United States v. Herrera , 216 F. App'x 809 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 15, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-6208
R AFA EL A N TO N IO H ER RER A, (D.C. No. CR-92-209-T)
(W . D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BRISCO E, M cK AY, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Rafael Antonio Herrera (Herrera), a federal prisoner appearing pro se,
challenges the district court’s order denying his motions for a writ of audita
querela under the All W rits Act. W e vacate the order, construe Herrera’s notice
of appeal, motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and appellate brief as an implied
application for authorization to file another § 2255 motion, and deny
authorization.
Herrera pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however,
for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
distribution of, cocaine powder and cocaine base (commonly known as “crack”)
and was sentenced to life in prison. The district court denied Herrera’s motion to
withdraw the guilty plea and, on direct appeal, we affirmed. See United States v.
Herrera, 16 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. Feb. 8, 1994) (unpublished), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1148 (1994). Herrera then filed his first § 2255 motion claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel and denial of due process as to his guilty plea, which the
district court denied. On appeal, we denied Herrera a certificate of appealability
and dismissed. See United States v. Herrera, 149 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. June. 5,
1998) (unpublished), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1139 (1999).
Herrera then filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 to modify an
illegal sentence based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The district court denied this
motion and, on appeal, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction over the matter,
finding the notice of appeal untimely. See United States v. Herrera, 178 Fed.
Appx. 830 (10th Cir. M ay 4, 2006) (unpublished). Herrera has also filed three
motions for authorization to file successive § 2255 petitions, all of which we have
denied. Last, Herrera filed a motion for a writ of audita querela under the All
W rits Act arguing that his life sentence is unconstitutional, citing to Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely v. W ashington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),
and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The district court concluded
that Herrera’s exclusive remedy was a § 2255 motion and denied the motion for
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lack of jurisdiction. The district court concluded further that even if it had
jurisdiction, it would deny Herrera’s motion because Booker, Blakely, and
Apprendi do not apply retroactively.
Herrera now challenges the district court’s denial of his motions for a writ
of audita querela. A post-judgment motion must be treated as a second or
successive petition and certified by an appellate panel if it asserts or reasserts a
substantive claim to set aside the movant’s conviction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 530-31 (2005) (deciding the extent to which a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)
motion filed in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding should be considered a second or
successive habeas petition); United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1147-48
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that if the post-conviction motion only attacks a defect
in the integrity of the federal postconviction proceedings, and not the substance of
the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, it is not advancing a new
claim and should not be treated as a successive motion to vacate).
Herrera’s motion for a writ of audita querela does not attack the integrity of
any § 2255 proceedings, but rather asserts substantive claims to set aside his
conviction. Thus, the motion was, in essence, a successive § 2255 petition under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA ). See United States
v. Torres, 282 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “a writ of
audita querela is not available to a petitioner when other remedies exist, such as a
motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255” and that a petitioner cannot
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avoid the bar against successive § 2255 petitions “by simply styling a petition
under a different name”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Caravalho v.
Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he mere fact [a petitioner] is
precluded from filing a second § 2255 petition does not establish that the remedy
in § 2255 is inadequate.”). As Herrera’s motion is in effect a successive § 2255
petition, the district court should have transferred the matter to this court. See
Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that district
court lacks jurisdiction over successive § 2255 motion filed in district court
without appellate court authorization and should transfer the matter to the court of
appeals).
W e construe Herrera’s filings as an implied application for authorization to
file another § 2255 petition. W e have thoroughly reviewed the matter and
conclude that Herrera has failed to make the prima facie showing required by §
2255 as amended by the AEDPA. His contentions are not based on newly
discovered evidence that, “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable fact finder would have found [him] guilty of the offense” or on a “new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The
caselaw cited by Herrera – Booker, Blakely, and Apprendi – does not apply
retroactively to final criminal judgments such as his. See United States v.
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Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that Booker is not to be
applied retroactively); United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that Blakely is not retroactive); United States v. M ora, 293 F.3d 1213,
1219 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Apprendi is not retroactive).
Accordingly, Herrera’s motion for extension of time to file reply brief is
DENIED, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, the district
court order is VACATED, and the implied application for authorization to file a
successive § 2255 motion is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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