Hill v. Pugh , 75 F. App'x 715 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 11 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ERNEST JACK HILL, III,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-1561
(D.C. No. 00-RB-2511)
MICHAEL V. PUGH, Warden; (D. Colo.)
G. L. HERSHBERGER, Regional
Director, B.O.P.; KATHLEEN
HAWK-SAWYER, Director, B.O.P.,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ , BALDOCK , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Ernest Jack Hill, a prisoner in the general population of the United States
Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado (ADX) appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his civil rights action. We affirm.
In his amended complaint, Mr. Hill alleged jurisdiction under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and asserted that defendants have subjected him to unnecessary
solitary confinement and sensory deprivation in disregard of his history of mental
illness. 1 Mr. Hill claimed that: (1) his conditions of confinement and the
facility’s lack of adequate psychiatric care violated his Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; (2) the same circumstances
violated his due-process and equal-protection rights under the Fifth Amendment;
and (3) defendants failed to comply with Federal Bureau of Prisons’ regulations,
in contravention of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 2
He sought money
1
We refer to Mr. Hill’s complaint, R., Vol. 1, Doc. 22; his addendum to
complaint, id. , Doc. 23; and his clarification and supplement, id., Vol. 2, Doc. 55,
as the “amended complaint.”
2
The amended complaint also advanced a claim of retaliation for seeking
redress in the courts and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the United Nations Convention
Against Torture. On appeal, Mr. Hill does not raise any meaningful arguments
concerning these claims and, as a consequence, we do not address them.
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damages and injunctive relief. On appeal, Mr. Hill challenges the district court’s
multiple reasons for granting defendants’ motion to dismiss. 3
We first address Mr. Hill’s procedural attacks on the district court’s denial
of his motion to amend and the basis for its rulings under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). The resolution of these issues affects the scope of our review of his
remaining claims.
With his motion to amend, Mr. Hill sought to substitute a claim under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for his APA claim, to supply further allegations
concerning defendants’ personal participation in Mr. Hill’s mental-health care,
and to name additional defendants. We review the district court’s decision to deny
leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co.
v. America Online Inc ., 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2000).
Concerning the addition of an FTCA claim, we note that Mr. Hill filed his
amended complaint before he had satisfied the FTCA requirement of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). In FTCA actions,
as a general rule, a premature complaint cannot be cured through
amendment, but instead, plaintiff must file a new suit. Allowing
claimants generally to bring suit under the FTCA before exhausting
their administrative remedies and to cure the jurisdictional defect by
filing an amended complaint would render the exhaustion
3
In a lengthy and thoughtful ruling, the magistrate judge recommended
granting defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district court conducted a de novo
review, then adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
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requirement meaningless and impose an unnecessary burden on the
judicial system.
Duplan v. Harper, 188 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation and citation
omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Hill’s
motion to add an FTCA claim.
Further, the district court denied the motion to amend on grounds of
untimeliness and undue delay. “Where [a] party seeking amendment knows or
should have known of the facts upon which the proposed amendment is based but
fails to include them in the original complaint, the motion to amend is subject to
denial.” Parker v. Champion , 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998) (alteration in
original, quotation omitted). The denial of Mr. Hill’s motion to amend was well
within the district court’s discretion, particularly in light of its liberality in
accepting Mr. Hill’s addendum to complaint and his clarification and supplement
of the complaint.
Thus, the claims, allegations, and defendants included only in Mr. Hill’s
motion to amend have no part in this court’s review. As a consequence, and as
Mr. Hill essentially concedes, he has no valid FTCA claim for defendants’ alleged
disregard of prison regulations or Eighth Amendment claim relating to allegedly
inadequate mental-health care.
The second procedural matter is Mr. Hill’s contention that the district court
considered evidentiary matters outside the amended complaint and, therefore, it
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should have converted defendants’ dismissal motion into a summary judgment
motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). This argument is based entirely on a footnote
in the court’s discussion of defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion referring to
information presented during a hearing on Mr. Hill’s motion for a temporary
restraining order. See R., Vol. 5, Doc. 201, at 25, n.6.
