United States v. Crouch ( 2022 )


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  • Appellate Case: 21-6109     Document: 010110710829       Date Filed: 07/14/2022     Page: 1
    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            July 14, 2022
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                          No. 21-6109
    (D.C. No. 5:17-CR-00278-F-1)
    WILLIAM MICHAEL CROUCH,                                     (W.D. Okla.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, MATHESON and EID, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Federal prisoner William Michael Crouch, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the
    district court’s denial of his 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate
    release. Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
    except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
    may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    1
    Because Mr. Crouch proceeds pro se, we construe his filings liberally but do
    not serve as his advocate. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 
    425 F.3d 836
    , 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
    Appellate Case: 21-6109      Document: 010110710829         Date Filed: 07/14/2022      Page: 2
    I. BACKGROUND
    While subject to a protective order that prohibited him from possessing guns,
    Mr. Crouch brandished and discharged a firearm near two children and his ex-wife,
    who had requested the protective order. Officers later searched his house and found
    eight rifles, five handguns, and three shotguns. Most of these guns were loaded.
    Officers located hundreds of additional rounds of ammunition in the house. They
    also found three loaded firearms in his trucks, including a .22 caliber rifle with a
    homemade silencer taped to the end of the barrel.
    The government charged Mr. Crouch under 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(8) for
    possessing the guns in violation of the protective order, and under 
    26 U.S.C. § 5861
    (d) for possessing the unregistered silencer. The district court ordered his pretrial
    release on a $5,000 unsecured bond with special conditions that, among other things,
    prohibited him from possessing firearms or other weapons, using alcohol to excess, or
    unlawfully using or possessing controlled substances. The special conditions also
    required him to submit to testing for prohibited substances.
    After Mr. Crouch failed three drug tests and missed seven others, the district court
    issued a warrant for his arrest for violating his pretrial release conditions. United States
    Marshals arrested him while he was driving to a drug test. They found two knives and
    two loaded .22 caliber pistols on his person. A search of his vehicle produced a loaded
    12-gauge shotgun, a loaded .22 caliber rifle, a pellet rifle, a hunting bow, more than 100
    12-gauge shotgun shells, and other ammunition. The Marshals also discovered
    methamphetamine, a hatchet, a rifle scope, a bottle of a “detox” drink intended to defeat
    2
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    drug tests, and a “whizzinator” device, also designed to defeat drug tests. A female
    passenger in the vehicle testified that Mr. Crouch had smoked methamphetamine the day
    before, and that Mr. Crouch had told her he would rather have a shootout with police than
    get arrested.
    Mr. Crouch pled guilty to the gun possession charge. The government
    dropped the silencer charge. At sentencing, the district court described Mr. Crouch
    as a “serial thief” and “a person for whom the law . . . fall[s] far short of effectively
    restraining his conduct.” R., vol. I at 57–58. It sentenced him to an above-guidelines
    sentence of 84 months in prison.
    With a little more than 31 months of his 84-month sentence remaining,
    Mr. Crouch filed his § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion seeking a reduction in his sentence to
    time served or an order allowing him to serve the remainder of his sentence in home
    confinement. In support, he argued that although he had “received both doses of the
    COVID-19 vaccine” and had thereafter “tested positive for COVID-19,” R., vol. I at
    239, he was nonetheless at an increased risk of severe and life-threatening illness
    from COVID-19 due to his underlying medical conditions that included chronic
    obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and pulmonary fibrosis.
    The district court denied the motion. It did not address whether Mr. Crouch’s
    medical conditions amounted to extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying
    early release. It instead found “that the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) weigh[ed]
    against compassionate release.” Supp. R. at 7. It acknowledged several facts in favor of
    Mr. Crouch, including “good behavior [in prison], his minimum risk [of recidivism]
    3
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    scores, his participation in educational and vocational programs, and his underlying
    medical conditions [that] mak[e] him more likely to get severely ill from COVID-19.”
    
