United States v. Cardenas-Pulido , 255 F. App'x 309 ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
November 6, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 07-1124
v. (D.C. No. 06-cr-00316-M SK)
(D . Colo.)
EFR AIN CA RD EN A S-PU LID O,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, HA RTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Efrain Cardenas-Pulido, a citizen of M exico, appeals his sentence of 46
months’ imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea for illegal reentry into
the U nited States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2). Cardenas-Pulido’s
counsel moves for leave to withdraw from the case in a brief filed pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Because we conclude that the
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
arguments raised by Cardenas-Pulido are frivolous, we AFFIRM his sentence,
DISM ISS the appeal, and GR A NT counsel’s motion to withdraw.
I
In M ay 2002, Cardenas-Pulido was convicted in Colorado state court of
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, which the Immigration and
Nationality Act defines as an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43),
1326(b)(2). As a result of that conviction, an immigration judge ordered
Cardenas-Pulido to be deported from the United States to M exico. Desiring to
provide greater financial support for his wife and daughter, however, Cardenas-
Pulido was not content to remain in M exico. In early 2006, he reentered the
United States to search for better employment.
Cardenas-Pulido’s search came to an abrupt halt in M ay of that year when
Colorado state law enforcement officials arrested him for a violation of state law.
On July 19, 2006, approximately two months after his initial detention by the
state, he was transferred to the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.
On August 7, 2006, a federal grand jury indicted Cardenas-Pulido for
illegal reentry into the United States subsequent to deportation for the
commission of an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2).
As a result of that charge, Cardenas-Pulido entered into a written plea
arrangement with the government, in which he agreed to plead guilty to the
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offense charged. In exchange, the government promised to recommend a sentence
at the bottom of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range and to move for a
one-point offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Cardenas-Pulido’s Presentence Report (“PSR”) calculated an adjusted total
offense level of 17 and a criminal history category of VI. Taken together, these
sentencing considerations provided for a Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months’
imprisonment. Prior to his sentencing hearing, however, Cardenas-Pulido moved
for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1), arguing that the
PSR overrepresented the seriousness of his criminal history. He did not ask the
court to grant a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
At his M arch 19, 2007 sentencing hearing, the government agreed with the
departure argument and recommended both that Cardenas-Pulido’s criminal
history category be reduced to V and that the court sentence him at the low end of
the revised Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. Adopting the
parties’ recommendations, the district court found “good grounds” to depart under
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1) and, after analyzing the factors required under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), imposed a sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment and three years of
supervised release. This timely appeal followed.
II
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If an attorney conscientiously examines a case and determines that any
appeal would be wholly frivolous, counsel may “so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel must submit a brief
to both the appellate court and the client, pointing to anything in the record that
would potentially present an appealable issue. The client may then choose to
offer any argument to the court. If, upon complete examination of the record, the
court determines that the appeal is in fact frivolous, it may grant counsel’s request
to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id. In the present case, acting pursuant to
Anders, counsel provided Cardenas-Pulido with a copy of the appellate brief, and
C ardenas-Pulido has filed a pro se brief in response. In his pro se brief, which w e
construe liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U .S. 519, 520 (1972), Cardenas-
Pulido raises three allegedly nonfrivolous issues for our consideration. W e
address each argument in turn.
A
Cardenas-Pulido first argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in the court below. Specifically, he asserts that his counsel was
ineffective in failing to: (1) advise him of his right to appeal; (2) “negotiate a
more reasonable deal with the government”; (3) argue mitigating factors to
support a lower sentence; (4) object to the imposition of supervised release; and
(5) instruct or advise him on how to speak to the sentencing judge.
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In this circuit, except in rare circumstances, claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel must be presented in collateral proceedings. United States v.
Gallow ay, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). “Rare circumstances”
generally exist only when there is a fully developed factual record before this
court. Id. at 1240-41. The rule exists to allow a district court to appropriately
develop the factual record in the first instance. See M assaro v. United States, 538
U.S. 500, 505-06 (2003). It also ensures that we have an appropriate record on
which to base a decision. Galloway, 56 F.3d at 1240. Thus, we have adopted a
rule that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought on direct appeal are
“presumptively dismissible.” Id.Our review of the record convinces us that Cardenas-Pulido’s current
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not fall into the narrow category of
claims that require no further development. Cf. United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d
724, 728 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding the record sufficient to review an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal where defense counsel averred to
mistakenly omitting a jury instruction on a lesser included offense). His claims
are therefore unsuitable for review on direct appeal. Accordingly, if Cardenas-
Pulido intends to pursue these claims further, he must raise them in a collateral
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
B
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Cardenas-Pulido next argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable
under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). He asserts that the district
court erred in imposing a within-Guidelines sentence because his conviction of
simple illegal reentry into the United States is not sufficiently serious to warrant
the sentence he received. Under the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), he
argues that he merits a non-Guidelines sentence. He also contends that because
he is not legally within the United States and will therefore be deported when he
completes his term of imprisonment, no purpose is served by incarcerating him
for 46 months.
Post-Booker, we review a sentence for reasonableness. See United States
v. K ristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 2006). In conducting this analysis, we
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
determinations de novo. United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 906 (10th Cir.
2005). W e also apply a presumption that a sentence falling within a properly
calculated Guidelines range is reasonable. 1 Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054.
Cardenas-Pulido’s reasonableness argument is frivolous. At his sentencing
hearing, he never objected to the court’s calculation of the relevant sentencing
range based on his PSR, and he failed to argue for a variance under the 18 U.S.C.
1
Our circuit’s use of an appellate presumption of reasonableness for those
sentences falling within a properly calculated Guidelines range was recently
upheld by the Supreme Court in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-68
(2007).
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§ 3553(a) factors. In fact, his only argument before the court below was that he
should receive a departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1) because the PSR
overrepresented his criminal history. The court agreed with that argument and
proceeded to sentence him to the bottom of the revised Guidelines range.
M oreover, the court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors in determining his
sentence. In short, because Cardenas-Pulido has done nothing to overcome the
presumption that his sentence is reasonable, we conclude that, under the
circumstances presented, Cardenas-Pulido’s sentence is in fact reasonable.
C
Finally, Cardenas-Pulido argues that the district court exceeded its
authority by imposing a sentence that includes three years of supervised release
when the statute under which he was convicted “does not mandate” that any
supervised release be imposed. This argument is meritless. Under 18 U.S.C. §
3583(a), a district court that imposes a term of imprisonment “may include as a
part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of
supervised release after imprisonment . . . .” In determining whether to include a
term of supervised release, the district court has broad discretion so long as its
decision is consistent with the factors set forth in § 3553(a). See United States v.
Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 1996). As we have already recognized, the
sentencing judge appropriately considered each of the relevant factors at the time
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it sentenced Cardenas-Pulido. It also acted well within its discretion when it
imposed a term of supervised release. Cardenas-Pulido’s argument that the
district court erred in doing so is therefore frivolous.
Because Cardenas-Pulido has failed to present us with any meritorious
grounds for appeal, we AFFIRM his sentence, DISM ISS the appeal, and
G R A N T counsel’s motion to w ithdraw.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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