Rodriguez v. Cache County Corporation ( 2022 )

Appellate Case: 21-4068 Document: 010110711457 Date Filed: 07/15/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 15, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
NANCY RODRIGUEZ, in her personal
capacity and as personal representative of
the Estate of Jose Mena, deceased,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 21-4068
(D.C. No. 1:18-CV-00115-CW)
CACHE COUNTY CORPORATION; (D. Utah)
CACHE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE;
LOGAN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
While housed at Cache County Jail, Jose Mena committed suicide. His wife,
Nancy Rodriguez, in her individual capacity and as a representative of his estate,
brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Cache County Corporation and Cache
County Sheriff’s Office (collectively, “Cache County”).1 She alleges that Cache
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Ms. Rodriguez included no individual defendants in her First Amendment
Complaint (“FAC”). But she did also assert a state-law claim of “wrongful
death/negligence” against Cache County and the Logan City Police Department. FAC
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County violated Mena’s rights under the United States Constitution and alleges a
separate claim based on the Utah Constitution.
Cache County moved for summary judgment. The district court granted its
motion on all of Ms. Rodriguez’s claims. Ms. Rodriguez now appeals. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On September 3, 2016, Mena was involved in a domestic dispute with Ms.
Rodriguez. Their argument turned violent and eventually led a neighbor to call the
police. Several officers from the Logan City Police Department responded and
arrested Mena for multiple offenses, including domestic violence, assault, and child
abuse.
The officers memorialized the details of the encounter in their written police
reports. For example, Officer Cody Olsen’s report included the contents of his
interview of Ms. Rodriguez about the incident. During that interview, Ms. Rodriguez
told Officer Olsen that Mena had physically struck her and her daughter and held
various weapons—a razor, gun, and knife—during the dispute. Ms. Rodriguez told
Officer Olsen that she was worried that Mena would hurt himself with these
weapons.2
at 6. The district court dismissed this claim under Utah’s Governmental Immunity
Act. Ms. Rodriguez does not appeal the dismissal of this claim.
2
Other officers documented in their reports that Ms. Rodriguez had told them
that Mena had threatened to kill himself.
2
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Officer Olsen and Officer Nathan Argyle then transported Mena to Cache
County Jail.3 There, Deputy Colton Peterson completed the initial-intake process.
Cache County Jail policies state that its staff “should” communicate with the
arresting and transporting officers.4 Even so, the record is ambiguous about whether
Deputy Peterson spoke with either Officer Olsen or Officer Argyle after they
transported Mena to the jail. But the record is clear that “Deputy Peterson . . . was
not informed that Ms. Rodriguez had represented to arresting officers that Mr. Mena
was suicidal or that his mother had committed suicide.” Appellant R. vol. 1 at 73.
As part of the intake process, Deputy Peterson asked Mena a list of questions,
including some about his mental health. For example, Deputy Peterson asked Mena
whether he was suicidal—to which Mena responded no. Jail policies also required
Deputy Peterson to observe Mena’s “behavior, condition, whether [he] appeared
inebriated, and if [he] said anything that should be noted.” Appellant R. vol. 1 at 72.
Ultimately, Deputy Peterson did not identify any risk factors for self-destructive
behavior.
After Mena completed the intake process, he was sent to booking. Cache
County Jail has a policy advising that its booking officers “should” speak with the
3
Though an investigation into Mena’s suicide listed Officer Olsen and Officer
Argyle as the officers who transported Mena to Cache County Jail, Officer Argyle
does not recall transporting Mena. We will assume that Officer Olsen and Officer
Argyle were the arresting and transporting officers.
4
For example, one policy states: “Before the transporting officer has left the
jail, booking deputies should ask the officers questions about the inmate’s demeanor,
attitude, and behavior prior to arriving at the jail.” Appellant R. vol. 2 at 2.
3
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transporting officers if they suspect the arrestee may have mental-health conditions
or is at risk of self-destructive behavior.5 But by the time Mena arrived at booking,
the transporting officers had already left. So Mena’s booking officer, Deputy Cody
Atwood, completed the booking procedures without speaking to Officer Olsen or
Officer Argyle.
During booking, jail policies required Deputy Atwood to ask Mena “questions
related to suicide, mental health, and self-destructive behavior.” Appellant R. vol. 1
at 75. In response to these questions, Mena told Deputy Atwood that he had never
received mental-health counseling; that he had never experienced depression or mood
swings; and that “he had never attempted suicide or self-mutilation.” Appellant R.
vol. 1 at 77. He also told Deputy Atwood that “he was not going to harm himself
while incarcerated.” Id. While speaking with Mena, Deputy Atwood observed that
Mena appeared “fairly happy.” Id. After completing the booking process, Mena was
placed into the maximum-security section of the jail given the serious nature of his
charges.
5
For example, one policy states:
If the booking deputy observes anything during the intake process which
creates a suspicion that the arrestee may have mental problems or is a
self-destructive behavior risk, questions should be directed to the peace
officer or other person who brought the arrestee to the CCJ to determine
the extent of the potential risk of self-destructive behavior by the arrestee.
