Lowry v. Honeycutt , 211 F. App'x 709 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                        F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
    January 2, 2007
    TENTH CIRCUIT                      Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    LEN N Y D EA N LO WR Y ,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                     No. 06-3136
    v.                                            (D. Kansas)
    R. HONEYCUTT, I & I,                          (D.C. No. 05-CV-3430-SAC)
    Hutchinson Correctional Facility
    and LO UIS E. BRUCE, W arden,
    Hutchinson Correctional Facility,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
    Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. **
    Lenny Dean Lowry, an inmate in the Hutchinson Correctional Facility in
    Hutchinson, Kansas who is proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s decision
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec.
    1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
    **
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34( A )(2); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action sua sponte for failure to state a claim
    pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). W e affirm the district court’s decision.
    I. BACKGROUND
    M r. Lowry’s claims arise out of a disciplinary proceeding in which prison
    officials concluded that he violated Kan. Admin. Reg. § 44-12-314, which
    provides that “[n]o inmate shall commit or induce others to commit an act of . . .
    sodomy, even with the consent of both parties.” The regulation defines sodomy
    as any of the following:
    (A) Oral contact with or oral penetration of the female
    genitalia or oral contact with the male genitalia;
    (B) anal penetration, however slight, of a male or female
    by any body part or object; or
    (C) oral or anal copulation or sexual intercourse betw een
    a person and an animal.
    Id. § 44-12-314(c)(2). Because M r. Lowry is proceeding pro se, we construe his
    filings liberally and examine the record in the light most favorable to him.
    Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972); Neal v. Lewis, 
    414 F.3d 1244
    ,
    1247 (10th Cir. 2005).
    The record indicates that on April 26, 2005, a prison official observed M r.
    Lowry and another inmate engaged in sexual activity: the other inmate had “his
    erect penis pressed up against inmate Low ry[’s] rectum area.” Rec. doc. 1 attach.
    (Disciplinary Report: Hutchinson Correctional facility - Central Unit, Case No.
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    05-05-053; dated M ay 5, 2005). According to M r. Lowry’s complaint, the two
    men were engaging in “what I consider horseplay which had some sexual
    content.” Id. at 2; see also id. at 3 (stating that “I did fondle [the other inmate]
    but w e were more hors[]ing around than anything”).
    M r. Lowry told the prison official that no intercourse had taken place, that
    the behavior w as consensual, and that he did not want to undergo a rape exam.
    Prison officials nonetheless took him to the prison clinic and administered an
    examination, which revealed no evidence of intercourse. Again under protest,
    officials took M r. Lowry to a hospital emergency room, where he underwent a
    formal rape kit examination. During the examination, M r. Lowry alleged, the
    defendant Officer Honeycutt laughed and joked and helped a nurse take pictures
    of M r. Low ry’s rectum and penis.
    This second examination also revealed no evidence of intercourse.
    However, prison officials convicted M r. Lowry of violating Kan. Admin. Reg. §
    44-12-314, finding that he had admitted to being engaged in sexual activity. The
    prison hearing officer ordered M r. Lowry to pay restitution totaling $672.18— the
    fees for the emergency room visit, the rape kit test, and the overtime wages spent
    conducting the investigation.
    M r. Lowry then filed this § 1983 action against Officer Honeycutt and
    Louis I. Bruce, the W arden of the Hutchinson Correctional Facility. He alleged
    violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. According to M r. Lowry,
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    because his sexual encounter with the other inmate was consensual and because
    no penetration occurred, there was insufficient evidence to support his
    disciplinary conviction for violating Kan. Admin. Reg. § 44-12-314.
    Additionally, he asserted, Officer Honeycutt had falsely stated that M r. Lowry
    had admitted to being the victim of a sexual assault. Finally, he alleged, Officer
    Honeycutt’s laughing and joking during the examination at the hospital was “the
    most degrading, humiliating, and debasing experience I’ve ever had to endure.”
    Rec. doc. 1, at 3.
    The district court dismissed M r. Lowry’s complaint for failure to state a
    claim. The court reasoned that M r. Lowry had “attache[d] unwarranted
    significance to the fact that the physical exam produced no evidence of assault.
