Armijo v. Tapia , 288 F. App'x 530 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 6, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
ANTHONY T. ARMIJO,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 08-2095
v. (D. New Mexico)
GEORGE TAPIA, Warden; THE (1:07-cv-01066-JCH-WPL)
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Anthony T. Armijo, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Mr. Armijo
has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we deny his application for a COA and dismiss this
matter.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2002, Mr. Armijo abducted his girlfriend, took her to his
apartment, and barricaded the door. Several hours later, police broke into the
apartment, where they found Mr. Armijo and his girlfriend, who had sustained
several lacerations. A bloody knife lay near his bed. Mr. Armijo was
subsequently charged with several crimes relating to the incident.
In the months leading up to his trial, Mr. Armijo, through counsel, filed a
motion for discovery, in which he requested several items, including the results of
any DNA analysis on the knife found in his apartment. When the trial court
conducted a discovery hearing, the prosecution informed the court that no
analysis could be undertaken because the state did not have a DNA sample to
match against the blood found on the knife. Mr. Armijo indicated that he would
be willing to provide a blood sample. Rather than expressly ordering DNA
testing, the court suggested that the parties arrange for Mr. Armijo to give a
sample as soon as possible. However, Mr. Armijo never provided a blood sample,
and the state never performed the DNA testing.
Prior to voir dire, Mr. Armijo’s attorney reminded the court that Mr.
Armijo had requested that the state perform DNA analysis. He informed the court
that Mr. Armijo’s theory of the case was that the blood on the knife was his, and
not his girlfriend’s, and he believed a DNA test showing that his blood was on the
knife would provide critical support for his theory. Through counsel, Mr. Armijo
requested a continuance so that the state could perform DNA analysis. The court
denied the request.
During the trial, the court granted a motion for Mr. Armijo’s attorney to
withdraw. Mr. Armijo had filed a disciplinary complaint against the attorney and,
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according to the attorney, was not cooperative in preparation for trial. Prior to
trial, Mr. Armijo had repeatedly expressed a desire to represent himself, and at
times the court had permitted him to do so, as several court-appointed attorneys
withdrew in light of conflicts with him. Proceeding pro se, Mr. Armijo argued to
the jury that his blood, and not his girlfriend’s, was on the knife. One witness for
the prosecution, a detective, testified that Mr. Armijo could have obtained DNA
analysis without the aid of the prosecution. In closing, the prosecution argued
against Mr. Armijo’s theory of the case by reminding the jury that Mr. Armijo
could have secured DNA analysis without the state’s assistance, but had not done
so.
The jury found Mr. Armijo guilty of several crimes including kidnaping,
attempted criminal sexual penetration, and aggravated battery, and the state
district court sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. After unsuccessfully
appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals of the State of New Mexico
(CANM), Mr. Armijo timely filed for state post conviction relief. In his state
habeas petition, Mr. Armijo raised several claims. Relevant to this matter, he
contended that the district court erred in refusing to require the prosecution to
conduct DNA analysis of the blood on the knife found near his bed. Mr. Armijo
also alleged prosecutorial misconduct, contending that prosecutors defied a court
order by failing to arrange for DNA analysis and then compounded the
misconduct by suggesting to the jury during closing arguments that his theory of
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the case was not credible, in part because he had failed to secure DNA analysis on
his own. The CANM denied Mr. Armijo’s petition.
Mr. Armijo then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the district court, Mr. Armijo argued that his right to
due process under the United States Constitution was violated by the
prosecution’s failure to conduct DNA testing. In particular, he urged that under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the government was obligated to conduct
the analysis and disclose the results to him prior to trial. Additionally, he
reiterated his prior claims of prosecutorial misconduct. In accordance with the
recommendation of a magistrate judge, who determined that Mr. Armijo’s claim
“lack[ed] merit,” Rec. doc. 26, at 1, the district court dismissed Mr. Armijo’s
petition with prejudice. Mr. Armijo then sought a COA, which the district court
denied.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Armijo seeks a COA with respect to three issues. He contends that (1)
the state’s failure to assist him in performing DNA testing amounted to a Brady
violation as well as (2) a violation of his right to compulsory process under the
Sixth Amendment. He urges that (3) state prosecutors committed misconduct in
violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing
to help him obtain DNA analysis and then suggesting to the jury that the
responsibility to perform testing was his, and not theirs.
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Mr. Armijo must obtain a COA in order to challenge the district court’s
dismissal of his habeas petition. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36
(2003). As he is proceeding pro se, we have construed Mr. Armijo’s pleadings
liberally. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2004). He is not
entitled to a COA, however, unless he can make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Specifically, Mr.
