United States v. Becker , 109 F. App'x 264 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 2 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 03-3189
LESLEY LEE BECKER, (D. Kansas)
(02-CV-3112-JAR)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Lesley Lee Becker appeals from the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence.
The issue before us is whether Mr. Becker has presented a potentially meritorious
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Becker claims that his counsel
failed to present expert testimony at sentencing challenging the government’s
drug estimates. Because factual issues remain unclear, and under § 2255, the
district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and files
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief,” we remand for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claim.
I
On March 31, 1997, police searched Mr. Becker’s residence pursuant to a
warrant. During the search, officers discovered acetone, ephedrine,
pseudoephedrine, and muriatic acid, all chemicals used in the production of
methamphetamine, as well as glassware, scales, and recipes for producing
methamphetamine. Officers detected methamphetamine residue in a bottle, a
zip-lock bag, a mixing bowl, and on the scales.
A jury found Mr. Becker guilty on five counts: (1) attempting to
manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2;
(2) maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing and
storing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2;
(3) possessing with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; (4) possessing acetone with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2; and (5) being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). We affirmed Mr. Becker’s conviction on
direct appeal. United States v. Becker, 230 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000).
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At issue is the district court’s calculation of how much methamphetamine
to attribute to Mr. Becker. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that “[w]here there
is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense,
the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance. In making
this determination, the court may consider . . . the size or capability of any
laboratory involved.” USSG § 2D1.1 n.12. Because only methamphetamine
residue was discovered at Mr. Becker’s residence, the probation office utilized the
forensics report of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI). The government
offered this report to approximate the capability of the lab.
The presentence report (PSR) noted that the KBI’s chemist
provided a theoretical yield produced by the quantity of muriatic acid
the defendant had at his property and determined the defendant could
have produced at least 23 pounds of methamphetamine, by following
the recipe the defendant had in his possession. The U.S. Probation
Office has used the most conservative estimate of 6 pounds of actual
methamphetamine, which the defendant could have produced, to
calculate the guideline in this case.
Supl. Vol. I, at 9, ¶ 28 (PSR).
Mr. Becker’s counsel objected to the estimation of drug quantity, arguing
that the offense level should reflect only the amount of actual drugs found at Mr.
Becker’s residence. However, Mr. Becker’s counsel did not object to the KBI’s
methodology of estimating the amount of methamphetamine from the quantity of
muriatic acid, and he presented no evidence of other methods or estimates.
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The district court adopted the PSR, finding that
the U.S. Probation Office has accurately calculated the guidelines in
this case. By using the 160 ounces of muriatic acid to approximate the
capability of the methamphetamine laboratory, the United States
Probation Office took into account the amounts of the muriatic acid that
the defendant likely used in a prior cook . . . .
The U.S. Probation Office, with the assistance of the KBI Forensics
Laboratory, approximated the capability of the methamphetamine
laboratory in this case and provided for error on the defendant’s part,
resulting in a reduced quantity. The Court is satisfied the U.S.
Probation Office appropriately calculated the guidelines in this matter.
Id. at 22-23, ¶¶ 20-21. The PSR attributed six pounds, or 2,718 grams, of
methamphetamine to Mr. Becker. Mr. Becker’s adjusted offense level of 38 and
criminal history category of II resulted in a sentencing range of 262-327 months.
Relying on the PSR, the district court sentenced Mr. Becker to concurrent
sentences of 262 months’ imprisonment on count one, 240 months’ imprisonment
on counts two and four, and 120 months’ imprisonment on counts three and five.
On direct appeal, Mr. Becker “challenge[d] the trial court’s determination
of the approximated capability of the methamphetamine lab and argue[d] the
resultant quantity calculation was not supported by the evidence.” Becker, 230
F.3d at 1235. Noting that “[Mr.] Becker . . . failed to produce an expert of his
own to challenge the proffered figures,” we held that the drug estimate used to
sentence Mr. Becker was supported by the record and was not clearly erroneous.
Id. at 1236.
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Mr. Becker filed a § 2255 petition, arguing that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at sentencing because his counsel failed to investigate the
government’s method of calculating drug quantities and failed to present expert
testimony to challenge the calculations relied upon by the district court. The
district court denied Mr. Becker’s § 2255 petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing. The district court found “that the method of drug calculation was
appropriate” and concluded that “we cannot say that [Mr. Becker] was prejudiced
by his counsel’s failure to put on an expert or further investigate the
government’s calculation method. It cannot be said that a reasonable probability
exists that if another expert had testified, the outcome would have been
different.” Rec. doc. 104, at 5-6 (Mem. and Order Denying Motion to Vacate
Sentence, filed May 8, 2003). This Court granted Mr. Becker’s request for a
certificate of appealability.