    That fact alone did not preclude the hearing officer’s finding of guilty of
    prohibited sexual activity, particularly given that plaintiff was observed by a
    guard engaging in such activity and another guard reported he had admitted
    sexual activity.” Rec. doc 4, at 8. (M emorandum and Order, filed M arch 22,
    2006). “N or,” the court continued, “does [M r. Lowry] present authority
    indicating the negative test result precluded prison officials from charging him for
    a medical exam deemed necessary by prison officials.” Id.
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    II. DISCUSSION
    W e review de novo the district court’s dismissal of M r. Lowry’s complaint
    for failure to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). See Perkins v.
    Kan. Dept. of Corr., 
    165 F.3d 803
    , 806 (10th Cir. 1999). “Dismissal of a pro se
    complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the
    plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he alleged and it would be futile to give him
    an opportunity to amend.” 
    Id.
     “In determining whether dismissal is proper, w e
    must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and . . . construe those
    allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in the
    light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 
    Id.
    Here, construing M r. Lowry’s allegations liberally, we read his complaint
    as asserting claims for (1) the denial of his due process rights on the grounds that
    there was not “some evidence” to support the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
    for a violation of K an. Admin. Reg. § 44-12-314, see Superintendent, M ass. Corr.
    Inst. v. Hill, 
    472 U.S. 445
    , 455 (1985); (2) the denial of a Fourteenth Amendment
    right to refuse medical treatment; (3) the denial of his Eighth Amendment right to
    be free from cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) the denial of his right to equal
    protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon review of the record, we
    agree with the district court that M r. Lowry’s complaint does not state a cause of
    action as to any of these claims.
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    First, as to his due process claim based on a lack of evidence to support the
    disciplinary conviction, we note that prison disciplinary convictions must be
    supported by “some evidence.” Hill, 
    472 U.S. at 455
    . In applying this standard,
    we are not required to undertake “[an] examination of the entire record, [an]
    independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or weighing of the
    evidence.” M itchell v. M aynard, 
    80 F.3d 1433
    , 1445 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). “Instead, the relevant conclusion is w hether there is
    any evidence that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary
    board.” 
    Id.
     Even “meager” evidence may be sufficient. 
    Id.
    Here, the documents attached to M r. Lowry’s complaint indicate that a
    prison guard observed another inmate with his “his erect penis pressed up against
    inmate Lowry[’s] rectum area.” Rec. doc. 1 attach. In our view , despite M r.
    Lowry’s denials, that statement constitutes some evidence of a violation of Kan.
    Admin. Reg. § 44-12-314, which requires “anal penetration, however slight” Id.
    § 44-12-314(c)(2)(B). Id.
    Second, as to the allegation that prison officials violated M r. Lowry’s right
    to refuse medical treatment by requiring him to submit to a rape examination at
    the hospital, we note that prison officials “may compel a prisoner to accept
    treatment when [they], in the exercise of professional judgment, deem it necessary
    to carry out valid medical or penological objectives.” W hite v. Napoleon, 
    897 F.2d 103
    , 112 (3rd Cir. 1990). M oreover, “the judgment of prison authorities
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    will be presumed valid unless it is shown to be such a substantial departure from
    accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the
    person responsible actually did not base the decision on such judgment.” 
    Id.
    Here, in light of prison officials’ legitimate concerns about the health risks of
    sexual assault and sexually transmitted diseases, M r. Lowry’s allegations do not
    indicate that requiring a rape examination was inconsistent with legitimate
    medical and penological objectives
    Third, with regard to his Eighth Amendment claim, M r. Lowry has failed to
    allege that he w as subjected to the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain or
    deliberate indifference to his health or safety. See W ilson v. Seiter, 
    501 U.S. 294
    ,
    297 (1991).
    Fourth, as to his equal protection claim, M r. Lowry has failed to allege
    facts sufficient to demonstrate that he was treated differently than other inmates
    and to “overcome a presumption of government rationality.” Brown v. Zavaras,
    
    63 F.3d 967
    , 971 (10th Cir. 1995).
    III. CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the dismissal of M r. Low ry’s claims.
    Entered for the Court,
    Robert H. Henry
    Circuit Judge
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