Colby v. Progressive Casualty Insurance , 218 F. App'x 796 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 28, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
D EA N CO LB Y,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-1301
(D.C. No. 04-cv-00761-W DM -BNB)
PROG RESSIVE CASUALTY (D . Colo.)
IN SURANCE COM PANY, an Ohio
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, BROR BY, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Dean Colby appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant Progressive Casualty Insurance Company
(Progressive). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we
affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
M r. Colby is a quadriplegic as the result of an automobile accident on
M arch 27, 1993, when he was a passenger in a vehicle owned and driven by
Thomas Sumners, Jr. M r. Sumners w as the insured under an automobile
insurance policy issued by Progressive. By operation of law, M r. Colby, as a
passenger in M r. Sumner’s vehicle with M r. Sumner’s consent, became eligible
for Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage under Progressive’s policy.
Progressive paid up to the policy limits for PIP benefits to M r. Colby, for a total
payment of $129,900, which included $50,000 in rehabilitation benefits.
W hen the limits of M r. Sumner’s policy had been exhausted, Progressive
ceased paying benefits and declined M r. Colby’s claim for additional
rehabilitation benefits beyond the $50,000 policy limits. M r. Colby then filed suit
in Colorado state court seeking a declaratory judgment that Progressive was
obligated to pay no-fault rehabilitation benefits in excess of $50,000. Although
M r. Colby was successful at the trial court level, the Colorado Court of Appeals
reversed the summary judgment entered in his favor, and the Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that Progressive was not obligated to pay further
rehabilitation benefits. See Colby v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 928 P.2d 1298,
1301-02 (Colo. 1996).
Over seven years later, in April 2004, M r. Colby filed the underlying
lawsuit in federal district court and argued for the first time that Progressive had
failed to inform M r. Sumners of his right to purchase enhanced PIP coverage
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under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-710. M r. Colby asserted the following claims for
relief: (1) declaratory relief and reformation of the insurance policy based on
alleged violations of Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-4-706, 10-4-710; (2) breach of
insurance contract; (3) statutory bad faith; and (4) breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Progressive,
concluding that M r. Colby’s claims were barred by the relevant statutes of
limitation. This appeal followed.
M r. Colby argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of Progressive because the district court made factual
determinations that should have been reserved for the jury. W e review de novo
the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard as the
district court. Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse
Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Id.Having considered the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we agree
with the district court’s determination that M r. Colby’s claims were barred by the
relevant statutes of limitation and therefore Progressive was entitled to summary
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judgment in its favor. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment for
substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its Order filed
June 30, 2006.
Entered for the Court
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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