Armijo must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[A] claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after
the COA has been granted and the case has received full consideration, that [the]
petitioner will not prevail.” Id. at 338.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs our
consideration of the merits of Mr. Armijo’s claims. Under AEDPA, a federal
court may grant habeas relief if (1) the state court adjudication “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or (2) the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). Under AEDPA, a state
court decision is not contrary to clearly established federal law unless “most
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reasonable jurists exercising their independent judgment would conclude that the
state court misapplied Supreme Court law.” Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665,
671 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 1819 (2007). Implicit in this
observation is the axiom that a principle of federal law may not provide a basis
for habeas relief under § 2254 unless it was “clearly established by the Supreme
Court at the time of the state court judgment.” Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d
1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004). Moreover, federal courts presume that factual
findings of the state court are correct. This presumption may be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence from the petitioner. House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d
1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 2008).
In light of these AEDPA standards, Mr. Armijo is not entitled to a COA
unless he can demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether the
CANM’s decision was “at such tension with governing U.S. Supreme Court
precedents, or so inadequately supported by the record, or so arbitrary as to be
unreasonable.” Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671 (quoting Badelle v. Correll, 452 F.3d
648, 655 (7th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For substantially
the same reasons as the district court, which adopted the thorough
recommendation of the magistrate judge in this case, we conclude that Mr. Armijo
has not met this burden with respect to any of his claims.
1. Brady
Mr. Armijo’s Brady argument relies on the incorrect assumption that the
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state had an obligation under the Constitution to provide DNA analysis. As the
well-reasoned recommendation of the magistrate judge observed, the Supreme
Court has explained that “the police do not have a constitutional duty to perform
any particular tests.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988); see Rec.
doc. 26, at 8 (Magistrate’s Recommendation). Under Brady and its progeny, a
due process violation occurs when “(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2)
the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) the evidence was material.”
United States v. Velarde, 485 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The constitutional duty of prosecutors to disclose evidence to the
accused extends to material exculpatory evidence in the hands of police and other
government investigators. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995).
However, the Brady line of cases does not stand for the proposition that the
prosecution must perform any forensic tests that may inure to the benefit of the
accused. See United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir. 1990)
(“Brady . . . does not place any burden upon the Government to conduct a
defendant’s investigation or assist in the presentation of the defense’s case.”).
Thus, under Supreme Court caselaw the state was under no obligation to provide
DNA testing to Mr. Armijo.
2. Compulsory Process
Mr. Armijo argues that the district court ignored his “obvious 6th
amendment [sic] claim,” Aplt’s Br. at 4, and urges that we grant a COA with
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respect to that claim. Specifically, he contends that the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .
. to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,” U.S. C ONST .
amend. VI, obligated the state to provide DNA testing for his defense because
“DNA testing could have been tantamount to [an] eyewitness.” Aplt’s Br. at 3.
To begin with, we do not agree with Mr. Armijo’s contention that he raised this
argument before the district court and, therefore, we need not consider his
argument here. See United States v. Windrix, 405 F.3d 1146, 1156 (10th Cir.
2005) (observing that, as a general rule, we will not consider an argument not
raised below). Moreover, Mr. Armijo cites no authority in support of his Sixth
Amendment claim, and we have found none. Thus, the Sixth Amendment’s
Compulsory Process clause does not afford a basis for habeas relief in this case.
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Finally, Mr. Armijo’s prosecutorial misconduct claim hinges on a factual
assertion that was not accepted by the CANM or the district court: that the
prosecution defied a court order by failing to provide DNA analysis. Rather than
embracing this claim, the CANM explicitly assumed that the trial court had
“fail[ed] to order the State to conduct DNA testing.” Rec. doc. 1-2, at 10.
Similarly, the magistrate judge’s recommendation observed, “It is not clear that
the trial judge actually ordered the prosecution to conduct the DNA analysis.”
Rec. doc. 26, at 9. After reviewing of the transcripts of relevant proceedings, we
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conclude that, at most, the trial judge suggested that the prosecution assist Mr.
Armijo in collecting a DNA sample that might be used for testing. Because Mr.
Armijo has not demonstrated that the trial court ordered testing, he cannot show
that prosecutors defied a court order by failing to provide it. More importantly,
Mr. Armijo has made no effort to demonstrate that any alleged misconduct,
including the prosecution’s comments in closing, “so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly
v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (explaining the circumstances under
which prosecutorial misconduct may violate a defendant’s due process rights and
serve as grounds for habeas relief). As such, Mr. Armijo has not demonstrated
that reasonable jurists would debate whether his prosecutorial misconduct claim
could be grounds for habeas relief.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Armijo’s application for a COA and DISMISS
this matter.
Entered for the Court,
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
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