II
Mr. Becker reasserts his argument that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his counsel failed to present expert testimony at sentencing
challenging the government’s method of estimating drug quantity.
As a preliminary matter, we reject the government’s contention that we
have already addressed Mr. Becker’s claim on direct appeal and that we should
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not reconsider it in a § 2255 motion. In bringing the present § 2255 action, Mr.
Becker took to heart our observation on direct appeal that “[Mr.] Becker . . .
failed to produce an expert of his own to challenge the [government’s] proffered
figures.” Id. at 1236. We agree with the district court that although our “direct
appeal analysis and decisions on the evidentiary issues have . . . bearing on [Mr.
Becker’s] § 2255 claims,” the claims are separate and distinct. Rec. doc. 104, at
3. Mr. Becker has properly raised his ineffective assistance claim in a § 2255
motion. United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 869 (10th Cir. 2003) (“With rare
exception, a defendant must raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a
collateral proceeding, not on direct appeal.”) (citing United States v. Galloway,
56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc)); see also Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 508 (2003) (“[F]ailure to raise an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a
later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255.”).
We now turn to the merits of Mr. Becker’s claim that he deserved an
evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claim. “Review in a section
2255 habeas action entails a two-step inquiry: [A] whether the defendant is
entitled to relief if his allegations are proved; and [B] whether the district court
abused its discretion by refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing.” United States
v. Whalen, 976 F.2d 1346, 1348 (10th Cir. 1992). We hold that Mr. Becker’s
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allegations can support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and if they
are proved, he may be entitled to relief. Therefore, under the stricture of the
statute, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion, and we remand
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Mr. Becker received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
A.
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted
defendant ‘must show that [1] counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,’ and that [2] the deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant. To establish prejudice, the defendant ‘must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.’” United States v. Prows, 118 F.3d
686, 691 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88, 694 (1984)).
1. Deficient Performance
Mr. Becker claims that his counsel was deficient for failing to challenge the
government’s drug estimates with evidence of other, more reliable methods of
estimation. The government based its estimate on the quantity of muriatic acid
seized from Mr. Becker’s house. Mr. Becker argues that expert testimony would
establish that muriatic acid is not a precursor chemical, but rather a reactive agent
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used sparingly in methamphetamine production, and that the drug estimates based
on the quantity of muriatic acid overstated the methamphetamine lab’s capability.
Mr. Becker offers the affidavit of one chemist and the testimony of another
chemist to support his argument that drug estimates based on muriatic acid are not
reliable and that estimates based on the precursor pseudoephedrine are reliable.
See Aplt’s Br., ex. B-C; id. at B, ¶ 9 (Report of Dr. John Vasiliades, Forensic
Toxicologist, dated Jan. 22, 2002) (“The use of hydrochloric acid (muriatic acid),
which is not a starting agent or precursor, and is of unknown concentration to
determine methamphetamine theoretical yield is both scientifically and
forensically unacceptable.”).
Several acceptable methods can be used to estimate the capability of a drug
lab, and the district court may rely upon any estimate that has “some basis of
support in the facts of the particular case.” United States v. Richards, 27 F.3d
465, 469 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v.
Havens, 910 F.2d 703, 705 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he trial court, upon proper
testimony, may estimate the ultimate quantity of produceable drugs. This estimate
should be equal to the amount of drugs produceable if the precursor chemicals
possessed by the defendant were combined with proportionate amounts of the
missing ingredients including processing equipment.”); see also United States v.
Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1457 (10th Cir. 1991) (estimating lab capacity based on the
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size of a glass flask); United States v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 280 (3d Cir. 2003)
(estimate based on amount of methylamine seized); United States v. Coleman, 148
F.3d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 1998) (estimate based on quantity of iodine seized). In
estimating drug quantities, “a decision to rely on one precursor chemical rather
than another does not render a quantity determination clearly erroneous.” Becker,
230 F.3d at 1235 n.4. However, the “question is what each specific defendant
could have actually produced, not the theoretical maximum amount produceable
from the chemicals involved.” Havens, 910 F.2d at 705.