Appellant R. vol. 2 at 10.
4
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None of Cache County Jail’s officers reviewed Officer Olsen’s arrest report,
or any other documents related to his arrest or charges. In fact, according to one
Cache County Jail employee, Doyle Peck, the jail “discourage[s]” its officers from
reading those documents because it may prevent them from “deal[ing] impartially
with” an inmate. Appellant R. vol. 1 at 169.
On September 16, 2016, at Mena’s request, he was moved from the jail’s
maximum-security section to general population. Four days later, on September 20,
2016—seventeen days after he arrived at Cache County Jail—Mena committed
suicide by hanging himself inside his cell.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same legal
standard that applies in the district court. Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 1260, 1265
(10th Cir. 2003). This means we view all facts in favor of the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Lounds v. Lincare, Inc., 812 F.3d 1208,
1220 (10th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “genuine” if there is
evidence on both sides of the dispute that would allow a rational trier of fact to
resolve the issue in either side’s favor. Lounds, 812 F.3d at 1220. A fact is “material”
if it is essential to a claim. Id.
5
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II. Deliberate Indifference
When seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff ordinarily
must demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation by an individual municipal
employee. See Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 997 (10th Cir. 2020) (“We typically
‘will not hold a municipality liable for constitutional violations when there was no
underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers.’” (quoting Olsen v. Layton
Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1317–18 (10th Cir. 2002)); see also Est. of Larsen v.
Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A § 1983 suit against a municipality
for the actions of its police officers requires proof that (1) an officer committed a
constitutional violation and (2) a municipal policy or custom was the moving force
behind the constitutional deprivation that occurred. But without the predicate
constitutional harm inflicted by an officer, no municipal liability exists.” (internal
citation omitted)); Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 239 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2001)
(“[E]ven if it could be said that Tulsa’s policies, training, and supervision were
unconstitutional, the City cannot be held liable where, as here, the officers did not
commit a constitutional violation.”). Thus, Ms. Rodriguez’s municipality claim
hinges on her showing that an individual county actor violated Mena’s constitutional
rights.6
6
If a plaintiff chooses to do so, he or she may attempt to show municipality
liability “even in the absence of individual liability by any county actor” when “the
sum of multiple officers’ actions taken pursuant to municipal policy results in a
constitutional violation.” See Crowson v. Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166, 1185
(10th Cir. 2020) (citing Garcia v. Salt Lake Cnty., 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985)).
Ms. Rodriguez has not advanced any such theory here or in the district court. And
6
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Section 1983 claims based on a jail suicide are “treated as claims based on the
failure of jail officials to provide medical care for those in their custody.”7 Barrie v.
Grand Cnty., 119 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1997). These claims are “judged against
the deliberate indifference to serious medical needs test.” Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d
1231, 1248 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
To show deliberate indifference for summary-judgment purposes, a plaintiff
must offer evidence that the individual actor “both [was] aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . .
also draw the inference.”8 Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994)). In other words, to demonstrate deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must
here, we will not do so for her. See Est. of Burgaz v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for
Jefferson Cnty., 30 F.4th 1181, 1190 (10th Cir. 2022) (declining to consider whether
the “combined actions of deputies can suffice for certain Monell claims” because the
plaintiff failed to raise this argument); see also Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185,
1208 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that we “should neither raise sua sponte an argument
not advanced by a party either before the district court or on appeal, nor then
advocate a particular position and resolve the appeal based on that advocacy”
(citation omitted)).
7
Ms. Rodriguez frames the underlying constitutional violation as the denial of
the right to medical care under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. But because
Mena was a pretrial detainee at Cache County Jail, his constitutional right to
adequate medical care arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Strain, 977 F.3d
at 989 (explaining that the constitutional basis for a pretrial detainee’s deliberate-
indifference claim arises from the Fourteenth Amendment).
8
The test for deliberate indifference also has an objective component. See
Strain, 977 F.3d at 989. But we need not discuss this factor because, as we will
explain, Ms. Rodriguez has failed to satisfy the subjective component.
7
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show that the jail officer acted with the requisite state of mind—here, “actual
knowledge . . . of an individual inmate’s substantial risk of suicide.” Id. at 1249.
Based on the summary-judgment materials, the district court found that “the
County had no knowledge of Mr. Mena’s risk of suicide and that nothing occurred
during the approximately two weeks that Mr. Mena spent in [Cache County Jail] that
indicated that he was suicidal.” Appellant R. vol. 1 at 26. Reviewing de novo, we
agree with this conclusion.
Ms. Rodriguez presented no evidence that any individual officer had “actual
knowledge” of Mena’s substantial risk of suicide. Indeed, Ms. Rodriguez admits that
Cache County jail officers were never made aware of this risk. See Appellant R. vol.
