Scherer v. United States , 88 F. App'x 316 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 5 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
THOMAS E. SCHERER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-3158
(D.C. No. 01-CV-2428-JWL)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE and McKAY , Circuit Judges, and BRORBY , Senior Circuit
Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff-appellant Thomas E. Scherer, appearing pro se, appeals the district
court’s order dismissing his claim challenging the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
§ 1346(d) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We affirm.
I.
Plaintiff filed suit against the United States seeking monetary damages and
other relief in connection with the processing of his applications for disability
benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). 1
Citing 38 U.S.C.
§ 511(a), the district court determined that the VA’s “decisions regarding
veterans’ benefits are unreviewable in the federal district courts.” Scherer v.
United States , No. 01-CV-2428, 2002 WL 299315, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 15, 2002).
The court therefore dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at *2. Plaintiff then appealed to this court, and we affirmed the
dismissal of plaintiff’s claims challenging the handling of his applications for
disability benefits. Scherer v. United States , 55 Fed. Appx. 517, 517-18
(10th Cir. Jan. 29, 2003). We noted, however, that plaintiff “also alleged in fact
twelve of his complaint that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(d) is unconstitutional,” and we held
that “[s]ection 511(a) does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to hear this
claim.” Id. at 518. Thus, we remanded plaintiff’s claim challenging the
constitutionality of § 1346(d) to the district court for further proceedings. Id.
1
In his complaint, plaintiff also alleged that the VA wrongfully denied him
life insurance benefits and violated the Freedom of Information Act, but these
claims are not at issue in this appeal.
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Section 1346(d) is known as the “Tucker Act,” and it “bars the district
courts from taking jurisdiction of ‘any civil action or claim for a pension.’”
Wojton v. United States , 199 F. Supp. 2d 722, 726 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1346(d)). In his complaint, plaintiff asserted that § 1346(d) “violates
the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution right to a jury trial in
equity claims.” R., Doc. 1 at 3, Fact 12. On remand to the district court, the
court dismissed plaintiff’s claim challenging § 1346(d) under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Specifically, the district court concluded that plaintiff had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted because: (1) plaintiff’s complaint
referred to an alleged right to a jury trial in “equity claims,” but “the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial attaches only to actions at law,” Scherer v. United
States , No. 01-CV-2428, 2003 WL 21254724, at *1 (D. Kan. May 30, 2003)
(citing Mile High Indus. v. Cohen , 222 F.3d 845, 856 (10th Cir. 2000)); (2)
“section 1346(d) does not limit a party’s right to a jury trial in cases involving
veteran’s benefits; rather, it limits the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts . . . [and] [i]t is beyond dispute that Congress ‘has the constitutional
authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts,’” id. (quoting
Castaneda v. INS , 23 F.3d 1576, 1579 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994)); and (3) “‘[i]t has
long been settled that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury does not apply
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in actions against the Federal Government,’” id. (quoting Lehman v. Nakshian ,
453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981)).
Before the district court dismissed his claim challenging § 1346(d),
plaintiff filed a motion for a declaratory judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 57.
In his motion, plaintiff sought a declaration from the district court that he was
entitled to recover costs and attorney fees from the government as a “prevailing
party.” Plaintiff claimed that he was a prevailing party because, in January 2003,
while he was awaiting a decision from this court in his prior appeal, the VA
issued a decision assigning him a disability rating of thirty percent and awarding
him disability benefits retroactive to 1975. Plaintiff also argued that he was
a prevailing party in his appeal to this court since he obtained a remand on his
claim that § 1346(d) is unconstitutional. The district court did not address the
merits of plaintiff’s motion for a declaratory judgment, as the court denied the
motion as moot when it dismissed plaintiff’s claim challenging the
constitutionality of § 1346(d). Scherer , 2003 WL 21254724 at *1-*2.
. II.
In this appeal, plaintiff raises three issues:
a) Did the lower court trial judge abuse judicial discretion and err by
ruling . . . that Scherer’s motion for declaratory judgment (seeking
costs and attorney fees from the government) was moot?
b) Does the Secretary of the VA have the ability to administer,
enforce and provide remedy for statutory violations of government
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wide statutes such as the [Americans With Disabilities Act], the
[Freedom of Information Act] and other laws outside of [38 U.S.C.
§ 511(a)]?
c) The plaintiff asks the US Court of Appeals to decide whether
Congress erred in making amendments to the Economy Act of 1933
by its all laws clause.