“[W]hen choosing between a number of plausible estimates of drug
quantity, none of which is more likely than not the correct quantity, a court must
err on the side of caution.” Richards, 27 F.3d at 469 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added). However, in this case the sentencing court received
only one estimate of drug quantity from which to choose. Cf. Havens, 910 F.2d at
706 (holding that where government presented two experts and defendant
presented one expert, “sufficient testimony was presented . . . to provide the
district court with a proper range of estimates.”) (emphasis added). Because Mr.
Becker’s counsel did not present expert testimony on this matter, the only drug
estimate available to the district court was the government’s estimate based on the
quantity of muriatic acid seized.
Mr. Becker has sufficiently alleged, and the chemists’ report and testimony
9
support his contention, that other, more reliable and conservative drug estimates
were available to his counsel, and that his counsel neither investigated them nor
presented them to the sentencing court. We conclude that counsel’s failure to
present this evidence may have constituted deficient performance. Because
“[t]his is primarily a factual matter proper for the district court’s determination,”
further proceedings in the district court are necessary. United States v. Harfst,
168 F.3d 398, 404 (10th Cir. 1999); see Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d
778, 788 (6th Cir. 1999) (observing that “the district court should hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether a reasonable attorney . . . would have
attempted to convince the sentencing court that [the defendant] was responsible”
for a lesser quantity of drugs).
2. Prejudice
Mr. Becker argues that counsel’s failure to present expert testimony about
methodologies of drug estimation prejudiced him because had the district court
considered such testimony, it would have chosen the more reliable and
conservative methodology, resulting in a shorter sentence for Mr. Becker. In
support of his arguments, Mr. Becker offers a chemist’s affidavit that states that
under a more reliable method of drug estimation, a maximum of 547 grams of
methamphetamine could have been produced by Mr. Becker’s lab. After
adjustments, this quantity of methamphetamine would establish a base offense
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level of 36, which, combined with Mr. Becker’s criminal history category of II,
results in a sentencing range of 210-262 months. This range is lower than the
262-327 month range under which Mr. Becker was sentenced. Although these
ranges overlap, and Mr. Becker was sentenced to 262 months, it is impossible
from this record to determine what sentence the district court would have given
Mr. Becker had it considered a different range. See Alaniz v. United States, 351
F.3d 365, 368 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that sentence falling within an area of
overlap between correct and incorrect Guidelines ranges is “unreviewable only if
the district court, at the time of sentencing, states unequivocally that it would
impose the same sentence with or without the challenged calculation”) (emphasis
added).
Indeed, Mr. Becker could have been prejudiced by as much as 52 months.
“[A]ny amount of [additional] actual jail time has Sixth Amendment
significance.” Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) (holding that
defendant sentenced to 84 months under the 78-97 month range received an
unlawful increase of between 6 and 21 months when, absent ineffective assistance
of counsel, he would have been sentenced in the 63-78 month range); Alaniz, 351
F.3d at 368 (holding that defendant sentenced to 240 months under the 240-262
month range was prejudiced when, absent ineffective assistance of counsel, he
would have been sentenced in the 210-262 month range).
11
Mr. Becker has sufficiently alleged that but for his counsel’s failure to
present evidence of other drug estimations, a reasonable probability exists that his
sentencing would have been different. However, we cannot determine this as a
matter of law on this record. “Under the law of this circuit, the prejudice analysis
. . . focuses not solely on the failure to make an argument . . . but on the ultimate
success of the argument,” making further proceedings in the district court
necessary. Harfst, 168 F.3d at 404 (“[W]hether defendant was prejudiced by
counsel’s failure to request a [sentencing] adjustment depends on whether the
district court would have granted the request, a matter only the district court can
decide.”).
B.
Having decided that Mr. Becker’s allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel, if proved, may entitle him to relief, we must consider whether the district
court abused its discretion in denying him an evidentiary hearing. Under § 2255,
the district court is required to conduct an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the
motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his § 2255 motion before the district
court, Mr. Becker presented the chemists’ report and testimony regarding the
relative reliability of various methods of estimating drug quantity, and he showed
that his counsel did not present such evidence at sentencing. On this record, our
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case law requires the district court to grant an evidentiary hearing on Mr.
Becker’s ineffective assistance claim. See United States v. Cervini, No. 03-6144,
2004 WL 1790026, at *5 (10th Cir. Aug. 11, 2004) (explaining that an evidentiary
hearing in a collateral attack is not required unless movant provides “a firm idea
of what the testimony will encompass and how it will support a movant's claim.”).
III
Accordingly, we REMAND for an evidentiary hearing.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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