Allen v. Zavaras , 430 F. App'x 709 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 18, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
EDWARD ALLEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 11-1020
v. (D.C. No. 08-CV-02506-ZLW-BNB)
(D. Colo.)
ARISTEDES ZAVARAS; J.
HASSENFRITZ; MS. GRAHAM;
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-Appellant Edward Allen, a state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals
from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in part and dismissal in part
of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint against various correctional
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
facilities and their officials. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
Background
Mr. Allen, a convicted sex offender, has been incarcerated since May 14,
2004. R. 8. On April 29, 2008 Mr. Allen was transferred to the Kit Carson
Correctional Center (“KCCC”), as ordered by Defendant Aristedes Zavaras, the
Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections (“DOC”). Id. at 9.
KCCC is a private facility operated by Corrections Corporation of America
(“CCA”). On May 6, 2008, Mr. Allen was moved to the “Echo B Unit” of KCCC
with another inmate, also a sex offender. Id. Some time after he was moved to
the “Echo B Unit,” two gang member inmates approached Mr. Allen and his
cellmate, demanding that they pay rent because they were sex offenders. Id. Mr.
Allen and his cellmate refused to pay, and the gang members assaulted them. Id.Mr. Allen did not suffer any injury, but his cellmate suffered sore ribs. Id. Mr.
Allen informed Defendant James Hassenfritz, the Unit Manager, and Mr.
Hassenfritz showed Mr. Allen pictures of inmates to help Mr. Allen identify the
assailants. Id. Mr. Allen and his cellmate were moved to “Echo A Unit” on May
13, 2008. Id.On September 10, 2008, Mr. Allen was approached by another gang
member in the kitchen bakery area where they both worked. Id. The gang
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member told Mr. Allen to quit his job because he did not want to work with a sex
offender, and then physically assaulted Mr. Allen. Id. Mr. Allen suffered a cut
on his hand. Id. Defendant Graham, the kitchen supervisor, moved the gang
member to another department in the kitchen. Id. 10.
On October 29, 2008, another gang member—acting on orders from another
inmate—attacked Mr. Allen, causing a cut above Mr. Allen’s right eye, a black
eye, a cut inside his mouth, and a swollen temple, cheek, and lip. Id. One or two
days after the assault, the inmate who ordered the assault was moved out of Mr.
Allen’s unit, but the assailant remained in the same unit. Id.Mr. Allen filed his civil rights complaint on November 10, 2008, asserting
two claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, each alleging Eighth
Amendment violations. Id. at 11-14. In claim one, Mr. Allen alleged that Mr.
Hassenfritz, Ms. Graham, and the CCA violated his Eighth Amendment rights
because they were deliberately indifferent to his safety. Id. at 11-12. In claim
two, he alleged that Mr. Zavaras and the DOC (“DOC Defendants”) violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by instituting a policy of placing sex offenders with
gang members. Id. at 13-14. He sued the individual defendants in their
individual capacities for nominal, emotional, and punitive damages and sought
injunctive relief against the DOC. Id. at 8. He initially sought injunctive relief
against CCA, but later disclaimed any intent to seek such relief. Id. at 76.
Defendants Hassenfritz and the CCA jointly filed a motion to dismiss
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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. at 41. Defendants Zavaras and the DOC
filed a separate motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). Id. at 17.
On November 12, 2009, the magistrate judge recommended granting the
CCA’s and Mr. Hassenfritz’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and
dismissing the claim against Ms. Graham, who is not employed by the CCA and
was apparently never served with a complaint, as legally frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Allen v. Zavaras, No. 08-cv-02506-ZLW-BNB, 2009 WL
6633305, at *6-*7 (D. Colo. Nov. 12, 2009). The magistrate also recommended
granting the DOC Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the DOC because
of Eleventh Amendment immunity, but denying it with respect to Mr. Zavaras.
Id. at *3-*6. The district court adopted these recommendations in full on June 28,
2010. Allen v. Zavaras, No. 08-cv-02506-ZLW-BNB, 2010 WL 2640198 (D.
Colo. June 28, 2010).
Mr. Allen and Mr. Zavaras then filed cross motions for summary judgment.
R. 79, 85. On November 2, 2010, the magistrate recommended that Mr. Zavaras’s
motion be granted and Mr. Allen’s motion be denied, and the district court
adopted these recommendations on December 1, 2010. Allen v. Zavaras, No. 08-
cv-02506-ZLW-BNB, 2010 WL 4977834 (D. Colo. Nov. 2, 2010); R. 152. Final
judgment in favor of all Defendants was entered on December 3, 2010. R. 154.
Mr. Allen timely appealed, alleging the same arguments.
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Discussion
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
imposes a duty on prison officials to protect inmates from violence at the hands of
other prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To establish an
Eighth Amendment violation based on an official’s failure to protect, the inmate
must show that (1) the alleged deprivation is objectively, “sufficiently serious,”
meaning the inmate “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm” and (2) the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference,”
meaning the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate’s
safety. Id. at 834, 837; Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1236 (10th Cir. 2008).
Prison officials cannot be held liable, however, where they know of a risk to
inmate safety and respond reasonably to it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
In addition, to establish liability of a prison official under § 1983, the
inmate must prove “an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by
a particular person ‘under color of state law’ and the constitutional deprivation.”
Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 922 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). “The relevant inquiry is whether an official’s acts or
omissions were the cause—not merely a contributing factor—of the
constitutionally infirm condition.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
With these principles in mind, we turn to Mr. Allen’s claims against each
Defendant.
