Nadal v. Federal Aviation Administration , 281 F. App'x 814 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 13, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
CHRISTIAN GILBERT TONY
NADAL,
Petitioner, No. 08-9520
v. (F.A.A. No. SE-17205)
FEDERAL AVIATION (N.T.S.B.)
ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner appeals a National Transportation Safety Board order affirming
the sixty-day suspension of his pilot certificate for crossing a runway in violation
of air traffic control instructions to “hold short.” Petitioner argues that the NTSB
erred in affirming certain evidentiary and procedural rulings made by the
administrative law judge. Petitioner further argues that the NTSB erred in failing
to grant his petition for reconsideration, which raised several new claims of error
in the ALJ’s rulings.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
We review NTSB decisions to determine whether they were “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
Hernandez v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 15 F.3d 157, 158 (10th Cir. 1994); see 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2000). “[T]he ultimate standard of review is a narrow one,” and we
are not empowered to substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
First, Petitioner argues that the ALJ erred in refusing to admit documents
describing the frequency of runway incursions at the runway that Petitioner
crossed in violation of air traffic control instructions. The ALJ concluded that
these documents were not relevant to whether this particular incursion occurred.
In affirming this ruling, the NTSB concluded that these documents would not
have changed the outcome of the case in any event because they did not show that
Petitioner had not violated air traffic control instructions, nor did they excuse his
runway incursion. We see nothing arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unsupported
by the law in this ruling. Although Petitioner argues that the frequency of other
incursions at this location suggests that contributory factors may have been at
play, we note that Petitioner never testified as to any confusion regarding, for
instance, the runway layout or the signs marking the intersection. We conclude
that the ALJ did not err in refusing to admit these documents.
Second, Petitioner argues that the ALJ erroneously excluded two FAA
witnesses from the sequestration order at the evidentiary hearing. As an initial
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matter, we note that the ALJ in fact allowed only one FAA witness to remain at
the hearing, and then only during Petitioner’s expert witness’ testimony. This
FAA witness only provided expert testimony in rebuttal to Petitioner’s expert, and
the ALJ partially excluded him from the sequestration order because Petitioner
had disclosed the identity of his expert witness after the deadline for such
disclosures and had not disclosed what his expert would testify to. In affirming
this ruling by the ALJ, the NTSB noted the broad discretion given to ALJs in such
matters. The NTSB further concluded that the ALJ’s ruling had not altered the
outcome of the case. Again, we see nothing arbitrary or capricious in this
decision.
Third, Petitioner argues that the ALJ erred in admitting a statement made
by Petitioner’s co-pilot to an FAA inspector. According to this statement, the co-
pilot “indicated that while [Petitioner’s plane] was crossing [the runway] without
authorization, she questioned the Captain[’]s actions. She later said, she wished
she would have spoken[] up sooner and prevented the incident from occurring.”
(R. at 346.) Petitioner argues that this evidence was irrelevant and constituted
unreliable hearsay. We agree with the NTSB that this evidence was relevant
because it tends to corroborate that Petitioner operated his aircraft contrary to an
air traffic control instruction. As to Petitioner’s hearsay objection, we note that
hearsay evidence is generally admissible in an administrative proceeding, see
Adm’r v. Howell, 1 N.T.S.B. 943, 944 n.10 (1970); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d
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145, 148 (9th Cir. 1980), and we see nothing in the record that seriously calls into
question the reliability of this evidence.
Fourth, Petitioner argues that the ALJ improperly allowed an incomplete
hypothetical to be posed to Petitioner’s expert on cross examination.
Specifically, as clarified by the ALJ, this question asked the expert what air
traffic controllers would expect a pilot to do if he were unable to comply with an
instruction. Without considering whether there was any error in the posing of this
hypothetical to the expert, the NTSB simply concluded that Petitioner had not
shown prejudicial error given the overwhelming evidence that Petitioner
committed the runway incursion. We see nothing arbitrary or capricious in this
decision. Moreover, in light of the expert’s previous testimony, we see no error
in the ALJ’s decision to allow this hypothetical.
Petitioner next argues that the NTSB erred in dismissing as untimely his
petition for reconsideration. A petition for rehearing or reconsideration before an
administrative agency is addressed to that agency’s own discretion. See United
States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 535 (1946). “Denial of such a
petition should be overturned [on judicial review] only upon a showing of the
clearest abuse of discretion.” Duval Corp. v. Donovan, 650 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th
Cir. 1981); see Pierce, 327 U.S. at 535. We conclude that the NTSB did not
clearly abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s request for an extension of
time and dismissing as untimely his late-filed petition for reconsideration. We
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therefore do not address the substantive issues raised for the first time in
Petitioner’s untimely petition for reconsideration.
Finally, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at the evidentiary hearing before the ALJ. Ineffective assistance of counsel is not
normally a ground for relief in a civil case. See MacCuish v. United States, 844
F.2d 733, 735-36 (10th Cir. 1988). “[T]he only context in which courts have
recognized a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in civil
litigation is in immigration cases,” Nelson v. Boeing, 446 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th
Cir. 2006). We see no reason to extend this right to FAA certification
proceedings.
We therefore AFFIRM the NTSB’s affirmance of the suspension of
Petitioner’s pilot certificate.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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