Hernandez v. Ashcroft , 72 F. App'x 764 ( 2003 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
RAMON DURAN-HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, United States No. 02-9513
Attorney General; MICHAEL
HESTON, District Director,
Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”); and JAMES W.
ZIGLAR, Commissioner, INS,
Respondents.
ORDER
Filed October 28, 2003
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Respondent’s motion for publication of this court’s order and judgment
filed on July 21, 2003 is granted. A copy of the published opinion is attached.
Entered for the Court
PATRICK FISHER, Clerk of Court
By:
Amy Frazier
Deputy Clerk
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 21 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
RAMON DURAN-HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, United States
Attorney General; MICHAEL No. 02-9513
HESTON, District Director,
Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”); and JAMES W.
ZIGLAR, Commissioner, INS,
Respondents.
Petition for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to an Order of Transfer Issued by the
United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 01-3488-RDR)
James S. Phillips, Jr., Phillips & Phillips, Chartered, Wichita, Kansas, for
Petitioner.
Cindy S. Ferrier, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division (Linda S.
Wendtland, Assistant Director, with her on the brief), United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY and EBEL , Circuit Judges.
EBEL , Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Ramon Duran-Hernandez (hereinafter “Duran”), a Mexican
citizen, was ordered removed from the United States in 1998 after he falsely
claimed United States citizenship at the U.S.–Mexico border. He was barred from
reentering the country for five years. Only two years later, however, Duran
reentered the United States illegally and thereafter applied for adjustment of his
immigration status. The Immigration and Naturalization Service rejected his
application and reinstated his prior removal order.
Duran, represented by counsel, filed a habeas corpus petition in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas, challenging the INS’s
reinstatement procedures on due process grounds. The district court, adopting the
recommendation of a magistrate judge, transferred the petition to this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Both parties assume, and we agree, that the
petition is now before us as a direct appeal from the INS adjudication.
Because we find that Duran has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by
the INS’s reinstatement proceedings, we AFFIRM the decision of the INS.
BACKGROUND
On April 12, 1998, Mexican national Ramon Duran-Hernandez was caught
attempting to enter the United States illegally with his American citizen wife at
the Presidio, Texas, Point of Entry. Later that day, in a signed, sworn statement
-2-
to an INS officer, Duran admitted that he was not a U.S. citizen and that both he
and his wife had falsely claimed that he was a U.S. citizen when they tried to
cross the border that morning. Duran admitted knowing that it was a crime to
falsely claim U.S. citizenship. Duran also admitted to having lived illegally in the
United States for 10 years prior to his reentry attempt and to having been
previously ordered deported in 1997.
That same day, the INS found that Duran was inadmissible to the United
States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), which renders
inadmissible any alien who falsely represents his United States citizenship.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).
Pursuant to the applicable provision of the INA, the INS ordered Duran returned
to Mexico. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i). The INS gave
Duran a written notice stating that 1) he was barred from reentering the United
States for five years from the date of his departure (April 12, 1998); 2) if he
wished to reenter the United States before the end of that five-year period, he
must ask for and receive permission to do so from the Attorney General (by using
application forms available at any U.S. Consulate or INS office); and 3) that he
could be criminally prosecuted for reentering without such permission. Duran
signed the notice and walked back to Mexico.
On January 15, 2000—within the five-year ban—Duran again illegally
-3-
entered the United States by walking through the desert near El Paso, Texas, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i). He was not
caught at that time and remained in the United States.
On April 13, 2001, Duran applied (through his wife) for adjustment of
status based on his 1997 marriage to an American citizen, under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255( i), INA § 245( i). 1 Eight months later, on December 18, 2001, the INS
denied Duran’s application. To be eligible for adjustment of status, an alien must
be “admissible to the United States for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(i)(2)(A), INA § 245(i)(2)(A). Because Duran had reentered the United
States within the five-year ban and without first applying to the Attorney General
for permission, the INS found that Duran was not “admissible to the United States
for permanent residence” and therefore was ineligible to have his status adjusted.
