United States v. Dudley ( 2022 )


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  • Appellate Case: 22-1016     Document: 010110714823       Date Filed: 07/22/2022    Page: 1
    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            July 22, 2022
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                          No. 22-1016
    (D.C. No. 1:18-CR-00286-WJM-1)
    MARVIN SAKORI MALEIK DUDLEY,                                 (D. Colo.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Marvin Dudley pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon and to
    possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A)(i). As his plea agreement required, he waived the right to
    appeal. He has appealed nevertheless, and the government moves to enforce the
    appeal waiver. See United States v. Hahn, 
    359 F.3d 1315
    , 1328 (10th Cir. 2004)
    (en banc) (per curiam). Seeing no grounds to oppose the government’s motion,
    Mr. Dudley’s attorney moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    ,
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
    of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
    its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    Appellate Case: 22-1016      Document: 010110714823        Date Filed: 07/22/2022     Page: 2
    744 (1967). At our invitation, Mr. Dudley himself has responded to the
    government’s motion.1
    We will enforce an appeal waiver if (1) the appeal falls within the waiver’s
    scope, (2) the defendant waived the right to appeal knowingly and voluntarily, and
    (3) enforcing the waiver would not “result in a miscarriage of justice.” Hahn,
    
    359 F.3d at 1325
    .
    Scope of the waiver. Mr. Dudley waived the right to appeal “any matter in
    connection with this prosecution, conviction, or sentence” subject to three exceptions
    that do not apply. R. vol. 1 at 149–50. This appeal fits within the scope of the
    waiver.
    Knowing and voluntary waiver. Mr. Dudley does not dispute the
    government’s claim that he waived the right to appeal knowingly and voluntarily.
    And our own examination of the proceedings reveals no grounds to dispute the
    government’s position. See Anders, 
    386 U.S. at 744
    .
    Miscarriage of justice. Enforcing an appeal waiver will result in a miscarriage
    of justice if (1) the district court relied on an impermissible factor; (2) ineffective
    assistance of counsel in negotiating the waiver makes it invalid; (3) the sentence
    exceeds the statutory maximum; or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful, seriously
    affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Hahn,
    
    359 F.3d at 1327
    . Mr. Dudley has the burden to show that enforcing his appeal
    1
    Mr. Dudley has filed a response and a supplement to the response.
    2
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    waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Anderson,
    
    374 F.3d 955
    , 959 (10th Cir. 2004).
    Mr. Dudley argues that his waiver is otherwise unlawful because he is actually
    innocent of the § 924(c) count. In the context of a prisoner’s first habeas
    proceedings, a credible showing of actual innocence can overcome procedural default
    and the limitations period. See Fontenot v. Crow, 
    4 F.4th 982
    , 1029 (10th Cir. 2021),
    cert. denied, 
    142 S. Ct. 2777
     (2022) (citing McQuiggin v. Perkins, 
    569 U.S. 383
    , 386
    (2013)). But neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever held that actual
    innocence can overcome an appeal waiver. And even if it could, Mr. Dudley has not
    made a credible showing of actual innocence.
    The § 924(c) count alleged that Mr. Dudley possessed a firearm in furtherance
    of a drug-trafficking crime—possession of a controlled substance under 
    21 U.S.C. § 844
    (a). Simple possession qualifies as a drug-trafficking crime if it is a felony.
    See § 924(c)(2). And simple possession is a felony if the defendant has “a prior
    conviction for any drug, narcotic, or chemical offense chargeable under the law of
    any State.” § 844(a); see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3559
    (a).
    In his plea agreement, Mr. Dudley stipulated that he had four prior Colorado
    controlled-substance convictions and that any one of them made simple possession a
    felony that could serve as the predicate for the § 924(c) count. Now, though, he says
    one of his prior convictions does not qualify as a “drug, narcotic, or chemical
    offense” under § 844(c). As a result, he concludes, simple possession was not a
    felony for him, and he is innocent of the § 924(c) count.
    3
    Appellate Case: 22-1016     Document: 010110714823       Date Filed: 07/22/2022      Page: 4
    Mr. Dudley’s argument does not suggest his innocence. He stipulated that he
    had four prior convictions, each of them sufficient to make simple possession a
    felony. So it does not matter if one of them does not in fact qualify as a “drug,
    narcotic, or chemical offense.” That would still leave him, by his own stipulation,
    with three prior convictions that each made simple possession a felony.
    Mr. Dudley also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
    dismiss and that the district court showed animus toward him at sentencing. These
    arguments allege error in Mr. Dudley’s conviction and sentence, not in the appeal
    waiver itself. So to the extent Mr. Dudley contends those errors make his waiver
    otherwise unlawful, he is mistaken: “An appeal waiver is not ‘unlawful’ merely
    because the claimed error would, in the absence of waiver, be appealable.” United
    States v. Sandoval, 
    477 F.3d 1204
    , 1208 (10th Cir. 2007).
    In sum, Mr. Dudley has not shown that enforcing his appeal waiver will result
    in a miscarriage of justice.
    *      *      *
    We grant the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver. We grant
    defense counsel’s motion to withdraw. We deny Mr. Dudley’s request to appoint
    different counsel to represent him. We dismiss this appeal.
    Entered for the Court
    Per Curiam
    4