“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted must be converted into a motion for summary judgment whenever the
district court considers matters outside the pleadings.” Lowe v. Town of Fairland ,
143 F.3d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1998). “Reversible error may occur . . . if the
district court considers matters outside the pleadings but fails to convert the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Nevertheless,
a district court’s consideration of matters outside the pleadings may be harmless
if the dismissal can be justified under Rule 12(b)(6) without reference to matters
outside of the pleadings. Id. In evaluating the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
rulings, therefore, this court is confined to the allegations in Mr. Hill’s amended
complaint.
Having resolved Mr. Hill’s preliminary issues, we next consider the
sufficiency of his complaint, reviewing de novo the district court’s dismissals
under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(2) for lack
of personal jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which
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relief may be granted. Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d
1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999) (concerning dismissals under Rule 12(b)(2));
Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Interior Sec’y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1152
(10th Cir. 1998) (concerning dismissals under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)).
Because Mr. Hill is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally.
Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam).
“‘Jurisdiction to resolve cases on the merits requires both authority over
the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and authority over the
parties (personal jurisdiction), so that the court’s decision will bind them.’”
Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l Corp ., 222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co ., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999)). “‘[T]here is no
unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy’ requiring federal courts to sequence one
jurisdictional issue before the other.” Id. (quoting Ruhrgas AG , 526 U.S. at 578).
In this case, the district court first examined whether it had personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants G. L. Hershberger, the Regional Director
for the North Central Region of the Bureau of Prisons in Kansas City, Kansas,
and Katherine Hawk-Sawyer, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
whose office is in Washington, D.C. Jurisdictional requirements are satisfied if,
“after reviewing the defendant[s’] interactions and connections with the forum
state, the court can conclude” that defendants “purposefully availed [themselves]
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of the protection and benefits of the laws” of Colorado, the forum state. United
States v . Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
“[T]he mere foreseeability of causing injury in another state” is insufficient to
establish the required contacts. Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp .,
90 F.3d 1523, 1534 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
Mr. Hill’s amended complaint alleges that Mr. Hershberger and
Ms. Hawk-Sawyer have overall responsibility for Bureau of Prisons’ operations in
Colorado and that Mr. Hershberger, with the consent of Ms. Hawk-Sawyer, had
authority over assignment of prisoners to ADX. It also alleges Mr. Hill and his
attorney have sent both Mr. Hershberger and Ms. Hawk-Sawyer administrative
grievances and letters warning of the potential detrimental effects of ADX
placement. This alleged conduct falls far short of the purposeful availment
necessary to establish jurisdiction over defendants Hershberger and
Hawk-Sawyer. It is not reasonable to suggest that federal prison officials may be
hauled into court simply because they have regional and national supervisory
responsibilities over facilities within a forum state. The district court properly
dismissed without prejudice all claims against these two defendants. 4
4
The district court’s personal jurisdiction ruling relieved Ms. Hawk-Sawyer
and Mr. Hershberger from potential liability to Mr. Hill in a Colorado forum. The
(continued...)
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Next, the district court analyzed its subject matter jurisdiction and
determined that Mr. Hill’s claims for money damages against defendants in their
official capacities were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As the
court recognized, it is well established that federal employees sued in their
official capacities are immune from a Bivens suit. See, e.g., Hatten v. White,
275 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002). Therefore, these claims were properly
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Mr. Hill also sought to evade the sovereign immunity bar by means of
a claim under the APA, which generally waives sovereign immunity in agency
review actions seeking equitable relief. See United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v.
United States , 253 F.3d 543, 550 (10th Cir. 2001). His amended complaint
alleges that, by originally assigning him to ADX and subsequently failing to
change his assignment, defendants violated bureau of prisons’ policy.
Specifically, he charges that defendants ignored a program statement providing
that ADX should be reserved for inmates who pose a serious threat to others and
who are not currently diagnosed as suffering from serious psychiatric illnesses.
4
(...continued)
discussion of Mr. Hill’s claims in the following text, therefore, is primarily
addressed to the sufficiency of the case against remaining defendant Mr. Pugh.
However, the analysis is equally applicable to the other two defendants.