1 at 73 (admitting that “Deputy Peterson . . . was not informed that Ms. Rodriguez
had represented to arresting officers that Mr. Mena was suicidal or that his mother
had committed suicide”); Appellant R. vol. 1 at 77 (admitting that “[n]o one informed
Deputy Atwood that a member of Mr. Mena’s family had told the arresting officers
that he was suicidal”). Nor does she direct us to evidence that Mena’s behavior at
Cache County Jail would have alerted a jail officer that he presented a suicide risk. In
fact, Ms. Rodriguez does not dispute that “[d]uring the intake process, Deputy
Peterson did not identify any of the risk factors for self-destructive behavior.”
Appellant R. vol. 1 at 73. She also doesn’t dispute that “Mr. Mena informed Deputy
Atwood that he had not previously and was not at that time receiving mental health
counseling; that he was not at that time, and had not previously experienced
depression or mood swings; that he had never attempted suicide or self-mutilation;
8
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and, that he was not going to harm himself while incarcerated.” Appellant R. vol. 1 at
77.
Without that sort of evidence, Ms. Rodriguez’s municipal-liability claim
against Cache County must fail. This is because it is insufficient to merely allege that
Cache County Jail maintained policies or customs of (1) not having its jail officers
speak with the arresting or transporting officer on arrival at the jail, or (2) not having
its jail officers review probable-cause statements, arrest reports, or other charging
documents when there has been no showing that an individual jail officer deprived
Mena of his constitutional rights. See Strain, 977 F.3d at 997 (“We typically will not
hold a municipality liable for constitutional violations when there was no underlying
constitutional violation by any of its officers.” (internal quotations and citation
omitted)); see also Est. of Burgaz., 30 F.4th at 1186 (“An official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk of which he was unaware, no matter how obvious the risk
or how gross his negligence in failing to perceive it, is not a constitutional
violation.”).
Finally, Ms. Rodriguez argues that the district court failed to resolve
inferences and issues of material fact in her favor. But none of the inferences and
issues bear on whether any individual officer acted with deliberate indifference and
thus committed a constitutional violation. For example, Ms. Rodriguez argues that
the court should have inferred that the arresting officers “did in fact convey Mr.
Mena’s risk of suicide.” Opening Br. at 20. Yet, as just explained, she has already
admitted that Deputy Peterson “was not informed that Ms. Rodriguez had represented
9
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to arresting officers that Mr. Mena was suicidal or that his mother had committed
suicide.” Appellant R. vol. 1 at 73. And part of her claim turns on Cache County Jail
maintaining a custom or policy of not having their intake deputies ask questions of
arresting and transporting officers. Thus, there was no reason for the district court to
infer that Deputy Peterson knew about Mena’s suicide risk.
At bottom, Ms. Rodriguez fails to show that any individual jail officer had
actual knowledge of Mena’s substantial risk of suicide. Thus, she has failed to
demonstrate any underlying constitutional violation by an individual defendant. So as
a result, the district court correctly dismissed her municipality claim against Cache
County.
III. Unnecessary Rigor Under the Utah Constitution
As we read her FAC, Ms. Rodriguez asserts a § 1983 claim based on an
alleged violation of the Utah Constitution’s Unnecessary-Rigor Clause. See FAC at 5.
But a “[a] violation of state law cannot give rise to a claim under section 1983.”
Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1164 (10th Cir. 2003). Thus,
we note that the alleged violation of the Utah Constitution’s Unnecessary-Rigor
Clause cannot support Ms. Rodriguez’s § 1983 claim.
But the parties and the district court approach the FAC as raising a standalone
state-law claim based on the Utah Constitution, not as a predicate for liability under
§ 1983. So we do the same.
The Utah Constitution’s Unnecessary-Rigor Clause states: “Persons arrested or
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.” Utah Const. art. 1, § 9. The
10
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clause “is focused on the circumstances and nature of the process and conditions of
confinement.” State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55, 72 (Utah 2016) (citation omitted). Its
aim is to protect prisoners from “unnecessary abuse.” Dexter v. Bosko, 184 P.3d 592,
595 (Utah 2008) (quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996), overruled
in part on other grounds, Spackman v. Bd. of Educ., 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000)).
“Abuse” in this context “focuses on ‘needlessly harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing’
treatment of prisoners.” Id. (quoting Bott, 922 P.2d at 740). But the clause does not
protect against “frustrations, inconveniences, and irritations that are common to
prison life.” Id. at 597 (quoting Bott, 922 P.2d at 741).
Ms. Rodriguez devotes little attention to this claim in her brief. Her argument
effectively boils down to this: a jail suicide is not a “‘frustration, inconvenience, and
irritation’ that should be ‘common to prison life.’” Opening Br. at 21. But as the Utah
Court of Appeals recently held, a prisoner’s suicide need not equate with a showing
of unnecessary rigor. See Christensen v. Salt Lake Cnty., 510 P.3d 299, 310 (Utah Ct.
App. 2022) (rejecting unnecessary-rigor claim based on jail suicide). Thus, Ms.
Rodriguez has not established unnecessary rigor.
As a result, the district court correctly dismissed this claim.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
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