United States v. Padilla-Rodriguez , 216 F. App'x 818 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 16, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-3264
(D.C. No. 04-CR-40154-SAC)
PAUL PADILLA-RODRIGUEZ, also (D . Kan.)
know n as Jose Luis Negron-Torres,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Paul Padilla-Rodriguez pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to aggravated re-entry into the United States as a previously removed
alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). Under the terms of the plea
agreement, he waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in
connection with his prosecution, conviction or sentence, except to the extent that
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
the district court departed upward from the applicable sentencing guideline range,
as determined by the court. 1 The district court determined that the advisory
sentencing guideline range was seventy to eighty-seven months’ imprisonment,
and it imposed a seventy-month sentence on defendant.
Notwithstanding the appeal waiver, defendant appealed. He raised three
claims: that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, erred in denying his request for new counsel, and imposed an unjust
sentence. The government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United
1
The text of the appeal waiver states:
11. W aiver of Appeal and Collateral Attack.
Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal or
collaterally attack any matter in connection with this prosecution,
conviction and sentence. The defendant is aware that Title 18,
U.S.C. § 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the conviction
and sentence imposed. By entering into this agreement, the
defendant knowingly waives any right to appeal a sentence imposed
which is within the guideline range determined appropriate by the
court. The defendant also waives any right to challenge a sentence
or otherwise attempt to modify or change his sentence or manner in
which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not
limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, U.S.C. § 2255 [except as
limited by United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187
(10 th Cir. 2001)] and a motion brought under Title 18, U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). In other words, the defendant waives the right to
appeal the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent, if any,
the court departs upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline
range determined by the court.
Plea Agreement at 8-9.
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States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (en banc). W e grant
the motion and dismiss the appeal.
In Hahn, this court held that a w aiver of appellate rights w ill be enforced if
(1) “the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights;”
(2) “the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights;” and
(3) “enforcing the waiver would [not] result in a miscarriage of justice.”
359 F.3d at 1325. The government’s motion addresses all of these considerations,
explaining why none of them undermine defendant’s appeal waiver. In this
regard, we note that, “an appeal of a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
is an attempt to contest a conviction on appeal and thus falls within the plain
language of [an appeal] waiver provision.” United States v. Leon, F.3d ,
No. 06-3195, 2007 W L 416913, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 8, 2007) (alteration in
original; quotation omitted). Defendant has responded that the motion should be
denied because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his appellate rights
and enforcing the plea agreement would result in a miscarriage of justice. He
does not dispute that the claims raised in his appeal fall within the scope of the
appeal w aiver, and thus, we need not address this factor. Id. at *1.
Knowing and Voluntary W aiver
Defendant claims that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his
appellate rights because he lacks understanding of the English language. He
argues that the court should take into consideration his body language or
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non-spoken gestures and his lack of formal education. In determining whether
defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal was made knowingly and voluntarily,
we consider “whether the language of the plea agreement states that [he] entered
the agreement knowingly and voluntarily” and whether there is “an adequate
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325.
Defendant bears the “burden to present evidence from the record establishing that
he did not understand the waiver.” Id. at 1329 (quotation omitted).
He has not met this burden. The transcripts of defendant’s Rule 11 plea
colloquy demonstrate that he was given an interpreter at the start of the Rule 11
plea colloquy, and that the entire colloquy and plea hearing proceedings were
translated to and for him. The defendant stated that he had a ninth-grade
education. At no time did he indicate that he had any difficulty understanding the
charges against him, the plea agreement, the appeal waiver, or any aspect of the
plea colloquy, and he offers no evidence now that the interpreter was inadequate
or insufficient. At the plea colloquy, the court summarized the plea agreement,
and informed him of the constitutional rights he was waiving, including the right
to appeal. Defendant represented to the court that he had reviewed the written
plea agreement, which he signed, with his attorney, that he was entering into the
plea agreement of his own free will, that he had a full opportunity to discuss with
his attorney the constitutional rights he was w aiving, including his right to appeal,
and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. “[S]tatements made
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in a plea colloquy are presumed to be true.” United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d
867, 873 (10th Cir. 2003). On these facts, we find that defendant’s appeal waiver
was knowingly and voluntarily given.
M iscarriage of Justice
Defendant argues that enforcement of the plea agreement would seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (holding that a miscarriage of justice will result if “the
waiver is otherwise unlaw ful,” to the extent that the alleged error “seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”)
(quotation omitted). He contends that enforcing the appeal waiver would be
unjust because the district court (1) included a ten-year old conviction in
calculating his criminal history category and enhancing his sentence, and (2) did
not exercise its discretion to grant a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1,
in order to avoid sentencing disparities between offenders where he was
sentenced and those sentenced in so-called “fast track” districts. See United
States v. M artinez-Trujillo, 468 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining
nature of potential sentencing disparity and holding that sentence is not rendered
unreasonable by sentencing court’s failure to consider this sentence-disparity
issue).
Quite clearly, however, defendant waived the right to assert these claims on
appeal when he waived the right to appeal any sentence imposed that was w ithin
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the guideline range determined appropriate by the court. The miscarriage of
justice exception looks to w hether “the waiver is otherwise unlawful,” Hahn, 359
F.3d at 1327 (emphasis added), not whether some other aspect of the proceeding
may have involved legal error. “The relevant question . . . is not whether
[defendant’s] sentence is unlaw ful . . ., but whether . . . his appeal waiver itself
[is] unenforceable.” United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 550 (2005).
The plea agreement here made clear the maximum sentence defendant faced
for the crime of conviction, that he gave up multiple constitutional and appellate
rights in exchange for concessions from the government, and that his sentence
would be determined by taking into consideration the applicable advisory
guidelines. As in Porter, the sentence imposed by the district court complied
with the terms of the plea agreement and with the understanding of the plea
defendant expressed at the plea hearing. Defendant has not demonstrated that it
would be a miscarriage of justice to enforce the w aiver.
The government’s motion to enforce the waiver is GRANTED and the
appeal is DISM ISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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