Buchanan v. Lamarque , 121 F. App'x 303 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 19 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DARRELL RAY BUCHANAN, also
known as Leroy Clark,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 03-5151
v. (D.C. No. CV-99-792-K(J))
(N.D. Okla.)
A. LAMARQUE; DREW
EDMONDSON, sued as Drew
Edmundson Attorney General of
Oklahoma,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner-appellant Darrell Ray Buchanan, a state prisoner proceeding pro
se, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We affirm and deny all outstanding applications for a Certificate of Appealability
(COA).
I. Introduction
In July 1996, Buchanan was convicted in an Oklahoma state court of
robbery with a firearm, assault and battery with a deadly weapon, and kidnaping,
and he was sentenced to serve consecutive prison terms of one hundred and fifty
years, twenty years, and ten years. In December 1997, the state trial court held a
retrospective competency hearing and found that Buchanan had been competent to
stand trial in July 1996. Buchanan’s convictions were subsequently affirmed by
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) in August 1998. Buchanan did
not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
Thus, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), Buchanan’s convictions became
“final” in November 1998. See Locke v. Saffle , 237 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.
2001).
Buchanan did not seek post-conviction relief in the Oklahoma courts.
Instead, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Buchanan filed a petition for a writ of
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habeas corpus in federal district court in August 1999. In August 2003, the
district court entered an order denying habeas relief.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), we previously granted Buchanan a COA
on “both his procedural and substantive competency claims.” Order filed April 8,
2004 at 1. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny habeas relief with respect to
Buchanan’s competency claims. Buchanan has also applied for a COA on several
other issues, and we deny all outstanding COA applications.
We also conclude that Buchanan filed a second or successive habeas
petition in the district court. Specifically, on July 12, 2002, Buchanan filed a
motion in the district court for leave to file a third amended habeas petition. See
Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 43. Because Buchanan asserted new claims in his proposed
third amended petition that do not relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) to
the filing of his initial habeas petition, the district court should have treated those
claims as a second or successive petition and transferred the petition to this court
for consideration under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). Accordingly, we hereby grant
Buchanan leave, subject to the conditions set forth herein, to file a motion in this
court for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive
habeas petition.
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II. Background
1. State Court Convictions and Competency Proceedings
In December 1984, Buchanan was arrested in Tulsa County, Oklahoma and
charged with committing the offenses of robbery with a firearm, assault and
battery with a deadly weapon, and kidnaping. On January 9, 1985, the state trial
court entered an order directing that Buchanan be committed to a state hospital
for a mental examination. See State Ct. R., Vol. I at 11. Buchanan was
subsequently examined by a psychologist at the state hospital, and the
psychologist determined that he was not competent to stand trial. See
Competency Trial Exs. at 22. On January 11, 1985, the trial court therefore
entered an order staying the criminal proceedings against Buchanan “until such
time as [he] may be declared to be presently competent,” State Ct. R., Vol. I at
14, and Buchanan was “committed to [the custody of the state hospital] for care
and treatment of [his] mental condition,” id.In a letter to the trial court dated March 15, 1985, Dr. Norfleet, the senior
staff psychiatrist at the state hospital, informed the trial court that Buchanan had
attained competency. Id. at 20. Buchanan was then returned to the custody of the
trial court, and a preliminary hearing was held on April 18, 1985. On April 25,
1985, Buchanan was released from custody pursuant to an appearance bond.
Subsequently, Buchanan jumped bail, and he failed to appear at his arraignment.
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Buchanan thereafter became a fugitive from justice, and nothing relevant
transpired in his Oklahoma criminal case between 1985 and 1996.
In June and December 1995, Buchanan was convicted on charges of second
degree robbery and first degree murder in separate trials in a California state
court, and he was sentenced to serve consecutive prison terms of five years and
twenty-five years to life. See Competency Trial Exs. at 13-14. After he was
convicted of the California charges, Buchanan was returned to Tulsa County,
Oklahoma to be tried on the charges stemming from his arrest in 1984.
In July 1996, Buchanan was convicted of all the Oklahoma charges in a
jury trial before the Honorable B.R. Beasley. Buchanan was represented at the
trial by Beverly Atteberry, a public defender employed by the Tulsa County public
defender’s office. Importantly, Judge Beasley did not make a judicial
determination that Buchanan was competent to stand trial prior to the trial in July
1996, and Ms. Atteberry did not raise the issue of competency at any time, either
before or during the trial. Instead, the issue was first raised by Buchanan in a
discussion with Judge Beasley outside of the presence of the jury. At that time,
Judge Beasley concluded (erroneously) that a post-examination competency
hearing had been held in March 1985. See Trial Tr., Vol. III at 295-97.