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A. Defendants CCA and Mr. Hassenfritz
We review a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Gallagher v.
Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss,
the complaint must allege facts that state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face; conclusory allegations alone are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009).
The only factual allegation Mr. Allen has made regarding Mr. Hassenfritz’s
knowledge of the assaults is that after the attack in the Echo B Unit, he told Mr.
Hassenfritz, the unit manager, about the attack, and Mr. Hassenfritz helped Mr.
Allen identify the assailants. R. 11. Mr. Allen was subsequently moved to a
different unit, without any other attacks in Mr. Hassenfritz’s unit. Id. Thus, even
assuming Mr. Allen was exposed to a sufficiently serious risk of harm, Mr.
Hassenfritz cannot be held liable on these factual allegations because he
responded reasonably to that risk by moving Mr. Allen to a different location.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
With regard to the CCA, Mr. Allen makes the conclusory allegation that the
action or inaction of the CCA staff violated his Eighth Amendment rights. R. 12.
A private defendant such as the CCA, can be liable under § 1983, see Dubbs v.
Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003), 1 but dismissal is
1
See also Smedley v. Correction Corp. of Am., 175 F. App’x 943, 946
(10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (CCA can be liable pursuant to § 1983 under
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
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appropriate where, as here, the plaintiff has failed to adequately allege an
underlying constitutional violation by one of its employees. See Graves v.
Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006).
B. Defendant Graham
The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss the
claim against Ms. Graham as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. R. 153. “[T]his
court has not yet determined whether a dismissal pursuant to § 1915A on the
ground that the complaint is legally frivolous is reviewed de novo or for abuse of
discretion,” Plunk v. Graves, 234 F.3d 1128, 1130 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted), but we need not resolve that question because we find no reversible
error under either standard.
A complaint is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The only factual allegation Mr.
Allen has made regarding Ms. Graham’s knowledge of the assaults is that after he
was assaulted in the kitchen, Ms. Graham, the kitchen supervisor, moved the
assailant to another department in the kitchen. R. 9-10. Mr. Allen was not
assaulted again in the kitchen. Assuming Mr. Allen was exposed to a sufficiently
serious risk of harm, Ms. Graham cannot be held liable because she responded
reasonably to that risk by moving the assailant to a different location. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
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C. Defendant DOC
We review de novo the decision to dismiss a claim based on Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir.
2002). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to states and state agencies
deemed “arms of the state” that have not waived their immunity, regardless of the
relief sought. Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1252-53
(10th Cir. 2007). The district court was correct in dismissing the claim against
the DOC for injunctive relief because, as we have previously held, the DOC is an
agency of Colorado that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Griess
v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 1988).
D. Defendant Zavaras
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, but
because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Zavaras
based on qualified immunity, our summary judgment standards are subject to a
somewhat different analysis from other summary judgment rulings. Toevs v. Reid
--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2437782, at *3 (10th Cir. June 20, 2011). “[T]o avoid
judgment for the defendant based on qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant’s actions violated a specific statutory or constitutional right,
and that the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated
were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.” Id. (quotation marks
and citations omitted). “We may address these questions in whatever order is
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appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted).
Mr. Allen argues that Mr. Zavaras has a policy of exposing sex offenders to
violence by placing them with gang members who target sex offenders. We
recently held that a plaintiff may succeed in a § 1983 suit against a defendant
supervisor by showing “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or
possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the
complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required
to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614
F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks, citation, and footnote
omitted), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2150 (2011). We conclude that Mr. Allen has
failed to show that Mr. Zavaras acted with deliberate indifference, the state of
mind required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.
Mr. Allen argues that Mr. Zavaras knows that Mr. Allen has been targeted
by gang members, yet he has failed to present evidence that Mr. Zavaras had
actual knowledge of the alleged risk to his safety, as required for a showing of
deliberate indifference. See Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916 (“An official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk of which he was unaware, no matter how obvious the
risk or how gross his negligence in failing to perceive it, is not an infliction of
punishment and therefore not a constitutional violation.”). In addition, he claims
that he was told that if he became “sex offender compliant,” then he would be
moved to a sex offender pod. R. 118-19. While troubling, he admitted that the
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statement was not made by Mr. Zavaras, and he has not shown that Mr. Zavaras
had actual knowledge of this statement. Id.We recognize that
if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a
substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive,
well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and
the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had
been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have
known about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier
of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the
risk.
Howard, 534 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43). But Mr. Allen
has not shown that Mr. Zavaras has been exposed to any information regarding
his condition; therefore Mr. Zavaras is entitled to qualified immunity.
Mr. Allen claims that Mr. Zavaras cannot be entitled to qualified immunity
because he is being sued in his official capacity for injunctive relief. See Beedle
v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1069 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A qualified immunity defense
is only available to parties sued in their individual capacity.” (citation omitted)).
In his complaint, however, Mr. Allen stated that he was suing Mr. Zavaras in his
individual capacity for nominal, punitive, and emotional damages. See R. 8. In
any event, summary judgment in favor of Mr. Zavaras was proper because Mr.
Allen has failed to show that Mr. Zavaras acted with deliberate indifference. See
Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants, including prison officials in their
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official capacities, where plaintiff failed to show deliberate indifference).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Allen’s claims
against Defendants Hassenfritz, Graham, the CCA, and the DOC and its grant of
summary judgment in favor of Defendant Zavaras. All other requests for relief
are denied. We grant IFP status and remind Mr. Allen of his obligation to make
partial payments until the filing fee is paid.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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