McBayne v. Pugh , 85 F. App'x 109 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 22 2003
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    ANTHONY RANDAZZO
    MCBAYNE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,                       No. 03-1228
    (D.C. No. 03-Z-549)
    v.                                                      (D. Colo.)
    MICHAEL V. PUGH, in his individual
    capacity, Former Warden, ADX-
    Florence; DANIEL SHOFF, in his
    individual capacity, Former S.I.A.,
    ADX-Florence; MARK COLLINS, in
    his individual capacity, ADX-
    Florence,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. **
    Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony McBayne, a federal prisoner incarcerated at
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    **
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
    panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    United States Penitentiary (USP) in Florence, Colorado, appeals from the district
    court’s dismissal of his complaint for damages filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six
    Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971). The
    district court dismissed the complaint as legally frivolous under the standard set
    forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Because we agree with the district court that Mr.
    McBayne has not alleged a violation of a protected constitutional right, we affirm
    the dismissal of this action as frivolous under § 1915A(b).
    Mr. McBayne is a federal prisoner who from 1997 to 2001 was incarcerated
    at USP Florence, Colorado. Upon arrival at USP Florence in 1997, Mr. McBayne
    was accepted into the pre-transfer program through which inmates may earn a
    transfer to a lower security facility. Mr. McBayne alleges that in December 2000,
    prison officials approached him requesting his assistance with an ongoing
    investigation into allegations that prison guards were accepting money and gifts
    from inmates in exchange for contraband. Mr. McBayne denied any culpability
    and refused to cooperate. Following his refusal, Mr. McBayne was issued two
    reports of misconduct, which caused his removal from the pre-transfer program.
    The two misconduct reports were later dismissed and Mr. McBayne was reinstated
    to the pre-transfer program. He was subsequently transferred to USP Allenwood,
    Pennsylvania.
    Mr. McBayne further alleges that once he arrived at Allenwood, federal
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    investigators continued to request his assistance with their ongoing investigation.
    He continued to refuse. In April 2002, Mr. McBayne was transferred back to USP
    Florence because of his continued refusal to cooperate with investigators. The
    specific reason for the transfer was his refusal to take a polygraph exam
    concerning information he previously provided. R. Doc. 4, Ex. 8.
    To succeed in a Bivens action, Mr. McBayne must demonstrate that federal
    officials violated his constitutional rights while acting under color of federal law.
    Dry v. United States, 
    235 F.3d 1249
    , 1255 (10th Cir. 2000). Specifically, Mr.
    McBayne alleges that defendants retaliated against him because he elected to
    exercise his constitutional right against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the
    Fifth Amendment.
    The district court dismissed the majority of Mr. McBayne’s claims due to
    his failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit as required by 42
    U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Porter v. Nussle, 
    534 U.S. 516
    , 532 (2002). Mr.
    McBayne appeals this determination, but a review of the record indicates that the
    district court was correct that Mr. McBayne had failed to exhaust remedies for
    every claim except that of retaliatory treatment by prison staff for exercise of his
    constitutional right against self-incrimination. We therefore consider only that
    claim on appeal.
    Though commitment to a penal facility may limit an inmate in the exercise
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    of his constitutional rights, inmates may not be retaliated against for exercising
    those constitutional rights they do retain. Frazier v. DuBois, 
    922 F.2d 560
    , 561
    (10th Cir. 1990). An inmate must prove that “but for” the retaliatory motive, the
    adverse action would not have occurred. Peterson v. Shanks, 
    149 F.3d 1140
    ,
    1144 (10th Cir. 1998). In his pro se brief, Mr. McBayne alleges that, contrary to
    the holding of the district court, his refusal to cooperate with federal investigators
    constituted an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
    and was motivated by a desire to avoid criminal prosecution. For two reasons, we
    disagree. First, Mr. McBayne did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights at the
    time of his initial questioning and he may not resurrect them now. Second, the
    district court reasonably interpreted Mr. McBayne’s claim to assert a right not to
    cooperate with authorities, rather than a violation of any constitutional right.
    The fact that Mr. McBayne is a federal prisoner does not serve to strip him
    of his privilege against self incrimination. McKune v. Lile, 
    536 U.S. 24
    , 36
    (2002) (plurality opinion). Fifth Amendment protections, however, may not be
    invoked retroactively. See Roberts v. United States, 
    445 U.S. 552
    , 559 (1980)
    (“The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not self-
    executing. At least where the Government has no substantial reason to believe
    that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating, the privilege may not
    be relied upon unless it is invoked in a timely fashion.”); United States v. Rogers,
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    921 F.2d 975
    , 979 (10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff admits to cooperating with the
    authorities and giving a statement, but then refusing to sign a statement, take any
    polygraph exam, or further cooperate. R. Doc. 5 at 20-23, 25, 27-28, 31-32, 36.
    On May 2, 2002, Mr. McBayne wrote a letter reminding the warden that
    McBayne had “a constitutional right not to be a witness against [him]self and not
    to cooperate with any law enforcement agents in their investigation where [he]
    may be a defendant.” R. Doc. 4, Ex. 7 at 2. However, in his lengthy affidavit of
    March 3, 2003, Mr. McBayne repeatedly states that he denied any involvement in
    the offenses being investigated. See, e.g., R. Doc. 5 at 1, 4. Consistent with 42
    U.S.C. § 1915A, we think it was reasonable for the district court to construe Mr.
    McBayne’s complaint as asserting a right not to cooperate with law enforcement
    authorities, rather than asserting a right to be free of compulsory self-
    incrimination. Plainly, a “right to remain silent” does not encompass the former,
    as concealment of crime has always been disfavored. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 4
    (misprision of a felony); Roberts, 
    445 U.S. at 557-58
    ; Branzburg v. Hays, 
    408 U.S. 665
    , 696-97 (1972).
    Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. McBayne’s
    action. Mr. McBayne is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We would
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    remind Mr. McBayne that he must continue to make payments until the entire
    filing fee has been paid.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
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