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2. First Direct Appeal and Remand
Buchanan subsequently filed a direct appeal in the OCCA, and he was
represented on direct appeal by Barry Derryberry. Mr. Derryberry was a public
defender, and, like Ms. Atteberry, he was employed by the Tulsa County public
defender’s office. Thus, he and Ms. Atteberry worked together in the same office
and were colleagues. See Tr. of Competency Trial at 14-15.
On direct appeal, Mr. Derryberry raised the following claims: (1) the trial
court did not have jurisdiction because the 1985 judicial determination of
incompetency had not been judicially overruled; (2) it would be a violation of
federal law to hold a retrospective competency hearing; (3) the jury instructions
were erroneous; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) double jeopardy.
In September 1997, the OCCA entered an “order of remand,” and it
directed the trial court to determine whether a competency hearing had in fact
been held in March 1985. If a competency hearing had not been held, the OCCA
directed the trial court to conduct a retrospective competency hearing if it was
feasible to conduct such a hearing. On remand to the trial court, Mr. Derryberry
continued to represent Buchanan, and he acted as his trial counsel in the remand
proceedings.
On remand, Judge Beasley determined that a competency hearing had not
been held in March 1985. See Subsequent State Ct. R. at 47. Judge Beasley also
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recused himself from the competency proceedings because the prosecution had
indicated that he may be called as a witness. Id. at 48. The Honorable Jesse S.
Harris was therefore substituted in Judge Beasley’s place, and Judge Harris
subsequently found that it would be feasible to conduct a retrospective
competency hearing. See Tr. of Feasibility Hearing at 14-15. Although Buchanan
had a right under Oklahoma law to have the competency issue decided by a jury,
Mr. Derryberry informed Judge Harris at the feasability hearing that Buchanan
(who was not present at the feasibility hearing) had waived his right to a jury
trial. Id. at 15; see also Subsequent State Ct. R. at 52. As a result, a bench trial
on the competency issue was subsequently held before Judge Harris on
December 15, 1997. Although Buchanan was represented by Mr. Derryberry at
the bench trial, Buchanan was not present at the trial.
At the competency trial, Judge Harris made the following ruling regarding
the issue of which party would have the burden of proof:
From my review of the records and documents in this case, the last
judicial determination as to the competency of Mr. Buchanan was
that he was incompetent. And likened to a situation whereby a
person is determined incompetent and there’s a post-evaluation and
they were sent for evaluation and treatment . . ., and at the post-
evaluation competency hearing, unless and until the Court is
convinced otherwise, they remain incompetent. All right. So I’ll
note [Mr. Derryberry’s] request that the Defendant be presumed
incompetent and will grant that request. Nevertheless, I still rule that
the defense has the burden of proof.
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Competency Trial Tr. at 8-9. Immediately after Judge Harris made this ruling,
Mr. Derryberry requested that the court take notice of the record, and he rested on
behalf of Buchanan. Id. at 9. The state then demurred to the sufficiency of
Buchanan’s evidence. Id. Judge Harris overruled the demurrer, explaining his
decision as follows:
I overruled your demurrer because I found minutes ago that the
defendant is incompetent, certainly based on the [judicial]
determination . . . [in 1985]. And since there has been no
determination to the contrary or any evidence that’s been presented
for the Court’s consideration up to this very second to cause the court
to decide otherwise, the Court finds a prima facie case has been
presented by the Defendant as to . . . the incompetency issue.
Id. at 10.
The state then called Ms. Atteberry as the only witness in its case. During
direct and cross-examination, Ms. Atteberry testified that she believed that
Buchanan had been competent to stand trial, although she also acknowledged that
her relationship with Buchanan had been strained and he had been difficult to
represent. Id. at 11-39. The state also introduced the following evidence to
support its claim that Buchanan had been competent to stand trial in July 1996:
(1) abstracts of the judgments showing the July and December 1995 California
convictions, which Judge Harris treated as evidence that Buchanan had been
competent to stand trial in 1995, id. at 51-52; (2) the March 15, 1985 letter from
Dr. Norfleet stating that Buchanan had attained competency, see Competency
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Trial Exs. at 15; and (3) other records from the state hospital pertaining to the
mental evaluations that were performed on Buchanan in 1985, id. at 16-17, 19-20,
22. As is apparent from the transcript of the competency trial, Judge Harris had
also reviewed portions of the transcripts of the July 1996 trial and the subsequent
sentencing hearing. See Competency Trial Tr. at 50-51, 53-54.
