Olsen v. United States Ex Rel. Department of the Army , 144 F. App'x 727 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 4, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PRISCILLA OLSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-7089
(D.C. No. 03-CV-463-W)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex (E.D. Okla.)
rel. Department of the Army,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , ANDERSON , and BRORBY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff-appellant Priscilla Olsen filed suit against the United States of
America under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1),
2671-80. Ms. Olsen “sought money damages as a result of an incident which
occurred on March 27, 2001, at which time she was sexually assaulted by a
United States Army recruiter named Kelvin Key.” Aplt. Br. at 2. The district
court granted the United States’ “Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment,” Aplt. App. at 15, concluding that: (1) Ms. Olsen failed
to meet her burden of proof on the issue of whether Key was acting within the
scope of his employment with the Army at the time of the sexual assault, id. at
167-68; and (2) Ms. Olsen’s respondeat superior and negligence claims are barred
by the FTCA’s exception for intentional torts, id. 168-69. 1
Having reviewed these issues de novo, we conclude that the FTCA’s
exception for intentional torts deprived the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction over Ms. Olsen’s respondeat superior and negligence claims. The
United States was therefore entitled to summary judgment, and we affirm. We
1
The district court also concluded that the negligence claims that Ms. Olsen
asserted against Key’s Army supervisors are barred by the FTCA’s discretionary
function exception. See Aplt. App. at 170. As set forth below, we do not need to
rely on the district court’s alternative ruling with regard to the discretionary
function exception to affirm the entry of judgment in favor of the United States
on Ms. Olsen’s negligence claims. As a result, we will not address the district
court’s ruling with regard to the discretionary function exception.
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note, however, that, when the district court entered judgment in favor of the
United States, the court should have specified that it was dismissing this action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 171. To remedy this oversight, the
district court’s judgment is modified to reflect that this action was dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Background
As pointed out by the district court, the facts in this case “are largely
undisputed.” Aplt. App. at 166. In her appellate brief, Ms. Olsen has described
the factual background of this case as follows:
Appellant, Priscilla Olsen, visited the Army Recruiting Office
in McAlester, OK, on March 25, 2001, at which time she met
[Sergeant] Kelvin Key, a recruiter at that office. [Sgt.] Key was still
in his nine (9) month probationary period for Army recruiters in
March 2001. [Sgt.] Key administered a practice [Army entrance]
exam to Ms. Olsen which she did not pass. [Sgt.] Key gave Ms.
Olsen a ride home from the recruiting office. During the car ride
home, [Sgt.] Key mentioned to Ms. Olsen that he could help her out
on the [Army entrance exam] by giving her some practice tests, etc.
[Sgt.] Key phoned Ms. Olsen that evening and told her once again
that he could help her to pass her [entrance] exam. Also, during the
phone conversation [Sgt.] Key asked Ms. Olsen if she liked to fish
and she responded in the affirmative.
On March 27, 2001, [Sgt.] Key called Ms. Olsen and asked her
if she would like to go fishing with him later that day. She agreed to
go and once again asked [Sgt.] Key if he would help her to pass the
[Army entrance] exam. [Sgt.] Key picked Ms. Olsen up at her home
around 1:30 p.m. in a black jeep which bore “ARMY” stickers on it.
[Sgt.] Key took Ms. Olsen fishing and proceeded to sexually assault
her. Sgt. Key asked explicit questions about Ms. Olsen’s sexual
activity and offered to orally stimulate her. Sgt. Key then
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masturbated in front of Ms. Olsen for about five minutes. At one
point, Sgt. Key got out of the Jeep and opened the passenger door, at
which point he began kissing Ms. Olsen’s breasts, rubbing her crotch
and tried to remove her clothes. Sgt. Key then led Ms. Olsen by the
hand to a stall in the men’s room, positioned himself behind her and
attempted to remove her pants. Ms. Olsen pulled away from Sgt. Key
and walked away while pulling up her pants. Sgt. Key returned to
the jeep and drove Ms. Olsen home. On the way home, Sgt. Key
stated that he and Ms. Olsen were going to have sex and made
another advance to which Ms. Olsen pulled away. He asked Ms.
Olsen not to tell anyone or he would risk losing his job with the
Army.
Ms. Olsen reported [Sgt.] Key’s sexual assault to the
Recruitment Office Supervisor, on March 27, 2001. Ms. Olsen also
reported the sexual assault to local law enforcement officials.
Deputy Sheriff Trent Myers of the Pittsburg County Sheriff’s
Department investigated the complaint by Ms. Olsen. The Deputy
stated in his affidavit that, during his investigation of Ms. Olsen’s
complaint, an employee of the Army contacted him and told him
specifically that the Army had previously received a complaint of
sexual assault against Mr. Key. Also, the Army admitted that they
did not investigate this previous complaint because they did not
believe the complainant.
