Stone v. Albert , 257 F. App'x 96 ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 3, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
LAFAYETTE STONE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-2336
(D.C. No. CIV-05-1067 WJ/LCS)
AARON ALBERT; CHRIS (D. N.M.)
SANCHEZ; FLOYD GONZALES;
BLAIN WARRIOR; ROBERT
FUENTES; FRANK MAESTAS;
CRAIG FOSTER; JEREMY
MAESTAS; MARCUS GULIN;
ROY HARTMAN; RAY GONZALES;
M. GARCIA; J. BACA;
S. CORDOVA; SCOOTER;
CHARLES POOLE; RUBEN
PADILLA; LOUIS HERNANDEZ;
SCOTT RICHTER; MIKE
ALVARADO, MDC Corrections
Officers; P. LAVILLA;
JUDY LUJAN; CHRISTINA
ROMERO, APD Officers; Two JANE
DOES, Corrections Medical Service
Nurses, all defendants in their
individual capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
(continued...)
Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Lafayette Stone appeals from an order dismissing several claims in
this pro se prison civil rights action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We affirm.
Plaintiff brought this action alleging he was (1) subjected to excessive
force and then gratuitously beaten by correctional personnel and local police
during and after a general disturbance at the Bernalillo County Metropolitan
Detention Center (BCMDC) on March 5, 2003, and (2) thereafter denied adequate
medical care. He named several BCMDC personnel, three police officers, and
two nurses (“Jane Does”) as defendants. The magistrate judge granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, making it the court’s duty “to serve process for the
plaintiff [under] 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d),” Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204
(10th Cir. 2003). The judge directed the clerk to “issue summonses (notice and
waiver forms) to [the] named Defendants,” R. doc. 15, but these were returned by
just seven BCMDC officers. This largely unsuccessful effort to effect service by
waiver was the only means pursued under § 1915(d), and as a result the majority
of the named defendants were never served.
*
(...continued)
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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The served defendants filed an answer to the complaint. They denied the
factual allegations of wrongdoing and summarily asserted a host of affirmative
defenses. None of the latter specifically referred to a failure to exhaust available
remedies, though the answer did generally assert that “[t]his lawsuit is subject to
and/or barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act and/or its state law equivalent,
NMSA § 33-2-11.” R. doc. 26, at 4. The next day, the magistrate judge issued an
order construing the answer as a motion to dismiss and setting a briefing schedule
for the matter. R. doc. 27.
The served defendants did not submit a brief in support of dismissal, but
instead moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) they had nothing to
do with plaintiff’s medical care at BCMDC, and (2) as to the incident on March 5,
2003, plaintiff had not pursued available administrative remedies as required
under § 1997e(a). R. doc. 30. They attached a copy of BCMDC’s inmate
grievance procedure, an affidavit from BCMDC’s records custodian, and copies
of the many grievances plaintiff had filed at BCMDC, in support of their
contention that plaintiff could have, but had not, filed a grievance with respect to
the violence he now alleges occurred during the March 5, 2003 disturbance.
Plaintiff did not respond to the substance of the motion, but sought an
extension of time “to seek counsel and to find witnesses.” R. doc. 31. The
magistrate judge granted a limited extension for responding to the motion. After
the second deadline passed, plaintiff filed a request for copies of court documents
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that he had lost and sought additional time for discovery and to respond to the
summary judgment motion, citing practical difficulties relating to a prison
transfer and his segregated confinement. R. doc. 34.
The next day, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation.
The judge acknowledged defendants’ summary judgment motion, but, in light of
circuit precedent holding exhaustion to be part of a plaintiff’s pleading burden,
see Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1210-12 (10th Cir. 2003),
abrogated by Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 921-22 (2007), still treated the matter
formally as one of dismissal. Nevertheless, the judge did not merely assess the
pleadings, but considered the administrative materials submitted in support of
defendants’ motion. Noting that (1) all of plaintiff’s grievances were directed at
his medical treatment rather than the incident of March 5, 2003, and (2) the
served defendants had nothing to do with plaintiff’s medical care, 1 the judge
recommended that all federal claims against the served defendants be dismissed
for lack of exhaustion and supplemental jurisdiction be declined over any state
law claims. R. doc. 35, at 4-6. Plaintiff filed objections to the recommendation
and a (procedurally inapt) notice of appeal as well. The district court summarily
adopted the recommendation and dismissed the case. Plaintiff did not file a
second notice of appeal from the dismissal order.
1
Medical care at BCMDC was handled by a private contractor and plaintiff
did not allege that the defendant correctional officers in any way interfered with
the care he was provided by the contractor’s employees.
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Jurisdictional Complications
Defendants insist this appeal should be dismissed because plaintiff’s notice
of appeal relates to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and “appellate courts
are without power to hear appeals directly from orders of federal magistrates.”
Niehaus v. Kan. Bar Ass’n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason
Co., 911 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1990); see Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 F.3d 1217,
1222 (10th Cir. 2006). We agree that appellate review of the district court’s
disposition of the case cannot be grounded on plaintiff’s notice of appeal from the
magistrate judge’s recommendation.
But that is not the end of the matter. Other documents, if timely filed and
substantially compliant with Fed. R. App. P. 3(a), may serve as substitute notices
of appeal. See Rodgers v. Wyo. Att’y Gen., 205 F.3d 1201, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir.