At the end of the competency trial, Judge Harris found that Buchanan had
been competent to stand trial in July 1996. Id. at 50-54; Subsequent State Ct. R.
at 52. Mr. Derryberry then filed a second direct appeal in the OCCA.
3. Second Direct Appeal
In the second direct appeal, Mr. Derryberry asserted only one claim, and
that was that Judge Harris had erred at the competency trial by placing the burden
of proving incompetence on Buchanan. In August 1998, the OCCA entered a
summary opinion rejecting the claims raised by Mr. Derryberry in both
Buchanan’s first and second direct appeals, and Buchanan’s convictions and
sentences were affirmed in all respects. Buchanan did not seek post-conviction
relief in the Oklahoma courts.
4. Initial Habeas Petitions
Buchanan filed his first § 2254 petition in August 1999, within a year of
when his Oklahoma convictions became final. Buchanan also subsequently filed
an amended petition and a second amended petition. Buchanan asserted identical
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substantive claims in his first three petitions, and we will refer collectively to the
first three petitions as Buchanan’s “initial petitions.”
In his initial petitions, Buchanan asserted the following claims: (1) the state
trial court did not have jurisdiction because the 1985 judicial determination of
incompetency had not been judicially overruled; (2) the trial court erred by
placing the burden of proving incompetence on Buchanan; (3) the jury
instructions were erroneous; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) double
jeopardy. See Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 13 at 8-14. In a reply brief that he filed in July
2002, Buchanan also claimed that there had been an inadequate record before the
state trial court to conduct a meaningful retrospective competency hearing. Id. ,
Doc. 44 at 7, 12. In his reply brief, Buchanan also asserted a substantive due
process challenge, claiming that he was actually incompetent at the time of his
trial in July 1996. Id. at 5-6.
5. Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Habeas Petition
On July 12, 2002 -- almost three years after he had filed his first habeas
petition and well after the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) had expired, Buchanan moved for leave to file a third amended
habeas petition. Id. , Doc. 43. Buchanan also submitted a proposed third amended
petition as an attachment to his motion for leave. In the proposed third amended
petition, Buchanan claimed for the first time that: (1) his exclusion from the
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competency trial violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial;
(2) Mr. Derryberry had provided ineffective assistance as his remand trial counsel
by failing to make arrangements for him to be present at the competency trial;
(3) Mr. Derryberry had provided ineffective assistance as his remand trial counsel
due to a conflict of interest; and (4) Mr. Derryberry had provided ineffective
assistance as his remand appellate counsel because he failed to assert the right to
be present and the conflict of interest claims in the second direct appeal to the
OCCA. Id. , Doc. 43 (proposed third amended petition at 14-22).
With regard to the conflict of interest claim, Buchanan claims that Mr.
Derryberry had a conflict of interest because his colleague at the Tulsa County
public defender’s office, Ms. Atteberry, testified as a witness for the State of
Oklahoma at the competency trial. As fleshed out in his opening brief, Buchanan
also alleges that Mr. Derryberry’s allegiance to the Tulsa County public
defender’s office gave him a motive for not wanting to establish that
Ms. Atteberry had performed deficiently in connection with the trial in July 1996.
See Aplt. Opening Br. at 10-14, 16-17. According to Buchanan, Mr. Derryberry
therefore failed to properly investigate the competency issue. Id. Buchanan has
further alleged that he did not discover this “potential for conflict” until July 23,
2001, less than a year before he filed his motion for leave to file the proposed
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third amended petition. See Declaration of Darrell R. Buchanan at 1, ¶ 3
(attached to proposed third amended petition).
On April 9, 2003, the district court entered an order denying Buchanan’s
motion for leave to file the proposed third amended petition. See Fed. Ct. R.,
Doc. 46. The court concluded, based on a failure to exhaust state remedies/mixed
petition analysis, id. at 2-4, that “the interests of justice would not be served by
allowing Petitioner to amend his petition . . . almost three . . . years after the
original petition was filed . . . to add . . . unexhausted claim[s],” id. at 4.