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Bureau of Prisons’ program statements, however, are “internal agency
guidelines” that are not “subject to the rigors of the [APA], including public
notice and comment.” Jacks v. Crabtree , 114 F.3d 983, 985 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quotation omitted); see Reno v. Koray , 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (describing a
bureau of prisons program statement as an “internal agency guideline . . . akin to
an ‘interpretive rule’ that ‘do[es] not require notice and comment’”) (quoting
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp ., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)). “Whether or not” the
Bureau of Prisons makes its program statements known, they “create entitlements
(meaning something that may be enforced to prevent substantive transgressions)
only if adopted in one of the ways the APA prescribes . . . .” Miller v. Henman,
804 F.2d 421, 426 (7th Cir. 1986). Because Mr. Hill does not allege that the
program statement at issue was adopted under APA procedures, the district court
properly dismissed the APA claim.
After resolving the above issues relating to jurisdiction and sovereign
immunity, the district court turned to the question of whether the amended
complaint stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Rule 12(b)(6).
Mr. Hill’s first substantive contention is that his placement and retention in ADX
violate his due process rights.
We are unable to discern a possible due process violation arising from
Mr. Hill’s classification. Prisoners are not entitled to any “particular degree of
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liberty.” Templeman v. Gunter , 16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994). Further, a
review of the facts alleged in the complaint shows that, notwithstanding
Mr. Hill’s rhetoric, his placement does not impose an “atypical, significant”
hardship upon him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v.
Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995).
Additionally, this situation does not give rise to an equal-protection
violation. Mr. Hill alleges that, as an inmate in the ADX general population, he is
similarly situated to inmates placed in the ADX control unit for disciplinary
reasons, but that he is not allowed a hearing comparable to the one afforded
inmates in the control unit. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.43 (setting out hearing procedure
for inmates recommended for placement in a control unit). Because the
classification of prisoners based upon their situs of incarceration does not employ
a suspect class or burden a fundamental right, it “is accorded a strong
presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe , 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
The only proper judicial inquiry is whether the challenged classification bears
a rational relationship to a legitimate penological concern. See Shifrin v. Fields,
39 F.3d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 1994).
As Mr. Hill has acknowledged, he was placed in ADX for his commission
of bank fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering offenses while imprisoned in
another facility on earlier charges. The amended complaint states that, in
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sentencing Mr. Hill, the trial court recommended to the Bureau of Prisons that
“the defendant be . . . held under the most restrictive environment possible, with
limited access to visitors, telephones and other inmates.” R., Vol. 1, Doc. 22
at ¶ 36. The trial court’s statement provides a rational basis for the difference in
hearing opportunities between Mr. Hill’s prison classification and another
inmate’s disciplinary assignment to the ADX control unit.
Finally, we measure Mr. Hill’s cruel and unusual punishment allegations
against prison officials’ Eighth Amendment duty to maintain “humane conditions
of confinement,” including “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.”
Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). A plaintiff claiming a violation of
the Eighth Amendment must satisfy both an objective test (whether the conditions
can be considered cruel and unusual) and a subjective test (whether the
defendants acted with a culpable state of mind). Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294,
298, 303 (1991).
The objective component of the Eighth Amendment test requires allegations
that an inmate was deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “To the extent that
[an inmate’s] conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. “Mere
‘inactivity, lack of companionship and a low level of intellectual stimulation do
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not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.’” Caldwell v. Miller , 790 F.2d 589,
600-01 n.16 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting Bono v. Saxbe , 620 F.2d 609, 614 (7th Cir.
1980)).
We cannot conclude that Mr. Hill’s Eighth Amendment allegations state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. He contends that ADX conditions are
cruel and unusual in that he is isolated in his cell twenty-three hours a day for
five days a week and twenty-four hours the remaining two days. He asserts that
the resulting sensory deprivation amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. He
admits, however, that “his minimal physical requirements - food, shelter, clothing
and warmth” have been met. R., Vol. 1, Doc. 22, at ¶ 17. The situation described
in the amended complaint shows neither an “unquestioned and serious deprivation
of basic human needs,” Rhodes , 452 U.S. at 347, nor intolerable or shocking
conditions, id. at 348.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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