Roble v. Pontesso , 90 F. App'x 334 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 27 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ALI NUR ROBLE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 03-1098
(D.C. No. 03-RB-17 (OES))
STEPHEN F. PONTESSO, Warden, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges, and BRORBY , Senior Circuit
Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner Ali Nur Roble filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Therein, Roble challenged a final administrative
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
order removing him to Somalia or alternatively to Kenya, and sought release
from his pre-removal incarceration by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). 1 The district court denied the petition in its entirety. Roble appeals.
We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Because the district court
failed to make the findings required to support its determination that the DHS
may continue to detain Roble, we vacate and remand.
I.
Roble arrived in the United States from Germany in June 1999. He was
carrying a Kenyan passport. Based on this passport, immigration authorities
admitted Roble. In August 1999, Roble applied for asylum. In his application,
Roble asserted he was not Kenyan, but Somalian. Roble averred that his Kenyan
passport was fraudulent and that he had purchased it for $300 after traveling
from Somalia to Kenya. As grounds for his asylum claim, Roble claimed he
suffered severe persecution in Somalia because of his membership in the
Midgan tribe.
An immigration judge (IJ) denied Roble’s application for asylum and
ordered him removed from the United States for failure to possess a valid
1
Effective March 1, 2003, the custodial functions previously performed
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See Yuk v. Ashcroft , 355 F.3d 1222,
1224 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004). We refer to the INS and DHS interchangeably.
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immigrant visa. The IJ determined Roble failed to establish he was in fact
from Somalia. Roble’s Kenyan passport appeared genuine. The IJ found
Roble’s testimony regarding his Somalian origins not credible. The IJ further
found no reliable documentation to corroborate Roble’s claim he was from
Somalia. Oddly, the IJ ordered Roble removed to Somalia, or in the alternative,
to Kenya. Roble appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision on August 9, 2002.
See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7) (2002). Roble did not seek judicial review of the
BIA’s decision.
Sometime during the first two weeks of April, 2002, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) placed Roble in civil detention, where he remains.
In December 2002, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the INS from
removing Somali natives or nationals in the United States to Somalia. See Ali
v. Ashcroft , 213 F.R.D. 390, 396 (W.D. Wash. 2003). In January 2003, the
court entered a permanent injunction because Somalia does not have a functional
government to accept aliens removed from this country. See id. 400-05.
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In September 2003, the Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction. Ali v. Ashcroft ,
346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003). 2
Roble filed a § 2241 petition in February 2003 seeking review of his
final order of removal and release from INS custody. The INS filed a response
to the petition, in which it asserted (1) Roble’s request for relief from removal
to Somalia was not ripe because the INS was not currently deporting aliens to
Somalia; (2) INS was attempting to obtain a travel document that would allow
Roble to be removed to Kenya; and (3) INS was entitled to continue holding
Roble because the ninety-day statutory “removal period” described in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(2), tolled by the injunction, had not run.
The district court summarily denied Roble’s petition, relying generally
on the INS’ brief. The district court’s analysis, however, departed significantly
from that of the INS in one respect. The district court refused to consider the
INS’s argument that Roble should be returned to Kenya because Roble did
not seek removal to Kenya in his petition.
2
The Supreme Court has agreed to determine, on a petition for writ of
certiorari to the Eighth Circuit, whether DHS may deport aliens to Somalia; but
the Court has not yet decided the issue. Jama v. INS , 329 F.3d 630 (8th Cir.
2003), cert. granted , 2004 WL 323175 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2004) (No. 03-674).
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II.
A. Request for Release
Roble seeks release pending removal, claiming his incarceration for an
indefinite period is unlawful. The law provides that the Attorney General shall
detain an alien during the “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). If the alien
is not removed during this period, he is entitled to release, subject to supervision
under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. Id. § 1231(a)(3). For
purposes of this case, the removal period is ninety days from the date the IJ’s
order of removal became administratively final, or August 9, 2000, the date on
which the BIA affirmed the IJ’s order. See id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). 3
We therefore
conclude the ninety-day “removal period” began running for Roble on August 9,
2002, and expired November 7, 2002.
Section 1231(a)(6) empowers the DHS to detain an alien beyond the end
of the removal period, if he is a “risk to the community” or “unlikely to comply
with the order of removal.” Id. § 1231(a)(6). The DHS admits the record does
not specify under which of these criteria it continues to hold Roble. The DHS
nevertheless contends subsection (a)(6) provides it with authority to continue
3
Although Roble requested review of the IJ’s removal order in his § 2241
petition, the district court did not enter a stay of his removal; therefore
§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) does not extend the date on which the removal period began.
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detaining Roble. Section 1231(a)(6), however, does not give the DHS carte
blanche to detain Roble indefinitely.
In Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court discussed
the constitutional limitations on indefinite detention under subsection (a)(6). 4
The Supreme Court began by observing that the detention requirement of
§ 1231(a)(6) has two purposes: (1) assuring the appearance of aliens at
immigration proceedings, and (2) protecting the community from dangerous
aliens. Id. at 690. As the possibility of removal becomes remote, the first
justification drops out. The second justification–protecting the community–is
sustainable “only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject
to strong procedural protections.” Id. at 691. The Court reasoned that
4
The Supreme Court expressly extended the protections in Zadvydas only to
aliens who have “effected an entry into the United States.” 533 U.S. at 693.
Circuit cases have reached differing results on what constitutes an “entry into the
“United States” sufficient to trigger the due process protections discussed in
Zadvydas. Compare, e.g., Borrero v. Aljets , 325 F.3d 1003, 1007-08 (8th Cir.
2003) (rejecting application of Zadvydas to inadmissible Mariel Cuban paroled
into the United States) with Rosales-Garcia v. Holland , 322 F.3d 386, 404-08 (6th
Cir.) (en banc) (permitting Mariel Cubans to assert Zadvydas ), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct 2607 (2003). In view of the apparent circuit split, the Supreme Court
has agreed to decide a case raising this issue. Benitez v. Wallis , 337 F.3d 1289(11th Cir. 2003), cert. granted , 124 S. Ct. 1143 (2004).
Here, however, we need not reach the issue. Although the DHS mentions
the fact that Roble was ordered removed “as an alien inadmissible at the time of
his entry into the United States,” Aplee Br. at 3, it does not argue that Zadvydas is
thereby inapplicable to this case, see id. at 26-29. We do not foreclose DHS from
making this argument on remand.
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§ 1231(a)(6) neither applies narrowly to such “specially dangerous individuals”
nor does it provide such “strong procedural protections.” Interpreting the
subsection “to avoid a serious constitutional threat,” the Court held that “once
removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. The Court created a rebuttable presumption
that an alien should be released if he has been detained for six months and
provides good reason to believe no significant likelihood exists he will be
removed in the foreseeable future. Id. at 701. 5
Here, Roble has been detained for more than six months and because
of the injunction barring removal to Somalia, his removal to Somalia does not
appear imminent. Whether Roble may be removed to Kenya in the foreseeable
future is another matter. The district court avoided this question, concluding
Roble’s removal to Kenya was not at issue. Because the IJ ordered Roble
removed to Kenya in the alternative, however, Roble’s possible removal to
that country is very much in issue. We therefore remand to the district court
5
Roble has undoubtedly been detained for more than six months. We reject
the DHS’s argument that the permanent injunction in the Ninth Circuit tolls the
six-month period. DHS cites Akinwale v. Ashcroft , 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.4
(11th Cir. 2002) in support of its tolling argument. Akinwale , however, reasoned
that an alien unjustifiably interferes with his own removal, within the meaning of
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C), by seeking a judicial stay. Nothing suggests the
Ninth Circuit stay resulted from Roble’s efforts.
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to address the issue of whether Roble might be removed to either Somalia or
Kenya in the foreseeable future.
On remand, the district court must first determine whether a significant
likelihood exists that Roble will be removed to Somalia or Kenya within the
reasonably foreseeable future. If the court so finds, then the DHS may be
entitled to further detain Roble for a reasonable period of time pending removal.
Roble’s continued detention would be authorized, however, only if the district
court determines that Roble is a flight risk or a risk to the community–factors
justifying confinement within that reasonable removal period. See id. at 700.
The record presently contains neither a judicial finding concerning the likelihood
of Roble’s removal to Somalia or Kenya, nor a judicial finding concerning his
flight risk or the risk he may pose to the community if he is released pending
removal. The district court should make such findings, as necessary. 6
B. Review of Final Order of Deportation
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241over Roble’s claim for release. Zadvydas , 533 U.S. at 687-88. The court’s
subject matter jurisdiction under § 2241 also generally extends to review of final
6
If the district court determines Roble is entitled to release, such
release would be upon conditions set by the Attorney General pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). Upon violation of those conditions, Roble
would be subject to return to custody. See Zadvydas , 533 U.S. at 700.
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orders of removal. See id. The DHS contends, however, that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review any of Roble’s claims, other than his
challenge to his continued detention, because Roble failed to seek direct review
of his final order of removal. The district court did not reach this issue. Instead,
it adopted the DHS’s argument that Roble’s challenges were not ripe, because he
could not be removed to Somalia. See R., doc. 10 at 3-4. The district court’s
conclusion regarding ripeness, however, is unsupportable, because a favorable
judicial determination on Roble’s asylum claim could affect the duration of his
continued incarceration.
The district court has not evaluated the DHS’s argument that Roble waived
review of his final order of removal by failing to seek direct review. Because the
panel is remanding on another claim over which the district court plainly has
jurisdiction, see Zadvydas , 533 U.S. at 687, we also instruct the district court on
remand to consider its jurisdiction (and the merits, if necessary) over the other
issues Roble raises.
The judgment of the district court is VACATED and this matter is
REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Roble’s
motion for immediate release from custody, referred to the merits panel, is
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DENIED in light of the further proceedings necessitated by this opinion.
His motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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