Aplt. Br. at 3-5 (citations omitted).
In its response brief, the United States does not dispute that Key sexually
assaulted Ms. Olsen during the fishing outing. The United States has also
admitted that
Key’s conduct toward Olsen violated Army restrictions on
inappropriate contacts with recruits, including an Army regulation
prohibiting any personal relationship or social contact between a
recruiter and a potential recruit. As a recruiter, Key received regular
training on these restrictions, which were taught not only during
recruiters’ initial nine-month probationary period but also during
subsequent training sessions held on a weekly, monthly, quarterly,
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and annual basis. Key’s conduct was ultimately the basis for court-
martial; he was convicted and ordered discharged from the Army.
Aplee. Br. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
III. Jurisdictional Issues Under The FTCA
“The United States is immune from suit unless it has consented to be sued
and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction
to entertain the suit.” Hart v. Dep’t of Labor ex rel. United States , 116 F.3d
1338, 1339 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted). “The FTCA represents a
waiver of the United States’ immunity and must, therefore, be strictly construed.”
Id.Under the FTCA, the United States has waived its sovereign immunity for
torts committed by federal employees while acting within the scope of their
employment, but the waiver does not include certain specified intentional torts.
The Supreme Court has explained this dichotomy as follows:
The FTCA gives federal district courts jurisdiction over claims
against the United States for money damages “for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). However,
among other limitations, the Act also provides that this broad grant
of jurisdiction “shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim arising out of
assault, battery” or other specified intentional torts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h).
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Sheridan v. United States , 487 U.S. 392, 398 (1988). 2
As noted above, applying these statutory provisions, the district court
granted the United States’ “Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment,” Aplt. App. at 15, concluding that Ms. Olsen failed to meet
her burden of proof on the scope of employment issue, and that Ms. Olsen’s
claims were barred the FTCA’s exception for intentional torts. The district court
did not recognize, however, that, if correct, both of these conclusions lead to the
result that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Ms.
Olsen’s FTCA claims. See Dorking Genetics v. United States , 76 F.3d 1261, 1264
(2d Cir. 1996) (“[A] claim which fails to state all six elements of § 1346(b) or
which is otherwise excepted from § 1346(b), see 28 U.S.C. § 2680, must be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”); Dry v. United States , 235 F.3d
1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The applicability of the [FTCA’s] intentional tort
exception is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, which we review de novo .”)
(citing Franklin v. United States , 992 F.2d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Consequently, when the district court entered judgment in favor of the United
2
The FTCA’s exception for intentional torts contains its own exception, as it
does not apply to “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers
of the United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). This exception has no
application to this case, however, because there is no evidence that Key was
acting as an investigative or law enforcement officer.
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States, the court should have specified that it was dismissing this action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Aplt. App. at 171.
IV. Standard of Review
The district court did not indicate which procedural rule it was relying on
when it entered judgment in favor of the United States. Ordinarily, a party may
challenge a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction by bringing a motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and “[a] court has wide discretion to allow
affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed
jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1).” Holt v. United States , 46 F.3d 1000,
1003 (10th Cir. 1995). “In such instances, a court’s reference to evidence outside
the pleadings does not convert the motion to a Rule 56 motion [for summary
judgment].” Id. We have also recognized, however, that
a court is required to convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss into a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 56 summary judgment motion when
resolution of the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits
of the case. The jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits
of the case if subject matter jurisdiction is dependent on the same
statute which provides the substantive claim in the case.
Id. (citations omitted).
In this case, the jurisdictional question is dependent on the same statutes
which provide Ms. Olsen’s substantive claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1) and
2680(h) . We also note that the district court referred to matters that are outside of
the parties’ pleadings in its order granting the United States’ dispositive motion.
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See Aplt. App. at 168-69. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court should
have treated the United States’ motion as a motion for summary judgment under
Rule 56, and we will review the district court’s order granting the United States’
motion as an order granting summary judgment.
“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo applying the same
standard as the district court embodied in Rule 56(c).” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is
proper if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “In
applying this standard, we view the factual record and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom most favorably to the nonmovant.” Adler , 144 F.3d at 670.
V. The FTCA’s Intentional Tort Exception
A. Respondeat Superior Liability for the Conduct of Key
In her appellate brief, Ms. Olsen first argues that the district court erred in
concluding that she had failed to show that Key was acting within the scope of his
employment with the Army at the time of the sexual assault. See Aplt. Br.
at 7-11. Although it is unclear from Ms. Olsen’s brief whether she is pursuing a
claim against the United States based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, we
will assume that she is raising the scope of employment issue as it pertains to Key
in an attempt to impose vicarious liability on the United States for Key’s conduct.