The INS also noted that Duran had admitted to having illegally entered the United
1
That statute allows an alien who is physically present in the United States
to apply to the Attorney General for adjustment of status upon submission of a
$1,000 application fee. 8 U.S.C. § 1255( i)(1)(C), INA § 245( i)(1)(C).
Upon receipt of such an application and the sum hereby required, the
Attorney General may adjust the status of the alien to that of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence if—(A) the alien is eligible to
receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for
permanent residence ; and (B) an immigrant visa is immediately available to
the alien at the time the application is filed.
8 U.S.C. § 1255( i)(2), INA § 245( i)(2) (emphasis added).
-4-
States ten years before his 1998 attempt.
The next day—December 19, 2001—the INS began and concluded the
process of reinstating Duran’s 1998 removal order. During that process, Duran
gave a second sworn statement to the INS. Before he gave that statement, he
signed a section of the Sworn Statement form acknowledging that he understood
his rights, that anything he said could be used against him, and that he did not
wish to consult with a lawyer. In his handwritten answers to preprinted questions
on the Sworn Statement form, Duran admitted, inter alia, 1) that he had been
deported on April 12, 1998; 2) that he last entered the United States on January
15, 2000, “near El Paso, TX. walking in the desert”; and 3) that he never applied
to the U.S. Attorney General for permission to reenter the country after his initial
deportation.
That same day (December 19, 2001), the INS had Duran sign a Notice of
Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order, which stated that the INS would be
reinstating its April 12, 1998 removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5),
INA § 241(a)(5). That statute—which is at the core of Duran’s appeal—states as
follows:
(5) Reinstatement of removal orders against aliens illegally reentering. If
the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States
illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under
an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its
original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is
not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act, and the alien
-5-
shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), INA § 241(a)(5) (emphasis added). The Notice form
informed Duran that he “may contest this determination by making written or oral
statement [sic] to an immigration officer. You do not have the right to a hearing
before an immigration judge.” Duran checked a box stating that he did not wish
to make a statement, and he signed the form. The INS then issued its final
reinstatement decision, which consisted of an INS official’s signature under one
sentence of preprinted text that stated, “Having reviewed all available evidence,
the administrative file and any statements made or submitted in rebuttal, I have
determined that the above-named alien is subject to removal through
reinstatementof [sic] the prior order, in accordance with section [illegible on the
blurred copy in the record, but presumably § 241(a)(5)] of this Act.”
On December 31, 2001, Duran filed (through counsel) a habeas corpus
petition with the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. First, he
challenged the constitutionality of the INA’s reinstatement provisions as violative
of his due process rights. Second, he challenged the INS’s purported failure to
pursue his application for adjustment of status before reinstating the prior
removal order. A magistrate judge recommended that the case be transferred to
the Court of Appeals, because “reinstatement is actually the enforcement of a
prior final removal order,” over which the Court of Appeals has exclusive
-6-
jurisdiction. Citing Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001),
the magistrate judge concluded that transfer, rather than dismissal, was
appropriate “because jurisdiction in these cases has been in a state of flux.” The
district court agreed and ordered the case transferred to the Tenth Circuit. 2
DISCUSSION
Congress has declared that petitions for review of INS orders of removal
must be filed “with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the
immigration judge completed the proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), INA
§ 242(b)(2). 3 Duran did not follow this procedure; rather, he bypassed direct
2
On April 5, 2002, Duran filed an emergency motion for a stay of
deportation pending appeal, as he was to be deported to Mexico later that day. In
an April 5 Order, we denied the motion. Although neither the parties nor the
record mention Duran’s current whereabouts, we presume that he is now back in
Mexico.
3
Although § 1252 speaks specifically of judicial review of “orders of
removal,” every circuit to address the question has found § 1252 to cover review
of reinstatement orders as well. See, e.g. , Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman , 308 F.3d
796, 801 (7th Cir. 2002); Ojeda-Terrazas v. Ashcroft , 290 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir.
