Cunningham v. Ridge , 258 F. App'x 221 ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 7, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JAMES D. CUNNINGHAM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 07-1074
v. D. Colo.
TOM RIDGE; MICHAEL MUKASEY; (D.C. No. 04-cv-01423-WDM-BNB)
DAVID M. STONE; JAMES LOY;
RENE DHENIN; RALPH HAMBLIN;
LINDA LANGLEY; RON DEGAUS;
ELLIE VASCONEZ; STEVE
GILLMOR; THOMAS MULHERN;
MARTINA GRIGGS JOHNSON;
CAROLYN J. WILLIAMS; VELMA
WILEY,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
James D. Cunningham appeals from the dismissal of his complaint, which
alleges the Department of Homeland Security and, specifically, employees of the
Transportation Security Administration (the TSA), wrongfully terminated his
employment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The TSA hired Cunningham in October 2002 as a “full-time ‘temporary’
employee for a period not to exceed five years.” (Vol. I, Tab 1.) After working
for the TSA at Walker Field in Grand Junction, Colorado, for approximately eight
months, Cunningham failed to locate a pocket knife while screening a bag. Three
days later, he was placed on administrative leave. He submitted a written report
stating his version of events. Approximately one week later, Cunningham’s
employment was terminated because a security background check revealed he
failed to disclose he was fired from a previous job. Cunningham filed a
complaint with the Office of Special Counsel’s Merit Systems Protections Board
alleging he was wrongfully terminated for “whistleblowing.” Eventually,
Cunningham established that he was not fired from the previous job. On February
23, 2004, Cunningham was reinstated with no loss in pay or benefits but he never
reported back to work.
On May 28, 2004, the TSA terminated Cunningham’s employment for his
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failure to locate the knife and for his disrespectful and abusive behavior when this
failure was brought to his attention. Apparently, Cunningham did not seek
administrative review of the termination. Cunningham filed a pro se complaint in
federal district court claiming a violation of due process and whistle blower
protections pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). His lawsuit named fourteen defendants in their
official and individual capacities. He sent copies of the summons and complaint
by registered mail to the eight defendants located in Washington, D.C. (D.C.
Defendants) but did not effect personal service as required by Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 The remaining defendants, located in Grand
Junction (Local Defendants), were personally served at their workplace. 2
However, Cunningham delivered the complaint and summons for these defendants
(in their official capacity) to Assistant United States Attorney Craig Wallace, who
left the United States Attorney’s office shortly thereafter and was not designated
to receive service.
On October 28, 2004, Cunningham filed a motion for default judgment,
1
The D.C. Defendants were Defendants Tom Ridge, Michael Mukasey for
John Ashcroft, David M. Stone, James Loy, Carolyn Williams, Martina Griggs
Johnson, Thomas Mulhern, and Velma Wiley.
2
The Local Defendants were Defendants Ralph Hamblin, Rene Dhenin,
Ron DeGaus, Linda Langley, Ellie Vasconez, and Steve Gilmore.
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which was referred to a magistrate judge. 3 The magistrate judge held a status
conference on January 24, 2005, in which he carefully explained in detail the
shortcomings of Cunningham’s service of process to that point. The magistrate
judge reviewed the relevant rules with Cunningham and told him what he needed
to do to properly effectuate service. The magistrate judge wisely recommended
Cunningham retain a lawyer to assist with the procedural requirements and gave
Cunningham until February 28, 2005, to comply. Pending that deadline, the
magistrate judge recommended Cunningham’s default motion be denied for
failure to effect proper service on all defendants. The court agreed and denied the
motion.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The Local Defendants filed in
their individual and official capacities. The D.C. Defendants filed in their official
capacities. 4 All defendants argued Cunningham’s official capacity claims were
barred by sovereign immunity. See Dept. of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S.
255, 260 (1999). The Local Defendants also asserted Cunningham’s individual
capacity claims were pre-empted by the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
3Cunningham argues he never consented to the referral to the magistrate
judge. His argument fails to recognize the district court does not need his consent
to “designate a magistrate judge to [consider any pre-trial motion] . . . and to
submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
the disposition, by a judge of the court. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
4
The D.C. Defendants asserted no response was necessary in their
individual capacities because they had not been properly served.
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1201-1206 (the CSRA). See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443 (1988);
Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-84 (10th Cir. 1990). The magistrate
judge recommended the court dismiss all the defendants in their official capacities
based on sovereign immunity, but deny the Local Defendants’ motion in their
individual capacities because they had failed to cite to the specific CSRA
regulations at issue. At the same time, the magistrate judge ordered Cunningham
to show cause why he had not complied with the 2004 Order requiring proper
service.
Cunningham failed to respond to the order to show cause, despite being
given an extension of time to do so. On January 24, 2006, the magistrate judge
recommended all claims be dismissed against the D.C. Defendants in their
individual capacities for failure to prosecute by failing to effect service. The
district court adopted the recommendations of the magistrate judge. It dismissed
all official capacity claims based on sovereign immunity. The individual claims
against the D.C. Defendants were dismissed for failure to prosecute. It agreed the
claims against the Local Defendants in their individual capacities would remain
pending but expressly invited them to renew their motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, the Local Defendants renewed the motion to dismiss, this time
citing to the specific CSRA regulations pre-empting Cunningham’s claims. The
magistrate judge recommended the motion be granted. It further recommended
the case be dismissed in its entirety due to Cunningham’s failure to effect proper
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service. The district court agreed. It dismissed the individual claims against the
Local Defendants because Cunningham had failed to seek relief under the CSRA
and dismissed the entire case.
Cunningham appeals, claiming he complied with the requirements for
service of process. Cunningham does not address the substantive conclusions of
the district court regarding sovereign immunity and preemption of his individual
claims by the CSRA. Therefore, these issues are waived. King v. PA Consulting
Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 589 (10th Cir. 2007). As a result, the only remaining
issue in this case is whether the district court properly dismissed Cunningham’s
claims against the D.C. Defendants in their individual capacities for failure to
prosecute.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the decision to dismiss a defendant for failure of proper service
for abuse of discretion. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th
Cir. 2003). Although we liberally construe Cunningham’s pro se complaint, we
do not “assume the role of advocate.” Id. at 1187-88. Moreover, Cunningham’s
pro se status “does not excuse [his] obligation . . . to comply with the
fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure.”
Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).
Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part:
(2) (B) Service on an officer or employee of the United
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States sued in an individual capacity . . . is effected by
serving the United States in the manner prescribed by
Rule 4(i)(1) and by serving the officer or employee in
the manner prescribed by Rule 4 (e), (f), or (g).
Rule 4(e) states:
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual
from whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed, . . . may be
effected in any judicial district of the United States:
(1) pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is
located, or in which service is effected, for the service of a summons
upon the defendant in an action brought in the courts of general
jurisdiction of the State; 5 or
(2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of
the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.
Cunningham claims he filed copies of the summons and complaint by
certified mail to the D.C. Defendants, thereby effecting proper service. However,
the magistrate judge specifically informed him that merely mailing a summons
and complaint was insufficient to effect service on the D.C. Defendants in their
individual capacities. Cunningham was told he also must provide proof of
personal service under Rule 4(e). He does not argue he has done so.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
5
Rule 4(e)(1) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure also requires
personal service.
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