Aplt. Opening Br. at vi.
We implicitly decided issues b) and c) adversely to plaintiff in his prior
appeal. Scherer , 55 Fed. Appx. at 517-18. Thus, plaintiff is barred by res
judicata from again raising these issues. In addition, while plaintiff briefly argues
at the end of his opening brief that § 1346(d) is unconstitutional, Aplt. Opening
Br. at 13-15, the constitutionality of § 1346(d) is not listed as an issue in
plaintiff’s statement of issues, id. at vi. As a result, plaintiff has waived his
constitutional challenge to § 1346(d). See Adams-Arapahoe Joint Sch. Dist. No.
28-J v. Continental Ins. Co. , 891 F.2d 772, 776 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that
“[a]n issue not included in either the docketing statement 2
or the statement of
issues in the party’s initial brief is waived on appeal”). Alternatively, even if
there was no waiver, we reject plaintiff’s claim that § 1346(d) is unconstitutional
for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court’s order. See
Scherer , 2003 WL 21254724, at *1.
2
Plaintiff has not submitted a docketing statement in this appeal.
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The only issue remaining is whether the district court erred in denying
plaintiff's motion seeking a declaration that, as a “prevailing party,” he was
entitled to recover the costs and attorney fees incurred in the district court and in
his prior appeal. In analyzing this issue, we assume: (1) that plaintiff is seeking
to recover his district court costs and attorney fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)
and the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and (2) that
plaintiff is seeking to recover his appellate court costs and attorney fees under
Fed. R. App. P. 39(b) and EAJA. 3
We conclude that plaintiff is not a prevailing party in this case. First, we
note that, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 511(b)(4), 7252, and 7292, plaintiff had the
right to appeal certain matters relating to the VA’s decisions concerning his
applications for disability benefits to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the United
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. We also note that plaintiff has pursued certain
appellate remedies with these entities. See Scherer v. Principi , 19 Fed. Appx.
3Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Fed. R. App. P. 39(b)
authorize an award of costs against the United States if the award is otherwise
authorized by law. For purposes of this case, the authorizing statute is EAJA, as
it provides that “a judgment for costs . . . may be awarded to the prevailing party
in any civil action brought by or against the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(a)(1). EAJA further provides that, subject to certain conditions, attorney
fees may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action against the United
States. Id. , § 2412(b) and (d)(1)(A).
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860, 861 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 2001) (dismissing appeal regarding denial of petition
for writ of mandamus seeking to accelerate action by the Board of Veterans’
Appeals on remanded appeal). In fact, the VA’s award of disability benefits to
plaintiff in January 2003 was in response to one or more of his other appeals. See
Letter from the VA to plaintiff dated January 4, 2003 4
(stating that the VA had
decided to award plaintiff retroactive disability benefits “based on the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals (BVA) Remand decision dated November 6, 2002”).
Second, plaintiff’s claim for costs and attorney fees is based on the
“‘catalyst theory,’ which posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if [he]
achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change
in the defendant’s conduct.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t
of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001). In Buckhannon , the Supreme
Court held that the catalyst theory is not a viable theory of recovery under the
“[n]umerous federal statutes,” such as EAJA, which provide for an award of costs
and/or attorney fees to the “prevailing party.” 5
Id. at 600. Instead, to be a
4
A copy of this letter is attached to plaintiff’s opening brief.
5
Although Buckhannon involved the prevailing party provisions in the Fair
Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, the holding of the case applies with equal
force to the prevailing party provisions in EAJA. See Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at
603 (noting that the term “prevailing party” is “a legal term of art”); see also
Vaughn v. Principi , 336 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir.) (rejecting claim for attorney
fees under EAJA based on catalyst theory because “ Buckhannon’s rejection of the
(continued...)
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prevailing party, a litigant must obtain a “material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties,” id. at 604, and this requires a party to obtain some
form of judicial “relief on the merits” such as an enforceable judgment or a
court-ordered consent decree, id. Consequently, because plaintiff has not
obtained any judicial relief in this case with respect to the merits of his
underlying claims for disability benefits or his challenge to § 1346(d), he is not a
prevailing party under EAJA.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
5
(...continued)
‘catalyst theory’ applied to EAJA”), petition for cert. filed , 72 U.S.L.W. 3427(U.S. Dec. 12, 2003) (No. 03-872); Perez-Arellano v. Smith , 279 F.3d 791, 794-95
(9th Cir. 2002) (same).
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