United States v. Felix-Salazar , 158 F. App'x 999 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 16, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-4184
(D. Utah)
ALEJANDRO FELIX-SALAZAR, also (D.Ct. No. 04-CR-123-DB)
known as Jesus Apodaca-Castro,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Alejandro Felix-Salazar pled guilty to one count of illegal re-entry after
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
deportation subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). At sentencing, he argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), required
the district court to hold the United States Sentencing Guidelines
unconstitutional. The district court held that the guidelines were constitutional,
and pursuant to a plea agreement, sentenced Felix-Salazar to thirty months in
prison, the minimum sentence within the applicable guidelines range. The district
court also imposed an alternate sentence of thirty months “not being bound by the
guidelines.” (R. Vol. III at 4.) On appeal, Felix-Salazar requests resentencing in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), and this Court's decision in United States v.
Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
Discussion
In Booker, the Supreme Court held that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 125
S.Ct. at 756. To remedy the Sixth Amendment difficulties within the sentencing
guidelines, the Court invalidated the mandatory application of the guidelines and
instead required district courts to consult them in an advisory fashion. Id. at 756
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(excising 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1), 3742(e)). While Felix-Salazar does not allege
a Sixth Amendment violation here, there is a non-constitutional Booker error
because the district court treated the guidelines as mandatory rather than advisory
when imposing the first sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403
F.3d 727, 731-32 (10th Cir.) (discussing the difference between constitutional and
non-constitutional Booker error), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 495 (2005). “In
non-constitutional harmless error cases, such as this, the government bears the
burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the
defendant’s] substantial rights were not affected.” United States v. Martinez, 418
F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2005 WL3067739
(2005). See United States v. Glover, 413 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2005).
Felix-Salazar contends his situation is identical to the defendant’s in
Labastida-Segura. There, the defendant was convicted of roughly the same
offense as Felix-Salazar, unlawful re-entry of a previously deported alien in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d at 1141.
Labastida-Segura challenged the constitutionality of the guidelines at sentencing
and was overruled by the district judge, who found the guidelines to be
constitutional. Id. at 1142. As in this case, the district court in Labastida-Segura
imposed the minimum sentence under the applicable guidelines range. Id. We
concluded the district court’s mandatory guideline sentence was not harmless
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error stating:
Here, where [the sentence imposed] was already at the bottom of the
guidelines range, to say that the district court would have imposed
the same sentence given the new legal landscape (even after
consulting the Sentencing Guidelines in an advisory capacity) places
us in the zone of speculation and conjecture--we simply do not know
what the district court would have done after hearing from the
parties. Though an appellate court may judge whether a district court
exercised its discretion (and whether it abused that discretion), it
cannot exercise the district court's discretion.
Id. at 1143.
However, in this case we are not left “in the zone of speculation and
conjecture” in determining what the district court would do if the guidelines were
not mandatory. Id. The district court’s alternative sentence, which did not treat
the guidelines as mandatory, is exactly the same sentence it imposed under the
guidelines. The district court clearly explained how and why it chose to exercise
its discretion in selecting an alternate sentence:
As an alternative sentence I impose a sentence of an identical
30 months. In doing so I am not bound at all by the guidelines. I do
find that some of the criminal history factors extremely influential in
my reaching a 30 month sentence as a non-guideline sentence. And
the fact that the defendant has engaged in drug trafficking activity in
the United States on at least two occasions, for which there are
convictions, has a substantial effect on the Court in imposing an
alternate sentence that is not at all effected by or required by any
guidelines requirement.
(R. Vol. III at 6-7.) Felix-Salazar claims the district court’s alternative sentence
is insufficient to establish harmless error because it did not consider all the
sentencing factors enumerated within 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and, therefore, this
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Court can only speculate as to what sentence the district court would have
imposed had it done so. We disagree.
The district court heard argument regarding the mitigating reasons for
Felix-Salazar’s re-entry and the innocuous circumstances of his arrest.
Nonetheless, the district court weighed those factors against his criminal history
in drug trafficking and responded with an appropriate sentence. This is precisely
the process suggested by Booker. “[N]otwithstanding Booker's invalidation of the
mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines, district courts must still consult
the Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing. Thus, appellate
review continues to encompass review of the district court's interpretation and
application of the Guidelines.” United States v. Graham, 413 F.3d 1211, 1218
(10th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
635 (2005). Here, as in United States v. Serrano-Dominguez, “[t]he district court
applied the sentencing methodology suggested in Booker and concluded that even
if the Guidelines were not mandatory [the defendant] would receive the same
sentence. Consequently, the error in his sentence is harmless. A remand would
needlessly burden the district court and counsel with another sentencing
proceeding, which we know would produce the same result.” 406 F.3d 1221,
1224 (10th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRM.
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Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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