6. Order Denying Habeas Relief
On August 12, 2003, the district court entered a final order denying habeas
relief on all of the claims that Buchanan had asserted in his initial petitions and
reply brief. Id. , Doc. 49 at 7-18. First, the court concluded that the state trial
court had been able to conduct a meaningful retrospective competency hearing
and had not erred in allocating the burden of proof. Id. at 9-11. Second, after
finding that “the evidence of [Buchanan’s] guilt was overwhelming,” the court
concluded that Buchanan was not entitled to habeas relief on his prosecutorial
misconduct claim. Id. at 13. Lastly, the court concluded that Buchanan’s
substantive due process claim failed on the merits because the state trial court’s
competency determination is presumed to be correct under § 2254(e)(1), and
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Buchanan had failed to meet his burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 16-18.
Buchanan is now appealing the district court’s rulings regarding his
procedural and substantive due process claims and his prosecutorial misconduct
claim. 1 Buchanan is also appealing the district court’s order denying his motion
for leave to file the proposed third amended petition. As noted above, we
previously granted Buchanan a COA with regard to both his procedural and
substantive due process claims, and Buchanan’s applications for a COA with
regard to his prosecutorial misconduct and amendment claims are presently before
this court.
III. Analysis
1. Procedural Due Process Claims
In the summary opinion that it issued in Buchanan’s second direct appeal,
the OCCA concluded that the retrospective competency trial “did not violate
1
In its final order denying habeas relief, the district court also determined
that Buchanan was not entitled to relief with regard to his jury instruction and
double jeopardy claims. See Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 49 at 11-12, 14-15. Although
Buchanan filed an application for a COA with regard to his jury instruction and
double jeopardy claims, he has waived those claims by failing to raise them in his
opening brief. See Tran v. Trs. of the State Colls. in Colo. , 355 F.3d 1263, 1266
(10th Cir. 2004). In addition, while Buchanan alleged that the state trial court
lacked jurisdiction in the statement of issues in his opening brief, see Aplt.
Opening Br. at 3, he does not refer to the jurisdictional claim in the body of his
brief, and he has provided no authority or arguments to support the claim. Thus,
the jurisdictional claim has also been waived. See Tran , 355 F.3d at 1266.
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Buchanan’s due process rights.” Summary Op. at 2. Because “the trial court
acted under the presumption that Buchanan was incompetent at the time of [the
retrospective] hearing,” id. at 2-3, the OCCA also rejected Buchanan’s claim that
the trial court “erred in placing the burden on him to prove his [incompetence],”
id. at 2.
Buchanan filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and his claims are thus
governed by its provisions. See Mitchell v. Gibson , 262 F.3d 1036, 1045 (10th
Cir. 2001). For purposes of AEDPA, we conclude that the OCCA adjudicated the
merits of Buchanan’s procedural due process claims. See Aycox v. Lytle , 196 F.3d
1174, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that “we owe deference to the state
court’s result , even if its reasoning is not expressly stated,” and that state court
summary opinions are therefore owed the same deference under § 2254(d) as
those that fully discuss the merits). Consequently, the district court was
prohibited from granting habeas relief on the claims
unless the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).
Mitchell , 262 F.3d at 1045. Applying these standards, we agree with the district
court that Buchanan “is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his claims related
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to procedures used to determine his competence by the state courts.” Fed. Ct. R.,
Doc. 49 at 11.
Under federal law, “[t]he law of competency is well-settled. The criminal
trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process. This prohibition is
fundamental to an adversary system of justice.” Allen v. Mullin, 368 F.3d 1220,
1238 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 18,
2004) (No. 04-7413).
In determining whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand
trial, the trial court must consider whether defendant has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
Gilbert v. Mullin , 302 F.3d 1166, 1178 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
It is also well established that “[c]ompetency claims may be based on
violations of both procedural and substantive due process.” Allen , 368 F.3d at
1239.
A procedural competency claim is based upon a trial court’s alleged
failure to hold a competency hearing, or an adequate competency
hearing, while a substantive competency claim is founded on the
allegation that an individual was tried and convicted while, in fact,
incompetent. The standards of proof for procedural and substantive
competency claims differ. To make out a procedural competency
claim, a defendant must raise a bona fide doubt regarding his
competency to stand trial[.] This requires a demonstration that a
reasonable judge should have doubted the defendant’s competency.
It does not require proof of actual incompetency. A substantive
competency claim, on the other hand, requires the higher standard of
proof of incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
To determine whether there was a “bona fide doubt” regarding a criminal
defendant’s competency, “we look to evidence of . . . irrational behavior, . . .
demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion to determine whether further
inquiry on the part of the trial judge was required.” Smith v. Mullin , 379 F.3d
919, 930 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). “Evidence of mental illness and
any representations of defense counsel about the defendant’s incompetence also
may be considered.” Gilbert , 302 F.3d at 1179 (quotation omitted).
