector General’s search of
Bingham Livestock’s premises beyond his authority and in violation of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and (3) directing the
Inspector General to terminate his investigation of Bingham Livestock and return
the records seized during the search. 2 Bingham Livestock later filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing the Inspector General acted beyond his authority in
investigating Bingham Livestock and searching its premises. In response, the
government filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, alternatively,
for summary judgment. After a hearing on the motions, the district court denied
Bingham Livestock’s motion for summary judgment and granted the government’s
motion. Bingham Livestock appeals, arguing the district court’s order should be
reversed and its business records returned.
1
We sua sponte designate the complaint as part of the record on appeal. See Fed.
R. App. Proc. 10(e)(2)(C).
2
Bingham Livestock also sought in its complaint an order rescinding the Inspector
General’s referral of the investigation to the Department of Justice and a declaration the
referral was “ultra vires.” Bingham Livestock later abandoned these claims for relief
because there was no “referral to the Department of Justice.” In any event, even if
Bingham Livestock still desired this relief, we nevertheless conclude this action is moot
for the reasons discussed below.
-3-
While this appeal was pending, Bingham Livestock entered a plea
agreement with the government and pleaded guilty to one count of Felony
Information in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In addition, the government ended
its investigation and returned the records it seized during the search of Bingham
Livestock’s premises to Bingham Livestock’s attorney. As a result of these
developments, the government filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot
because the “investigation is complete and the records at issue in this case [are]
returned to Bingham [Livestock].”
Bingham Livestock opposes the government’s motion. It argues the
government agreed, as part of the plea agreement, Bingham Livestock would be
able to withdraw its guilty plea if it was successful on this appeal. The
government and Bingham Livestock’s attorney in the criminal proceedings deny
entering any agreement concerning this appeal, and the plea agreement does not
reflect any such agreement. In addition, Bingham Livestock argues it did not sign
the plea agreement. After reviewing the government’s motion and the parties’
arguments, we conclude this action is moot.
“Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or
controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.”
-4-
McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996). “In
general a case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455
U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “‘Past exposure to
illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.’”
Beattie v. United States, 949 F.2d 1092, 1094 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting O’Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974) (alterations omitted)). Likewise, “[i]t is
well established that what makes a declaratory judgment action ‘a proper judicial
resolution of a “case or controversy” rather than an advisory opinion – is [] the
settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant toward the
plaintiff.’” Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)).
Under these principles, we conclude Bingham Livestock’s claim for
injunctive relief is moot. Bingham Livestock already achieved the explicit
objective of its proposed injunction: the government ceased the investigation and
returned Bingham Livestock’s business records. As a result of these
developments, there is no longer a “live” controversy.
-5-
We also conclude Bingham Livestock’s claims for declaratory relief are
moot. Because the government already ended its investigation and returned
Bingham Livestock’s business records, a declaratory judgment in Bingham
Livestock’s favor “would amount to nothing more than a declaration that [it] was
wronged, and would have no effect on the [government’s] behavior towards [it].”
Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 1997). 3
Furthermore, we conclude the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
exception to mootness is not applicable to the facts of this case. See Murphy, 455
U.S. at 482. The particular controversy in this case “is neither likely to recur nor,
by nature, so ephemeral as to elude the processes of judicial review.” Beattie,
940 F.2d at 1094 n.2. See, e.g., Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482 (stating the “capable of
repetition, yet evading review exception” is limited to cases where “(1) the
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same
3
We also note Bingham Livestock’s “interest in attorney’s fees is insufficient to
create an Article III case or controversy where a case or controversy does not exist on the
merits of the underlying claim.” Cox, 43 F.3d at 1348 n.4. Furthermore, under the
circumstances of this case, Bingham Livestock’s general prayer for “[s]uch other and
further relief as the Court may deem appropriate” does not preserve this action as a live
case or controversy. See Thomas R.W. v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Educ., 130 F.3d 477,
480 (1st Cir. 1997).
-6-
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again” (quotation marks
and citation omitted)). In light of the terms of the plea bargain, the possibility
that the government will begin a new investigation of Bingham Livestock or (if
Bingham Livestock is able to withdraw its guilty plea) re-open its previous
investigation is simply too speculative and remote at this time to qualify for this
exception. See F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding
the possibility of a subsequent investigation for Medicaid fraud “too speculative
to support” an exception to the mootness doctrine.)
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude this action is moot. We
therefore GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss this appeal as moot,
VACATE the judgment of the district court, and REMAND to the district court
with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. See United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950).
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
-7-