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This is in contrast to the negligence claims discussed below, where Ms. Olsen is
seeking to impose liability on the United States for the conduct of Key’s Army
supervisors.
In Sheridan , the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he tortious conduct of
an off-duty serviceman, not acting within the scope of his office or employment,
does not in itself give rise to Government liability [under the FTCA] whether that
conduct is intentional or merely negligent.” Sheridan , 487 U.S. at 401. We do
not need to resolve the scope of employment issue in this case, however, because
it is equally well established that “a Government employee acting within the
scope of his employment but committing [an assault or] a battery commits a tort
excepted under § 2680(h).” Leleux v. United States , 178 F.3d 750, 757 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1999); cf. Franklin , 992 F.2d at 1496 (noting that, if a plaintiff’s theory of
liability under the FTCA amounts to a “battery theory,” “the action is specifically
excluded from the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA”).
Here, there is no question that Key committed an assault and/or a battery when he
sexually assaulted Ms. Holt. As a result, even if Key was acting within the scope
of his employment with the Army at the time of the sexual assault, the FTCA’s
intentional tort exception bars Ms. Olsen from imposing liability on the United
States based on a respondeat superior theory of liability. The United States was
therefore entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Holt’s respondeat superior claim.
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B. Liability for the Alleged Negligence of the Army Supervisors
As noted above, Ms. Olsen is also seeking to impose liability on the United
States for the conduct of Key’s Army supervisors. See Aplt. Br. at 11 (stating
that “the Government is responsible because of negligence in screening, training,
and supervising Sergeant Key”), at 13 (stating that “the Government should be
held liable in this case for their (sic) negligence in retaining Sergeant Key as a
recruiter, allowing him access to vulnerable young females, failing to train him on
inappropriate behavior, and allowing this assault to occur”).
In United States v. Shearer , 473 U.S. 52, 53 (1985), a four-justice plurality
of the Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether the survivor of [an Army]
serviceman, who was murdered by another [Army] serviceman, may recover from
the Government under the [FTCA] for negligently failing to prevent the murder.”
After noting that it was “clear that [plaintiff’s] claim [arose] out of the battery
committed by [the other serviceman],” id. at 54-55, the plurality concluded that
the FTCA’s intentional tort exception barred the plaintiff’s negligence claim.
[Plaintiff] cannot avoid the reach of § 2680(h) by framing her
complaint in terms of negligent failure to prevent the assault and
battery. Section 2680(h) does not merely bar claims for assault or
battery; in sweeping language it excludes any claim arising out of
assault or battery. We read this provision to cover claims like
[plaintiff’s] that sound in negligence but stem from a battery
committed by a Government employee.
Id. at 55.
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In Sheridan , a case decided three years after Shearer , a majority of the
Supreme Court clarified that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception does not bar
all negligence claims that are related to an assault or a battery committed by a
government employee. See Sheridan , 487 U.S. at 398 (“[I]t is both settled and
undisputed that in at least some situations the fact that an injury was directly
caused by an assault or battery will not preclude liability against the Government
for negligently allowing the assault to occur.”). Instead, as the district court
recognized, the majority in Sheridan “held that liability may result from the
breach of an independent affirmative duty which takes place ‘in a case in which
the employment status of the assailant has nothing to do with the basis for
imposing liability on the Government.’” Aplt. App. at 168 (quoting Sheridan ,
487 U.S. at 402). As this court has explained, however, Sheridan did not
undercut the Shearer plurality’s general analysis of § 2680(h):
Since Shearer , . . . the Supreme Court has recognized one category of
battery-related cases that falls outside the preclusive compass of §
2680(h). Specifically, when a negligence claim against the
government arises out of an incident of battery but is in no way
contingent on the perpetrator’s federal employment status, i.e., when
the government’s liability is based on its breach of a duty owed the
victim that is independent of its relationship, if any, to the
perpetrator, § 2680(h) does not bar recovery under the FTCA.
Sheridan [,] 487 U.S. [at] 400-03 . . . . With this important
qualification, the Shearer plurality’s general analysis of § 2680(h)
appears to remain the prevailing view.
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Franklin , 992 F.2d at 1498-99; see also Borawski v. Henderson , 265 F. Supp. 2d
475, 485 (D.N.J. 2003) (“The majority of the circuits addressing the meaning of
the ‘arising out of’ clause have adopted the [ Shearer ] plurality view that a
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention claim necessarily arises out of an
underlying intentional tort, precluding government liability under the FTCA.”).