This court has also recognized that, “[a]lthough retrospective competency
hearings are disfavored, they are permissible whenever a court can conduct a
meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant.”
Clayton v. Gibson , 199 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).
A meaningful determination is possible where the state of the record,
together with such additional evidence as may be relevant and
available, permits an accurate assessment of the defendant’s
condition at the time of the original state proceedings. A court
should consider (1) the passage of time, (2) the availability of
contemporaneous medical evidence, including medical records and
prior competency determinations, (3) any statements by the defendant
in the trial record, and (4) the availability of individuals and trial
witnesses, both experts and non-experts, who were in a position to
interact with defendant before and during trial, including the trial
judge, counsel for both the government and defendant, and jail
officials.
Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
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Having carefully reviewed the state and federal court records in this case,
we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Buchanan is not
entitled to habeas relief under § 2254(d) with regard to his procedural due process
claims. To begin with, while it is well established that a “prior [state]
adjudication of incompetence . . . gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of
continued incompetence,” Sena v. New Mexico State Prison , 109 F.3d 652, 655
(10th Cir. 1997), we agree with the district court that, “by recognizing a
presumption of incompetence, as requested by [Buchanan], the trial court in effect
required the State to overcome the presumption and demonstrate that [Buchanan]
had achieved competence at the time of his trial.” Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 49 at 10-11.
Moreover, even if the state trial court utilized an unconstitutional burden of
proof, we conclude that Buchanan has failed to raise a bona fide doubt regarding
his competency at the time of his trial in July 1996. This is not a clear-cut issue,
however, as the state court record reveals that Buchanan acted erratically at times,
both before and during his trial, and that he had a very contentious relationship
with Ms. Atteberry. There is also a complete lack of contemporaneous medical
evidence in the state court record regarding Buchanan’s mental state in 1996 and
1997. This omission is troubling since the prior medical records from 1985
indicate that Buchanan suffered from significant mental problems. See
Competency Trial Exs. at 16-17, 19-20.
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On the other hand, the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence is
off-set, to some extent, by the abstracts of the judgments showing the July and
December 1995 California convictions. In addition, because we have recognized
that “defense counsel is often in the best position to determine whether a
defendant’s competency is questionable,” McGregor v. Gibson , 248 F.3d 946, 960
(10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quotation omitted), we find it particularly significant
that Ms. Atteberry took the side of the state on the competency issue, see Walker
v. Gibson , 228 F.3d 1217, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting habeas petitioner’s
procedural competency claim, in part, because defense counsel “explicitly denied
raising to the [trial] court that [petitioner] was not competent to stand trial” and
“[a]t no time did counsel request a competency evaluation or hearing”), abrogated
on other grounds by Neil v. Gibson , 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2001);
Clayton , 199 F.3d at 1171 (finding no bona fide doubt as to habeas petitioner’s
competency at the time of trial where defense counsel declined to express
“serious” concerns about his client); Walker v. Att’y Gen. , 167 F.3d 1339,
1346-47 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting habeas petitioner’s procedural competency
claim, in part, because trial counsel never raised the issue of petitioner’s
competency at trial). In sum, based on the record before this court, we cannot
conclude that “the state trial court ignored evidence that, viewed objectively,
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raised a bona fide doubt as to [Buchanan’s] competency.” Clayton , 199 F.3d at
1171 (quotation omitted).
Finally, Buchanan is not entitled to habeas relief under § 2254(d) with
regard to his claim that the state court record was inadequate for purposes of
conducting a retrospective competency hearing. Although the trial court could
certainly have developed a more complete record regarding the competency issue,
especially in terms of obtaining contemporaneous medical evidence, we believe
the existing state court record allowed the trial court to “conduct a meaningful
hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of [Buchanan],” id. at 1169,
and that is all the Constitution requires.
2. Substantive Due Process Claim
Buchanan did not assert a substantive due process claim in the state-court
proceedings. 2
As a result, the AEDPA deference standards in § 2254(d) do not
apply to our review of that claim. Instead, “we review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.” Allen , 368 F.3d at
1234. However, under § 2254(e)(1), “[a] state court factual finding is presumed
2
In its order denying habeas relief, the district court correctly pointed out
that Buchanan had failed to exhaust the substantive due process claim in the
Oklahoma courts. See Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 49 at 6, 15. Buchanan’s failure to
exhaust the remedies available under Oklahoma law did not prevent the district
court from addressing the merits of the substantive due process claim, however,
because the district court exercised its prerogative under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)
to deny the claim on the merits. Id.-19-
correct. The applicant for a writ of habeas corpus has the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.“A petitioner may make a substantive due process competency claim by
alleging he was, in fact, tried and convicted while mentally incompetent.”