    Id. at 8
    . But it recounted the seriousness of Mr. Crouch’s offense and noted that “while
    on pretrial release, [he] repeatedly violated his bond conditions by using drugs, lying
    about his drug use to the pretrial officer[,] missing drug tests[,] [and] possessi[ng] . . .
    loaded firearms, knives[,] and methamphetamine.” 
    Id.
     at 7–8. And it “conclude[d] that a
    prison sentence longer than [Mr. Crouch] has served to date is necessary to reflect the
    seriousness of [his] offense, provide just punishment, and protect the public from further
    criminal activity.” 
    Id. at 8
    .
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Legal Background
    “[T]he plain language” of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) “creates a three-step test.” United
    States v. Hald, 
    8 F.4th 932
    , 937 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted),
    cert. denied, No. 21-6594, 
    2022 WL 1611819
     (U.S. May 23, 2022). “At step one a
    district court must find whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a
    sentence reduction.” 
    Id. at 938
     (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). “At
    step two a district court must find whether such reduction is consistent with
    applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 
    Id.
     (ellipsis and
    internal quotation marks omitted).2 “At step three § 3582(c)(1)(A) instructs a court
    2
    Because the Sentencing Commission’s existing policy statement applies only
    to motions filed by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the second step is not
    relevant when, like here, the prisoner has moved for compassionate release. See
    United States v. McGee, 
    992 F.3d 1035
    , 1050 (10th Cir. 2021).
    4
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    to consider any applicable 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors and determine whether, in its
    discretion, the reduction authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole or in
    part under the particular circumstances of the case.” 
    Id.
     (brackets, ellipsis, and
    internal quotation marks omitted). “[D]istrict courts may deny
    compassionate-release motions” based on any of the three steps “and do not need to
    address the others.” 
    Id. at 942
     (italics and internal quotation marks omitted).
    “We review a district court’s order denying relief on a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion
    for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hemmelgarn, 
    15 F.4th 1027
    , 1031
    (10th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect
    conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    B. Analysis
    On appeal, Mr. Crouch reiterates that his “medical conditions” put him “at
    significant risk of severe and life threatening illness from COVID-19 variates
    DELTA and OMICRON,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 3, and he maintains the district court
    should have weighed the § 3553(a) factors differently. He believes the court should
    have put more emphasis on his risk of severe illness from COVID-19, his limited
    criminal history, and his post-conviction behavior. He also takes issue with the
    district court’s calling him a “serial thief” at sentencing and argues he should have
    been placed on home confinement.
    5
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    1. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances
    First, we reject any argument that the district court erred by not specifically
    addressing whether Mr. Crouch had shown extraordinary and compelling
    circumstances justifying his early release. The court could deny release based on its
    § 3553(a) analysis alone. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 942 (rejecting argument that the
    district court erred by considering the § 3553(a) factors before resolving, or at least
    assuming, the existence of extraordinary and compelling reasons).
    2. Section § 3553(a) Factors
    “Because the weighing of the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the discretion
    of the district court, we cannot reverse unless we have a definite and firm conviction
    that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of
    permissible choice in the circumstances.” Hald, 8 F.4th at 949 (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    The district court denied compassionate release based on the seriousness of
    Mr. Crouch’s offense, the need to provide just punishment for this offense, and the
    need to protect the public from further criminal activity. It noted that Mr. Crouch
    “possessed 18 firearms and one firearms silencer while he was subject to a . . .
    restraining order,” had been sentenced to an above-guidelines sentence, and had
    “repeatedly violated his bond conditions.” Supp. R. at 7. The district court’s
    decision was not a clear error of judgment and did not exceed the bounds of
    permissible choice. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 950 (“[W]e see no error in the court’s
    decision that the seriousness of the offense and the need to provide adequate
    6
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    deterrence weighed against compassionate release and see no reason why
    these factors should necessarily be outweighed by [the prisoner’s] relatively minor
    preexisting criminal history or his unspecified efforts at rehabilitation while in
    prison.”).
    3. “Serial Thief” Characterization
    Mr. Crouch also takes issue with the district court’s characterization of him at
    sentencing as a “serial thief.” R., vol. I at 57. But he does not contend the district
    court relied on this finding in denying his §3582(c)(1)(A) motion. And even if it did,
    the court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence presented at the sentencing
    hearing supports that finding, and Mr. Crouch has not established that it was clearly
    erroneous. See, e.g., R., vol. I at 135–43; see also United States v. Craine, 
    995 F.3d 1139
    , 1157 (10th Cir.) (“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is without
    factual support in the record or if the appellate court, after reviewing all of the
    evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    made.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 
    142 S. Ct. 502
     (2021).
    4. Home Confinement
    Mr. Crouch finally argues the district court should have considered ordering
    him to home confinement. But the court lacked authority to do so. See Tapia v.
    United States, 
    564 U.S. 319
    , 331 (2011) (“When a court sentences a federal offender,
    the [Bureau of Prisons] has plenary control, subject to statutory constraints, over ‘the
    place of the prisoner’s imprisonment’ . . . .” (quoting 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b))); United
    States v. Ko, 
    739 F.3d 558
    , 561 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[A] person is in the [Bureau of
    7
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    Prisons’] ‘custody’ while serving the remainder of a sentence in home confinement.
    While at home, the confinee is serving a ‘term of imprisonment,’ . . . .” (quoting
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3624
    (c)(2))). This court has held that a similar argument did not support
    overturning a district court’s § 3582(c)(1) ruling. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 949 (“As for
    [the prisoner’s] suggestion of home confinement, his contention is only that the
    [district] judge failed to ‘seriously consider’ the suggestion, which amounts to
    nothing more than a complaint that the judge did not agree with him.” (citation
    omitted)).
    III. CONCLUSION
    We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Crouch’s motion for compassionate
    release. We grant Mr. Crouch’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
    Entered for the Court
    Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-6109

Filed Date: 7/14/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/14/2022