We conclude that Sheridan is distinguishable, and that Ms. Olsen’s
negligence claims fall within the Shearer plurality’s general analysis of
§ 2680(h). In Sheridan , “an obviously intoxicated off-duty [naval medical aide]
named Carr fired several rifle shots into an automobile being driven by [the
plaintiffs] on a public street near the Bethesda Naval Hospital.” Sheridan , 487
U.S. at 393-94. As summarized by the Supreme Court, the shooting was preceded
by the following events:
After finishing his shift as a naval medical aide at the hospital, Carr
consumed a large quantity of . . . alcoholic beverages. He then
packed some of his belongings, including a rifle and ammunition,
into a uniform bag and left his quarters. Some time later, three naval
corpsmen found him lying face down in a drunken stupor on the
concrete floor of a hospital building. They attempted to take him to
the emergency room, but he broke away, grabbing the bag and
revealing the barrel of the rifle. At the sight of the rifle barrel, the
corpsmen fled. They neither took further action to subdue Carr, nor
alerted the appropriate authorities that he was heavily intoxicated and
brandishing a weapon. Later that evening, Carr fired the shots that
caused physical injury to one of the [plaintiffs] and property damage
to their car.
Id. at 395.
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The plaintiffs subsequently “brought suit against the United States alleging
that their injuries were caused by the Government’s negligence in allowing Carr
to leave the hospital with a loaded rifle in his possession.” Id. at 394. “The
District Court dismissed the action–and the Court of Appeals affirmed–on the
ground that the claim [was] barred by the intentional tort exception to the
[FTCA].” Id. On certiorari review before the Supreme Court, the question was
thus “whether [plaintiffs’] claim [was] one ‘arising out of’ an assault or battery
within the meaning of . . . § 2680(h).” Id. A majority of the Court answered this
question in the negative and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
concluding that the case presented a “basis for Government liability that is
entirely independent of Carr’s employment status.” Id. at 401. As the Court
explained,
By voluntarily adopting regulations that prohibit the possession of
firearms on the naval base and that require all personnel to report the
presence of any such firearm, and by further voluntarily undertaking
to provide care to a person who was visibly drunk and visibly armed,
the Government assumed responsibility to “perform [its] ‘good
Samaritan’ task in a careful manner.” Indian Towing Co. v. United
States , 350 U.S. 61, 65 . . . (1955). The District Court and the Court
of Appeals both assumed that [plaintiffs’] version of the facts would
support recovery under Maryland law on a negligence theory if the
naval hospital had been owned and operated by a private person. . . .
On this assumption, it seems perfectly clear that the mere fact that
Carr happened to be an off-duty federal employee should not provide
a basis for protecting the Government from liability that would attach
if Carr had been an unemployed civilian patient or visitor in the
hospital. Indeed, in a case in which the employment status of the
assailant has nothing to do with the basis for imposing liability on
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the Government, it would seem perverse to exonerate the
Government because of the happenstance that Carr was on a federal
payroll.
Id. at 401-02 (footnotes omitted).
As noted above, Ms. Olsen is seeking to impose liability on the United
States for the alleged negligence of Key’s Army supervisors in “screening,
training, and supervising . . . Key,” Aplt. Br. at 11, and she argues in her
appellate brief that “ Sheridan applies directly to this case,” id. at 12. Ms. Olsen’s
reasoning is as follows:
Prior to Ms. Olsen’s incident, the Army had received a complaint of
sexual assault against Mr. Key. In Sheridan , an off-duty Navy
employee was intoxicated and armed. Some Corpsmen discovered
the “off duty” Navy employee; however, they did nothing even
though they saw that he was inebriated and was carrying a weapon.
....
Thus, the Sheridan case applies to this case where there was an
Army employee who committed an assault while he was off duty.
The United States failed to investigate and/or report any prior
complaints made against Mr. Key. It was foreseeable that Mr. Key
had the propensity to do the same thing again. Thus, the Government
should be held liable in this case for their (sic) negligence . . . in the
hiring, retention, and . . . supervision of Mr. Kelvin Key.
Id. at 12-13.
Ms. Olsen’s analysis is unconvincing. As the government has pointed out
in its response brief, even if the United States had “an obligation to investigate
claims of sexual misconduct, . . . its obligation [arose] out of the employment
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relationship with [Key].” Aplee. Br. at 22-23. Moreover, in contrast to the
situation in Sheridan where the naval corpsmen voluntarily assumed responsibility
to perform a Good Samaritan task, see Sheridan , 487 U.S. at 401, there is no
independent basis for imposing a duty of care on the facts of this case. As a
result, “[b]ecause the existence of any duty on the part of the United States to
prevent Olsen’s sexual assault is dependent on the government’s employment
relationship with [Key], Olsen’s claims do not fall within . . . Sheridan .” Id. at
23; see also Garcia v. United States , 776 F.2d 116, 117-18 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception barred claim against the
United States for alleged negligence in supervising military recruiter who
allegedly sexually assaulted a potential recruit).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The district court’s
judgment is modified to reflect that this action was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Aplt. App. at 171.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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