United States v. Campbell , 73 F. App'x 382 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    AUG 22 2003
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                    No. 03-6221
    (D.C. No. 98-CV-211-L)
    ROSCO CAMPBELL;                                       (W.D. Okla.)
    SHERRY CAMPBELL,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
    After examining the parties’ filings, this panel has determined unanimously
    that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal.
    See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
    submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    In this case brought by the United States to collect federal tax liabilities
    incurred from 1989-1991 and 1993, we have for consideration defendants’
    emergency motion for stay of the district court’s orders granting a motion to
    compel post-judgment discovery responses brought pursuant to Federal Rule
    of Civil Procedure 69(a), and denying reconsideration. The responses are due
    August 22, 2003.
    In order to obtain a stay, defendants must establish our jurisdiction over
    their appeal and show that: (1) they are likely to succeed on appeal; (2) they will
    be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) plaintiff will not be harmed if a stay
    issues; and (4) the public interest favors a stay. See 10th Cir. R. 8.1; Desktop
    Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 
    993 F.2d 755
    , 756-57, 760 (10th Cir. 1993),
    aff’d, 
    511 U.S. 863
     (1994).
    We must have jurisdiction over a matter before we may exercise our
    equitable powers to grant injunctive relief. See Knopp v. Magaw, 
    9 F.3d 1478
    ,
    1479-80 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction must attach before the
    court may exercise its equitable powers.”); Desktop Direct, Inc., 
    993 F.2d at 756-57
     (determining appellate jurisdiction before considering merits of petition
    for stay). We therefore resolve the jurisdictional question first. Our jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     is generally limited to review of final decisions, which
    are described as those that “end[] the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing
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    for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 
    486 U.S. 517
    , 521 (1988) (quotation omitted). In addition, a “small class” of
    interlocutory decisions are immediately appealable under §1291 under the
    collateral order doctrine, even though the decision has not terminated the
    proceedings in the district court, if the order conclusively determines the disputed
    question, resolves an important issue separate from the merits of the action, and is
    effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.   Id.
    While the denial of a post-judgment motion to compel discovery under
    Rule 69(a) has been held to be an immediately-appealable final order, see, e.g.,
    Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 
    664 F.2d 260
    , 262 (11th Cir. 1981); United States v.
    McWhirter, 
    376 F.2d 102
    , 105 (5th Cir. 1967), our sister circuits have held that
    orders compelling discovery under Rule 69(a) are interlocutory orders that are not
    immediately appealable, see Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
    Fund v. Express Freight Lines, Inc., 
    971 F.2d 5
    , 6 (7th Cir. 1992); Rouse Constr.
    Int’l, Inc. v. Rouse Constr. Corp., 
    680 F.2d 743
    , 745-46 (11th Cir. 1982); Childs
    v. Kaplan, 
    467 F.2d 628
    , 629 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Fabric Garment
    Co., 
    383 F.2d 984
    , 984 (2d Cir. 1967). Although the December 21, 1999,
    judgment ended the proceedings that determined the defendants’ tax liability and
    the United States’ right to relief, the collection proceedings began when
    defendants refused to pay the judgment. See Cent. States, 
    971 F.2d at 6
    . “A
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    contested collection proceeding will end in a judgment or a series of judgments
    granting supplementary relief to the plaintiff. The judgment that concludes the
    collection proceeding is the judgment from which the defendant can appeal.” 
    Id.
    Thus, if the government discovered an asset from defendants’ disclosures
    on which it could bring a further judicial collection action, defendants could
    appeal from the interlocutory discovery order once judgment was entered
    regarding that particular asset. See 
    id.
     In the alternative, defendants could refuse
    to comply with the discovery order, and if the district court entered a contempt
    sanction, that sanction would be immediately appealable. See Consumers Gas &
    Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 
    84 F.3d 367
    , 370 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that
    a post-judgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders, whether it is
    characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction, is immediately appealable as a final
    order under § 1291); Cent. States, 
    971 F.2d at 6
    ; Fabric Garment Co., 
    383 F.2d at 984
     (noting that principle behind the rule that orders granting discovery are not
    appealable is that defendant has choice to obey or to be punished for contempt
    and immediately appeal, which is adequate for the defendant’s protection without
    unduly impeding the progress of the case).
    But we also note that the Seventh Circuit has adopted the view that, if
    a Rule 69(a) post-judgment motion to compel discovery results in the discovery of
    assets that may be levied without further court order, the order compelling
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    discovery would be the “terminus of the case” and would be final for purposes of
    appeal. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 
    994 F.2d 1221
    , 1225 (7th Cir. 1993).
    We need not decide in this case whether we would adopt a similar test,
    because defendants, who bear the burden of establishing our jurisdiction in this
    matter, have not alleged that the government may immediately levy upon any
    property the government discovers without further judicial proceedings. Nor have
    defendants made a proper showing that the order is an appealable collateral order.
    We conclude that defendants have failed to satisfy their initial burden to show
    that the court’s orders granting discovery are either appealable interlocutory
    orders or final orders under § 1291. Therefore we must dismiss the appeal and
    deny the stay as moot.
    Even if we determined that we had jurisdiction, we would not grant an
    emergency stay because defendants also have not satisfied their burden to
    demonstrate entitlement to a stay. Defendants make only conclusory statements,
    unsupported by any documentation, that they have a likelihood of success on
    appeal. They claim that, because their affidavits “remain undisputed” and their
    questions remain unanswered, they are likely to succeed. But the United States’
    motion to compel was granted for defendants’ failure to respond to the motion.
    See Dist. Ct. Order filed 7/23/2003. Defendants subsequently filed a “Demand
    for Remedy in the Form of Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,” which the district
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    court construed as either an untimely response, a motion for reconsideration,
    a request for injunctive relief, or as another challenge to the court’s subject
    matter jurisdiction. The district court denied it because defendants failed to
    provide any good reasons for granting the relief requested. See Dist. Ct. Order
    filed 7/24/2003. On these facts, it is unlikely that defendants would succeed
    on appeal.
    Further, as the United States has pointed out, defendants did not appeal
    from the judgment entered against them in 1999 or from the district court’s
    subsequent orders denying their motions for post-judgment relief. Thus, they
    cannot challenge the government’s right to collect the tax judgment in any appeal
    from the order compelling discovery. And the government has a statutory right
    under Rule 69(a) to obtain the discovery the court granted precisely because it has
    a valid, unchallenged judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a).
    As to irreparable harm, defendants assert that the United States’ discovery
    requests invade Mr. Campbell’s personal and private business affairs. They argue
    that no justification for compelling such disclosure would exist if they prevail on
    appeal. But this argument does not support the granting of a stay given our
    analysis that they are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their appeal.
    Further, defendants have failed to satisfy their burdens to present arguments
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    on all four factors considered for a stay and to support their claims with record evidence.
    The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, and defendants’ motion
    for an emergency stay pending appeal is DENIED as moot.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    PER CURIAM
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