2000) (collecting cases), overruled on other grounds as stated in Moore v. Marr,
254 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001). In Haney v. Addison, 175 F.3d 1217(10th Cir. 1999), this principle was applied to circumstances virtually identical to
those present here: a pro se petitioner had filed a notice of appeal from an
unfavorable magistrate judge recommendation and then, “instead of filing an
amended notice of appeal [from the district court order adopting the
recommendation], petitioner filed a pro se docketing statement with this court in
connection with his earlier appeal.” Id. at 1219. The docketing statement in the
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instant case was filed within thirty days of the district court’s order and identifies
the appellant and the district court case from which appeal is taken. The
appellees are not separately named on the statement itself, but their identities are
reflected in the attachments. While–as in Haney–the materials were filed “in
connection with [the] earlier appeal” from the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, in light of the district court’s unqualified adoption of that
recommendation there can be no realistic claim of prejudicial surprise or
uncertainty regarding the subject of this appeal. Following Haney, we look to the
docketing statement to “conclude that [plaintiff] filed a timely notice of appeal of
the district court’s final order, and therefore that we have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Haney, 175 F.3d at 1219.
One other potential jurisdictional impediment should be addressed briefly.
Ordinarily, an order resolving fewer than all claims against all defendants is not
final and hence not subject to appeal without the requisite certification under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 566, 569 (10th Cir.
1997). Here, however, the medical-care claims unresolved in the dismissal order
under review involved defendants who had not been served. “These unserved
defendants were never made parties to this lawsuit. It was not necessary for
the district court to enter an order dismissing them prior to its entry of the order
and judgment [from which appeal was taken].” Bristol v. Fibreboard Corp.,
789 F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir. 1986).
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Merits of Dismissal Order
Following the disposition of this case, the Supreme Court clarified that
exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is a matter of affirmative defense to be asserted and
substantiated by the defendant rather than a threshold pleading requirement for
the plaintiff, see Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 921, thereby abrogating the circuit precedent
for dismissal on the pleadings specifically cited by the magistrate judge. But, as
discussed above, this case was not dismissed simply because the pleadings failed
to affirmatively demonstrate exhaustion. Defendants raised lack of exhaustion as
an affirmative defense in their motion for summary judgment, submitting an
affidavit and related documentation to support the motion and giving plaintiff an
opportunity to address the issue. If the resulting evidentiary record was sufficient
to establish as a matter of law that the claims in question had not been exhausted,
dismissal would be proper under traditional summary-judgment principles, and
Jones’ rejection of special pleading requirements for exhaustion would be legally
irrelevant.
The affidavit from the BCMDC records custodian states that plaintiff “did
not file any grievance, and thus did not avail himself of and exhaust available
administrative remedies per [the attached BCMDC inmate grievance policy],
relative to the alleged incidents of excessive force that he claims were perpetrated
upon him . . . on or about March 5, 2003.” R. doc. 30, Ex. A at 2. Copies of the
forty-six grievances from plaintiff, attached to the affidavit, see id., Exs. A-02 to
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A-47, bear out that statement. Unless controverted, this showing was sufficient to
warrant dismissal of the claims against the served defendants.
In his opening brief on appeal, plaintiff insisted he could have proved
exhaustion if allowed to obtain paperwork from a lawyer he had at one time
retained to pursue this lawsuit. He later submitted a follow-up letter attaching
documents he claims satisfy the exhaustion requirement: a contingency fee
agreement to retain the aforementioned attorney; two documents, from a different
law firm, relating to an ongoing class action over conditions at BCMDC; and a
handwritten “Letter of Intent to File Civil Suit” dated October 20, 2003, which
plaintiff states he mailed to the parties in this case. Letter filed May 14, 2007,
Exs. A to D. Not one of these documents is a BCMDC grievance, see R. doc. 30,
Ex. A-01, a fact that should be clear to someone who has filed nearly fifty such
grievances.
Plaintiff also argues that he was not, in any event, required to exhaust his
administrative remedies because he had retained an attorney to file this case and
therefore did not fall within the compass of the PLRA. This is an odd argument,
in that he ultimately did file pro se. In any event, there is no qualification that a
prisoner proceed pro se, or in forma pauperis for that matter, in order to trigger
the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a); the statute unqualifiedly directs that
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner
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confined in any jail, prison, or correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff also appears to argue that the need to recover lost paperwork
provided good cause for his failure to timely respond to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The point is immaterial. The magistrate judge did not rely
on this procedural omission but resolved defendants’ motion on its legal merit.
See R. doc. 35, at 4. Moreover, as noted above, the documentation plaintiff
claims demonstrates exhaustion clearly does not–leaving defendants’ otherwise
legally conclusive evidence on the issue uncontroverted. Finally, construing
plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to oppose summary judgment as a
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), and overlooking the lack of the formal
affidavit required under that rule, see DiCesare v. Stuart, 12 F.3d 973, 979 (10th
Cir. 1993) (noting affidavit requirement and holding pro se party must follow
procedures governing Rule 56(f) motions), plaintiff’s perfunctory and generic
assertion that he “need[ed] more discovery,” R. doc. 34, fell far short of the
substantive requirements of the rule. See Comm. for the First Amendment v.
Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1523 n.7 (10tth Cir. 1992) (holding Rule 56(f) not
satisfied by “[m]erely stating that more discovery is needed”); see also Trask v.
Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing requisite substance
and specificity of Rule 56(f) affidavit). He did not specify what evidence he
could obtain that would save his claims against defendants; indeed, as noted
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above, the evidence in defendants’ possession (as well as evidence plaintiff has
submitted from other sources) affirmatively undercuts those claims.
The served defendants’ summary judgment motion seeking dismissal, on
exhaustion grounds, of all claims in which they were implicated was substantively
and procedurally valid. While the district court formally framed its disposition as
one under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), that disposition was in practical effect one under
Rule 56 and may be upheld as such in light of our authority to “affirm on any
legal ground supported by the record.” Grantham v. Ohio Cas. Co., 97 F.3d 434,
435 (10th Cir. 1996).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith. Appellant’s motion to proceed without prepayment of costs and fees is
granted. Appellant is reminded to continue make partial payments until the fee is
paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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