2002); Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft , 280 F.3d 858, 861, 868 (8th Cir. 2002);
Bejjani v. INS , 271 F.3d 670, 674 (6th Cir. 2001); Velasquez-Gabriel v. Crocetti ,
263 F.3d 102, 105 (4th Cir. 2001); Castro-Cortez v. INS , 239 F.3d 1037, 1043
(9th Cir. 2001).
Our Circuit has two conflicting unpublished opinions regarding this issue.
Compare Lopez-Herrera v. INS , No. 00-9501, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 774 (10th
Cir. Jan. 20, 2000), at *3 (“[T]his court is specifically barred from reviewing the
agency’s reinstatement of a prior deportation order.”), with Yanez-Torres v. INS ,
No. 99-9504, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1525 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2000), at *2 (“We
(continued...)
-7-
review and filed a habeas corpus petition (his first error) in the district court (his
second error) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 4 The district court then transferred that
petition to the Tenth Circuit under the transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which
permits a court to transfer a case where there is “a want of jurisdiction” and
transfer would be “in the interest of justice.” Id. The district court’s use of the
transfer statute cures Duran’s second error, the filing of his petition in the district
court as opposed to the Tenth Circuit. That leaves us with only his first
error—filing a habeas petition instead of a direct appeal—to consider. Both
parties proceed as if Duran had properly filed a direct appeal with this court. 5 In
3
(...continued)
have jurisdiction to review the final order reinstating the 1981 deportation order
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)....”). We recognize that unpublished decisions are
not binding authority, United States v. Goff , 314 F.3d 1248, 1250 (10th Cir.
2003), and therefore follow the weight of authority in other circuits and our own
opinion in Yanez-Torres . Accordingly, we hold that we have jurisdiction to hear
petitions for direct review of reinstatement orders under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, INA §
242.
4
We note that Duran’s petition, although filed in the wrong court, was
timely. Petitions for review of orders of removal must be filed within thirty days
of the date of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), INA § 242(b)(1).
Petitioner’s reinstatement order became final on December 19, 2001, and he filed
his habeas petition twelve days later, on December 31, 2001.
5
Duran’s brief states, “Petitioner originally filed a habeas corpus action
while incarcerated in Kansas, but the United States District Court ordered the case
transferred to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case is now proceeding as
a petition for review of the agency action .” Pet. Br. at 2 (emphasis added). For
its part, the Government’s brief states, “A district court transferred Duran’s case
(initially brought as a habeas petition ) to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631....
(continued...)
-8-
the interests of justice, we will also treat Duran’s petition as if it had been so
filed and review it as a direct appeal of the INS’s action. See Lopez v. Heinauer,
332 F.3d 507, 510–11 (8th Cir. 2003); Batista v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 8, 12 (1st
Cir. 2001); Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001).
Turning to the merits of Duran’s appeal, his due process claim fails because
he has not proven that he suffered prejudice as a result of the INS’s reinstatement
procedures. The regulation governing reinstatement of removal orders, 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.8(a), directs an immigration officer to determine three facts before
reinstating a prior order of removal: 1) whether the alien was subject to a prior
order of removal; 2) whether the alien is the same alien who was previously
removed; and 3) whether the alien illegally reentered the United States. Because
Duran contests none of these facts, he cannot prove that additional procedural
safeguards would have changed the result in his case. This failure to prove
prejudice leads us to reject Duran’s due process claim. See Ojeda-Terrazas v.
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 292, 302 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Garcia-Martinez,
228 F.3d 956, 964 n.10 (9th Cir. 2000); Salazar v. Ashcroft, No. 01-3342, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 12814 (3d Cir. June 27, 2002), at **4-5.
5
(...continued)
This Court has jurisdiction to review the INS’ reinstatement order pursuant to
Section 242(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).” Gov’t Br. at 2 (emphasis
added).
-9-
We also reject Duran’s adjustment of status claim. Duran asserts that the
INS reinstated his removal order before it adjudicated his adjustment of status
application. The record proves that the opposite is true: the INS adjudicated and
rejected Duran’s adjustment of status application on December 18, 2001, and it
reinstated his removal order one day later, on December 19, 2001. Duran’s claim
to the contrary clearly lacks merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the INS.
- 10 -