Walker , 228 F.3d at 1229. As noted above, the standard for establishing a
substantive due process violation is more demanding than the “bona fide doubt”
standard that governs procedural competency claims, see Walker , 167 F.3d at
1347, and “to succeed in stating a substantive incompetency claim, a petitioner
must present evidence that creates a real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to
his competency to stand trial,” id. (quotation omitted). For the reasons set forth
above, we have concluded that the evidence in this case does not satisfy the bona
fide doubt standard for a procedural competency claim. As a result, we also
conclude that Buchanan “cannot meet the more stringent substantive due process
competency standard.” Walker , 228 F.3d at 1230.
We have also recognized that “[c]ompetency to stand trial is a factual
question.” Bryson v. Ward , 187 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1999). Accordingly,
because we have concluded that the state trial court did not utilize an
unconstitutional burden of proof, “we afford the state court’s finding of
competency a presumption of correctness unless [Buchanan] rebuts the
presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” Wallace v. Ward , 191 F.3d
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1235, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999). Based on the record before this court, we agree with
the district court that Buchanan has failed to make the necessary showing to rebut
the presumption of correctness. See Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 49 at 16-18.
3. Outstanding COA Applications
As noted above, Buchanan’s application for a COA with regard to his
prosecutorial misconduct claim is currently before this court. A COA can issue
“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
“Prosecutorial misconduct does not warrant federal habeas relief unless the
conduct complained of is so egregious as to render the entire proceedings against
the defendant fundamentally unfair.” Smallwood v. Gibson , 191 F.3d 1257, 1275
(10th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, “we consider the totality of the
circumstances, evaluating the prosecutor’s conduct in the context of the whole
trial.” Id. at 1276. (quotation omitted). Specifically, “we look first at the
strength of the evidence against the defendant and decide whether the
prosecutor’s [conduct] plausibly could have tipped the scales in favor of the
prosecution.” Id. (quotation omitted).
As summarized by the district court, Buchanan claims that he was denied a
fair trial due to the following prosecutorial misconduct:
Petitioner claims that during closing argument, the prosecutor made
comments . . . leading the jury to speculate that [petitioner] may have
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shot, or even killed one or both victims [of the robbery], had it not
been for the failure of the gun to fire. In addition, Petitioner
complains that the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument
led the jury to give “short [shrift]” to the issue of guilt. Lastly,
Petitioner complains that the prosecutor referred more than once to
the evidence as “uncontroverted,” thereby commenting improperly on
his right to remain silent and to not testify at trial.
Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 49 at 12 (citations omitted).
Having carefully reviewed the transcript of the trial proceedings, we agree
with the district court that, “even assuming that the specific instances of alleged
misconduct identified [by Buchanan] were improper, the prosecutor’s misconduct
was not of sufficient magnitude to influence the jury’s decision. In this case, the
evidence of [Buchanan’s] guilt was overwhelming.” Id. at 13. Buchanan is
therefore not entitled to a COA on his prosecutorial misconduct claim.
4. Second or Successive Petition Issues
As set forth above, on July 12, 2002 -- almost three years after he had filed
his first habeas petition and well after the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) had expired -- Buchanan moved for leave to file a third amended
habeas petition. See Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 43. Buchanan also submitted a proposed
third amended petition as an attachment to his motion for leave, and, for the first
time, Buchanan asserted his right to be present claim, his conflict of interest
claim, and the related ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The district court
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denied the motion for leave based on a failure to exhaust state remedies/mixed
petition analysis. Id. , Doc. 46 at 2-4.
Because Buchanan’s new claims were filed after the one-year limitations
period in § 2244(d)(1)(A) had expired, we conclude that the district court should
have determined, as a threshold matter, whether the claims related back under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) to the filing of Buchanan’s first habeas petition in 1999.
As we have previously recognized, the threshold relation back analysis is critical
because, if a district court determines that new habeas claims do not relate back
and are therefore time-barred, the court must then treat the new claims as a
second or successive habeas petition and transfer the petition to this court for
consideration under § 2244(b)(3). Cf. United States v. Espinoza-Saenz , 235 F.3d
501, 503-05 (10th Cir. 2000) (involving motion filed by federal prisoner to
supplement habeas claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); see also Woodward
v. Williams , 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that reasoning of
Espinoza-Saenz applies to amended habeas petitions filed by state prisoners under
§ 2254).
