Roberts v. Paulson , 263 F. App'x 745 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    February 5, 2008
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    JIMMY ROBERTS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                  No. 07-4087
    (D.C. No. 1:06-CV-75-DB)
    HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., *                             (D. Utah)
    Secretary, United States Treasury;
    BECKY MILES, Management
    Official; ROBYN JACKSON,
    Management Official, Internal
    Revenue Service,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
    Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    *
    On July 10, 2006, Henry M. Paulson, Jr. became the Secretary for the
    United States Treasury. In accordance with Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of
    Appellate Procedure, Mr. Paulson is substituted for John W. Snow as an appellee
    in this action.
    **
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
    with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    After his termination from his employment with the Internal Revenue
    Service (IRS), plaintiff appellant Jimmy Roberts sued in federal district court
    alleging various violations of federal law. In response to defendants’ motion to
    dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the district court
    dismissed the case “[f]or the reasons set forth in the Defendants’ briefs,” and
    denied Mr. Roberts’s motion for a default judgment. R. Doc. 24 (District Court
    Order) at 1. Mr. Roberts appeals, and we affirm. 1
    Our jurisdiction arises under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review a dismissal
    under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. U.S. West, Inc. v. Tristani,
    
    182 F.3d 1202
    , 1206 (10th Cir. 1999) (reviewing Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal);
    Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 
    493 F.3d 1210
    , 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (reviewing
    Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). Particularly with respect to Rule 12(b)(6), “[w]e must
    accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe
    them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We look for plausibility in th[e]
    complaint.” 
    Id.
     (quotations and citations omitted).
    1
    Defendants assert that Mr. Roberts did not appeal from the dismissal of his
    claims under the Privacy Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Answer
    at 2. We find no support for this statement in the record. The district court’s
    order dismissed all of Mr. Roberts’s claims and denied all of his outstanding
    motions. Mr. Roberts filed a timely notice of appeal from the entirety of that
    order. There is no indication that he intended to forego appealing the dismissal of
    his Privacy Act and FTCA claims or that he has actually done so.
    -2-
    Prohibited Personnel Practices Claims
    Mr. Roberts acknowledges, and his thirty-two-issue complaint
    demonstrates, 2 that the bulk of his claims accused defendants of various
    prohibited personnel practices as defined in the Civil Service Reform Act
    
    5 U.S.C. § 1101
     (CSRA). See Aplt. Opening Br. at 4; R. Doc. 1 (Complaint) at
    18-27. As such, those complaints are preempted by the CSRA and may not be
    brought in federal court. Petrini v. Howard, 
    918 F.2d 1482
    , 1485 (10th Cir.
    1990).
    Contrary to Mr. Roberts’s apparent belief, the fact that the Office of
    Special Counsel (OSC) declined to petition the Merit Systems Protection Board
    (Board) for consideration of his complaint, does not mean that federal courts then
    acquired jurisdiction. “[A]ll review ended when [the OSC] declined to petition
    the Board for consideration of the grievance.” Stephens v. Dep’t of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    901 F.2d 1571
    , 1574 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing 
    5 U.S.C. § 1214
    ).
    Because Mr. Roberts did not assert a claim under the Tucker Act, his reliance on
    Worthington v. United States, 
    168 F.3d 24
    , 27 (Fed. Cir. 1999), is misplaced.
    2
    Mr. Roberts lists forty issues in his opening appellate brief. We will
    review on appeal only those issues presented to the district court; the remaining
    eight issues are waived. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 
    928 F.2d 966
    , 970
    (10th Cir. 1991).
    -3-
    Privacy Act
    Mr. Roberts’s claims under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, are based on
    the same general occurrences that he claims constituted prohibited personnel
    practices. “[T]he Privacy Act does not vest the court with jurisdiction to review
    personnel decisions where the Civil Service Reform Act precludes such review.”
    Henderson v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    908 F.2d 559
    , 560-61 (10th Cir. 1990).
    Federal Tort Claims Act
    To the extent Mr. Roberts made claims which would only be cognizable
    under the FTCA, he has not demonstrated that he presented his tort claims in the
    first instance to the IRS as required by 
    28 U.S.C. § 2675
    (a). He has therefore
    failed to exhaust his remedies under the statute, thus depriving the federal court
    of jurisdiction over these claims. Kendall v. Watkins, 
    998 F.2d 848
    , 852
    (10th Cir. 1993).
    Freedom of Information Act
    As with his tort claims, Mr. Roberts has failed to demonstrate that he has
    exhausted his remedies under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) because he
    did not allege that he complied with the notice requirements of 
    26 C.F.R. § 601.702
    (c)(4)(i)(C). The district court thus properly dismissed the FOIA claim.
    See Taylor v. Appleton, 
    30 F.3d 1365
    , 1367 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that “[t]he
    FOIA clearly requires a party to exhaust all administrative remedies before
    seeking redress in the federal courts” and collecting cases).
    -4-
    Refusal to Grant Default Judgment
    Mr. Roberts argues that the district court should have granted him a default
    judgment based on defendants’ failure to file a timely answer. We review the
    district court’s refusal to grant a default judgment for abuse of discretion. Dennis
    Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int’l Corp., 
    115 F.3d 767
    , 771 (10th Cir.
    1997). “In light of the strong preference for the disposition of litigation on the
    merits, and the lack of any allegation of prejudice to [Mr. Roberts], the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying [Mr. Roberts’s] motion for default
    judgment.” Gulley v. Orr, 
    905 F.2d 1383
    , 1386 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation
    omitted).
    Because he has not presented “a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the
    law and the facts in support of the issues raised on appeal,” see DeBardeleben v.
    Quinlan, 
    937 F.2d 502
    , 505 (10th Cir. 1991), Mr. Roberts’s motion to proceed
    without prepayment of costs or fees is DENIED, and Mr. Roberts is obligated to
    pay the remainder of the filing fee. Mr. Roberts’s amended motions to strike
    appellees’ answer brief and to strike their motion for extension of time to file that
    brief are DENIED.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
    -5-