United States v. Jenkins , 535 F. App'x 720 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    October 8, 2013
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    TENTH CIRCUIT                    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    No. 12-6289
    v.                                            (D.C. No. 5:12-CR-00118-HE-1)
    (W.D. Okla.)
    STEVEN DEWAYNE JENKINS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, KELLY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. **
    Defendant-Appellant Steven Jenkins appeals from his sentence after
    pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). Our jurisdiction arises under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a). We affirm.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    **
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
    panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Mr. Jenkins had four prior convictions for serious drug offenses and was
    sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment and four years’ supervised release under
    the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1). He argues that
    his sentence violates Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual
    punishment. In support, he claims the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the
    offense because he possessed the firearm only after being robbed at gunpoint
    approximately a month earlier. Additionally, he relies on remarks by the district
    court that the mandatory 15-year sentence may have been unduly harsh under the
    circumstances.
    “The Eighth Amendment contains a narrow proportionality principle that
    applies to noncapital sentences.” United States v. Yeley-Davis, 
    632 F.3d 673
    , 682
    (10th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 2172
     (2011) (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted). It prohibits grossly disproportionate sentences in relation
    to the crime, though successful challenges on this basis are rare. Id.; see also
    Ewing v. California, 
    538 U.S. 11
    , 21 (2003). Usually a sentence within statutory
    limits will not be deemed either excessive or cruel and unusual punishment.
    United States v. Gillespie, 
    452 F.3d 1183
    , 1190 (10th Cir. 2006).
    Mr. Jenkins’ argument is foreclosed; this circuit and every other addressing
    the ACCA’s sentencing requirements have upheld them as constitutional under
    the proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., United States
    v. Angelos, 
    433 F.3d 738
    , 750-53 (10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
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    Nigg, 
    667 F.3d 929
    , 931, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 2704
    (2012); United States v. Whaley, 
    552 F.3d 904
    , 907 (8th Cir. 2009); United States
    v. Helm, 
    502 F.3d 366
    , 368-69 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gamble, 
    388 F.3d 74
    , 77 (2nd Cir. 2004); United States v. Reynolds, 
    215 F.3d 1210
    , 1214 (11th Cir.
    2000); United States v. Bonat, 
    106 F.3d 1472
    , 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1997); United
    States v. Presley, 
    52 F.3d 64
    , 68 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Warren, 
    973 F.2d 1304
    , 1311 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gilliard, 
    847 F.2d 21
    , 27 (1st
    Cir. 1988).
    The minimum sentence imposed by § 924(e)(1) does not take into account
    the motive for possessing a gun. See Reynolds, 215 F.3d at 1214. This is
    understandable: the purpose of the sentencing statute is to curb and incapacitate
    armed, career criminals with a minimum of three prior violent felony or serious
    drug offense convictions. See United States v. Orona, 
    724 F.3d 1297
    , 1309 (10th
    Cir. 2013); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 
    445 U.S. 263
    , 285 (1980) (noting that
    punishment for recidivism is a matter “largely within the discretion of the
    punishing jurisdiction”). In this case, Mr. Jenkins does not dispute his four prior
    convictions for serious drug offenses that subject him to the 15-year statutory
    minimum. Although the district court noted that a lesser sentence may have been
    -3-
    more appropriate, its remark does not render the sentence unconstitutional.
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
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