Subject to certain restrictions, a habeas petitioner may amend a habeas
petition under Rule 15. The claims asserted in an amended habeas petition do not
automatically relate back to the date when the initial petition was filed, however.
Instead, Rule 15(c)(2) provides that “[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back
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to the date of the original pleading when . . . the claim . . . asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
. . . in the original pleading.” Rule 15(c)(2) has been the subject of much debate
in the context of habeas proceedings brought pursuant to § 2254, but this circuit
has taken a firm stance and held that
an untimely amendment to a [§ 2254 petition] which, by way of
additional facts, clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory in the
original [petition] may, in the District Court’s discretion, relate back
to the date of the original [petition] if and only if the original
[petition] was timely filed and the proposed amendment does not
seek to add a new claim or to insert a new theory into the case .
Woodward , 263 F.3d at 1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Espinoza-Saenz , 235 F.3d
at 505).
While Buchanan’s right to be present and conflict of interest claims are
related factually to his other competency claims, they are based on entirely
separate theories of relief, and we therefore conclude that they are “new” claims
for purposes of Rule 15(c)(2). Id. As a result, “the relation back provision of
Rule 15(c) cannot be applied to save [Buchanan’s right to be present and conflict
of interest claims], and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
. . . permission to amend.” Espinoza-Saenz , 235 F.3d at 505.
The district court did not follow the right procedure in this case, however,
as the court should have treated Buchanan’s right to be present and conflict of
interest claims as a second or successive habeas petition and transferred the
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petition to this court for consideration under § 2244(b)(3). Id. at 503; see also
Coleman v. United States , 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that “when
a second or successive petition for habeas corpus relief under § 2254 . . . is filed
in the district court without the required authorization by this court [under
§ 2244(b)(3)(A)], the district court should transfer the petition . . . to this court
. . . pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 1631”). Indeed, as we have recognized in the
analogous context of § 2254 cases involving motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b),
a district court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or
successive petition until this court has granted the required prior authorization
under § 2244(b)(3)(A). See Lopez v. Douglas , 141 F.3d 974, 975-76
(10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
Accordingly, “we will construe [Buchanan’s] notice of appeal and appellate
brief as an implied application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) for leave to file a
second habeas petition in the district court,” id. at 976, and we must determine
whether Buchanan has made “a prima facie showing that satisfies AEDPA’s
criteria for the filing of a second habeas petition,” id. For purposes of this case,
Buchanan must therefore make a prima facie showing that: (1) “the factual
predicate[s] for [his right to be present and conflict of interest claims] could not
have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence;” and
(2) “the facts underlying the claim[s], if proven and viewed in light of the
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evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found [him competent to stand trial].” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
Before we will authorize Buchanan to proceed in the district court with
regard to his right to be present and conflict of interest claims, he must also make
a prima facie showing that the claims are not barred by the one-year limitations
period in § 2244(d)(1). Although this requirement is not expressly set forth in
§ 2244(b)(3), we see no reason to authorize the filing of a second or successive
petition in the absence of such a prima facie showing. For purposes of this case,
Buchanan must therefore show that he filed his motion for leave to file his third
amended habeas petition within one year of “the date on which the factual
predicate[s] of [the right to be present and conflict of interest claims] . . . could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(D).
Based on the record before this court, it is undisputed that Buchanan knew
that a retrospective competency trial had been conducted in his absence by at least
August 1999 when he filed his first habeas petition. 3
Thus, Buchanan was aware
3
Buchanan’s awareness of the competency trial is confirmed by the fact that
an attachment to the first habeas petition specifically states that the state trial
court had held a competency trial on December 15, 1997. See Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 1
(attachment setting forth Buchanan’s fifth claim for habeas relief).
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of the factual predicate of the right to be present claim in August 1999. As a
result, the claim is barred by the one-year limitations period since: (1) Buchanan
did not file his motion for leave to file his third amended petition until almost
three years later; and (2) we see no basis for equitable tolling, see Woodward , 263
F.3d at 1142-43 (“AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling
only when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the
failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his
control.”) (quotation omitted).
