Dawson v. Miller , 171 F. App'x 739 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    March 22, 2006
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    DALLAS CHARLES DAWSON,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                  No. 05-6182
    (D.C. No. CIV-03-1161-T)
    DAVE MILLER,                                       (W.D. Okla.)
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    Dallas Charles Dawson appeals the denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas
    petition. Dawson was convicted in state court in Oklahoma of two counts of
    robbery after former conviction of a felony, and one count of possession of a
    firearm after former conviction of a felony. He was sentenced to thirty years for
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
    judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
    conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    each count of robbery and ten years for the possession of firearm count.
    Dawson’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal by the Oklahoma
    Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA). Dawson sought state post-conviction relief,
    which was denied at all levels.
    Dawson then filed his federal habeas petition. The magistrate judge
    conducted an evidentiary hearing and then filed a report recommending that
    habeas relief be denied. After considering Dawson’s objections to the report, the
    district court entered judgment denying relief. The district court then granted
    Dawson a certificate of appealability on Dawson’s double jeopardy claims,
    ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, and the district court’s application
    of the firm waiver rule to the remaining claims raised in the petition. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
     and 2253(a) and we affirm.
    When a state court has considered a claim on the merits, this court must
    affirm unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
    Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable
    determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
    proceeding.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1) & (2). Further, state court findings are
    presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and
    convincing evidence. 
    Id.
     § 2254(e)(1).
    -2-
    When a state court has not considered a claim on the merits, “we review the
    district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.”
    Allen v. Mullin, 
    368 F.3d 1220
    , 1234 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
    543 U.S. 1156
     (2005). We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to
    apply the firm waiver rule. See Moothart v. Bell, 
    21 F.3d 1499
    , 1504-05
    (10th Cir. 1994) (describing abuse of discretion standard); Moore v. United
    States, 
    950 F.2d 656
    , 659 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting discretionary nature of firm
    waiver rule, which “need not be applied when the interests of justice so dictate”).
    On appeal, Dawson asserts that: 1) his convictions for two counts of
    robbery violated the Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy; 2) his
    convictions for robbery with a firearm after former conviction of a felony and
    possession of a firearm after former conviction of a felony violated the
    Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy; 3) trial counsel’s deficient
    performance denied Dawson the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
    Sixth Amendment; and 4) the district court erred in applying the firm waiver rule
    to Dawson’s remaining claims.
    Our review of the appellate briefs, the record, and the applicable law, lead
    us to conclude that, for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s order
    of April 28, 2005, Dawson is not entitled to habeas relief.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    -3-
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-6182

Citation Numbers: 171 F. App'x 739

Judges: Briscoe, Kelly, Lucero

Filed Date: 3/22/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023