With regard to Buchanan’s conflict of interest claim, we reach a different
result. As noted above, Buchanan has alleged that he did not discover the
“potential for conflict” until July 23, 2001, less than a year before he filed his
motion for leave to file the third amended petition. See Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 43
(attached declaration at 1, ¶ 3). Buchanan has also alleged that Mr. Derryberry
“lured [him] into believing . . . that no such conflict [existed].” Id. (proposed
third amended petition at 20). Moreover, while we believe that Buchanan knew
from a very early date that both Ms. Atteberry and Mr. Derryberry were public
defenders, we cannot determine, based on the record currently before this court,
when Buchanan actually discovered that they worked in the same public
defender’s office.
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That said, we note that Mr. Derryberry forwarded a copy of the entire
“court file which was provided to [his] office for [Buchanan’s] direct appeal” to
Buchanan in November 1998. Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 14, Ex. A. Although the
documents forwarded to Buchanan did not include trial transcripts, the
information contained in the court file should have been sufficient to provide the
factual predicate of Buchanan’s conflict of interest claim if he had exercised due
diligence to pursue the claim as required by § 2244(d)(1)(D). Based on the
attachments to his first habeas petition, it is also undisputed that Buchanan knew
by at least August 1999 that Ms. Atteberry had testified at the retrospective
competency hearing as a witness for the state. See Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 1 (attached
“Brief of Appellant After Remand” at 2-3). Finally, while it appears that
Buchanan has been unable to obtain transcripts of the trial court proceedings
despite repeated requests to the state courts and the district court, we do not
believe the lack of transcripts provides a basis for equitable tolling with regard to
Buchanan’s conflict of interest claim.
Nonetheless, the record before this court is not sufficiently developed for
us to definitively rule on the discovery and equitable tolling issues. In addition,
while we are skeptical that Buchanan can satisfy the demanding requirements of
§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) concerning the merits of his conflict of interest claim,
Buchanan has at least raised a colorable claim that Mr. Derryberry had an “actual”
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conflict of interest due to his working relationship with Ms. Atteberry. See
Workman v. Mullin , 342 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003) (addressing
requirements for conflict of interest claims brought under § 2254 in cases where
the defendant raised no objection at trial), cert. denied , 124 S.Ct. 2397 (2004).
Subject to the conditions set forth below, we therefore conclude that Buchanan
should have the opportunity to file a formal motion in this court for an order
authorizing the district court to consider the conflict of interest claim in a second
or successive petition.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, we AFFIRM the denial of habeas relief
with regard to Buchanan’s procedural and substantive competency claims. We
also DENY all outstanding applications for a COA.
We GRANT Buchanan leave to file a motion in this court for an order
authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive habeas petition.
If Buchanan fails to file such a motion within thirty days of the entry of this order
and judgment, “an order will be entered denying authorization to file the
underlying petition . . . in the district court.” Coleman , 106 F.3d at 341.
However, if Buchanan chooses to file an authorization motion, the motion shall be
limited to Buchanan’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel following the remand from the OCCA for a retrospective
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competency hearing because his public defender had a conflict of interest.
Further, the motion shall set forth the specific reasons why Buchanan believes
that he has made a prima facie showing that satisfies the criteria under
§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) for the filing of a second or successive petition. The
motion shall also set forth the specific reasons why Buchanan believes that his
conflict of interest claim is not barred by the one-year limitations period in
§ 2244(d)(1). Specifically, Buchanan shall set forth all of the relevant facts that
support his allegation that he did not discover the conflict of interest claim until
July 23, 2001. See Declaration of Darrell R. Buchanan at 1, ¶ 3 (attached to
proposed third amended petition). 4
Buchanan shall further explain why he could
not have discovered the claim earlier through the exercise of due diligence.
Because the claim is barred by the one-year limitations period in
§ 2244(d)(1), we DENY Buchanan authorization to file a second or successive
petition to assert his right to be present claim and any related ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims.
Finally, we DENY Buchanan’s motion/application to expand the issues to
be certified for this appeal and stay briefing. We GRANT Buchanan’s request to
4
Although Buchanan claimed in his declaration that he discovered the
potential for a conflict of interest in July 23, 2001, we note that Buchanan alleges
in his opening brief that he did not discover the potential for a conflict of interest
until August 23, 2001. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 27. Buchanan will need to
address this discrepancy if he decides to file an authorization motion in this court.
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add additional pages to his opening brief. We also GRANT Buchanan’s request
that this court take judicial notice of the “Order Appointing Psychiatrist” that was
entered in Buchanan’s criminal case in California in June 1994. We DENY
Buchanan’s request that this court take judicial notice of the discharge summary
that was prepared by Dr. R.N. Garcia in March 1985 as moot because the
discharge summary is already a part of the record before this court. See
Competency Trial Exs. at 16-17.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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